Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Dissertations

Theses and Dissertations

1994

Due process rights for private school students : philosophical,
legal and educational bases
Harley. Rabinowitz
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss
Part of the Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Rabinowitz, Harley., "Due process rights for private school students : philosophical, legal and educational
bases" (1994). Dissertations. 3011.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/3011

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more
information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1994 Harley. Rabinowitz

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

DUE PROCESS RIGHTS FOR PRIVATE SCHOOL STUDENTS:
PHILOSOPHICAL, LEGAL AND EDUCATIONAL BASES

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE SCHOOL OF EDUCATION
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATIONAL LEADERSHIP AND POLICY STUDIES

BY
HARLEY RABINOWITZ

CHICAGO,

ILLINOIS

JANUARY 1994

Loyola University Chicago
DUE PROCESS RIGHTS FOR PRIVATE SCHOOL STUDENTS:
PHILOSOPHICAL, LEGAL AND EDUCATIONAL BASES
This study identified constitutional principles that
make the right of "due process" applicable to non-public
elementary and secondary school students.

Relevant court

cases and judicial opinion, in addition to scholarly
writings, were reviewed to determine the relevance of these
principles to the non-public school student.

A legal

argument was constructed to show that the constitutional
right to the "due process of law" applied to non-public
school students as well.
The constitutional right to the "due process of law" is
based on a guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.

The Amendment states,

.nor

II

shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."

Public schools,

considered an arm of the state, are obligated to provide the
"due process of law" before depriving a student of the legal
right to education.

Legal opinion has, heretofore, judged

private school students as beyond the grasp of the
Fourteenth Amendment because private schools have not been
considered an arm of the state.
Five approaches to securing "due process" rights for
private school students were presented and analyzed.

These

approaches sought to show that the constitutional right of

students.

Each chapter provided a different approach to

overcoming the apparent "state action" requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment.

The approaches were:

(i) Natural Law

and the natural right to fundamental fairness;
students'

(ii) the

"property" and "liberty" rights to education;

(iii) the constitutionally "fundamental" right that students
have to education;

(iv) the "public function" served by

private education which would require private schools to
follow the same procedures as public schools;

(v) a

reevaluation of the century-old "state action" requirement.
All of these approaches were presented for the purpose of
suggesting a legal, philosophical and educational rationale
for securing "due process" rights for private school
students involved in disciplinary action that suspends them
from school.
Both types of constitutional "due process"
("procedural" and "substantive") were identified and applied
to private school students.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The constitutional rights of non-public elementary and
secondary school students have not been clearly defined by
the courts.

While the law relating to public schools has

been developing steadily since 1960, 1 there have been
relatively few cases relating to non-public schools.

Since

1960, the Supreme Court of the United States has recognized
certain rights to which public school students are
entitled. 2

No case regarding the rights of non-public

school students has ever been decided by the United States
Supreme Court.
The landmark case of Dixon v. Alabama recognized that
students at public colleges have rights to the "due process
of law."

These rights are protected from federal

1

Although Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), is considered a landmark decision in the area of
public schools, the case that marks the beginning of
development of public school law is Dixon v. Alabama, 186
F. Supp. 945 (1960), rev. at 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1961),
cert. den. 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
2

Dixon broke the judicial restraint to decide cases
against the institution. Dixon awarded procedural due
process protection for public school students. Subsequent
cases of note are Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969),
that awarded free speech to public school students, Goss v.
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), that awarded due process rights
to public school students, and Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
308 (1975), that awarded damages from a board of education
to public school students.

2

interference by the Fifth Amendment to the United States
Constitution 3 and from state constriction by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 4

The right to "due process" was brought down to

the public high school level, and presumably elementary as
well, by West Virginia Board· ~of Education v. Barnette,

5

and, subsequently, by Goss v. Lopez. 6
The predominant constitutional reason why the Supreme
Court has held that public school students are entitled to
"due process" protection is because of the close connection
between public schools and the state government.

The public

schools are financially supported and statutorily mandated
by the state.

There are state officers who are directly

responsible for the effective running of the public schools.
Public schools are viewed as an extension of the state.

3

U.S. Constitution, Amend. V, provides in relevant
part: "No person
shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law."
4

U.S. Constitution Amendment XIV, § 1 provides:
"
[N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ... "
5

West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S.
624, 63 7 ( 1943) .
("The Fourteenth Amendment . . . protects
the citizen against the State itself and all of its
creatures--Boards of Education not excepted.")
6

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975)
(Public school
students are entitled to constitutional "due process" before
being suspended from school.)

3

Thus, when the Fourteenth Amendment asserts "nor shall any
state deprive anyone of life, liberty, or property without
the due process of law" the courts have interpreted this
clause as including public schools and their students. 7
The predominant reason why the courts have not applied
the constitutional protection of due process to private
school students is because of the nature of the connection
between the state and the private school.

By definition,

the private schools are not financially supported by the
state, nor is their daily governance controlled by it.

The

Fourteenth Amendment's limitation to the "state" brought the
Supreme Court to recognize over one hundred years ago that
there must be a connection to the state government, 8 called
"state action," before "due process of law" is required.
Although the Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled on this
issue, some lower courts, beginning with Bright v.
Isenbarger, have found "state action" lacking in private

schools.
7

These courts have ;i::-efused to impose "due process"

See Barnette, id.; Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.

8

The connection to the state that is necessary is the
result of the holding in United States v. Cruikshank, 92
U.S. 542 (1875), and in The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883) (where the term "state action" was coined).
9

Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F.Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind.,
1970), 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971).

4

requirements on private school administrators.
DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY
The Problem
The problem that was investigated was the application
of constitutional rights to ··'due process" rights for nonpublic school students.

The argument was developed that

private school students are entitled to the same
constitutional rights and protections as their public school
counterparts.

In auguring constitutional rights for private

school students, the argument sought to fit within the
constructs of constitutional law and jurisprudence, yet
overcome the prevailing notion of "state action."
This study took an approach that varied from dominant
legal opinion.

Most legal practitioners, as evidenced by

the approach taken in documented cases, believe that there
is insufficient "state action" to muster the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process protections to private school
students.

Several doctoral dissertations have concluded the

same . 10

See, e.g., Tieken, Al, "The Application of Statutory
and Constitutional Due Process Rights to Nonpublic
Elementary and Secondary School Students and Teachers,"
Ed.D. dissertation, Indiana University, 1981, and
Shaughnessy, Mary A., "Student and Teacher Rights in the
Private School: Legal Considerations for the Private School
Administrator," Ph.D. dissertation, Boston University,
10

5

This study constructed a new legal argument to earn
constitutional ''due process" rights for non-public school
students.

Its various chapters discuss different aspects of

the legal argument, each one pointing to the same conclusion
of the legality and educatio"nal importance of these rights
for private school children.

Each chapter will show a

constitutional connection between non-public school students
and "due process" rights.

Traditionally, this connection

was believed to be non-existent.
The Supreme Court has identified two types of "due
process," known as "procedural" and "substantive" due
process.

"Procedural due process" refers to the procedure

to follow; once the proper procedure is followed,
requirement has been fulfilled.

the

"Substantive due process"

refers to the constitutional protection of "fundamental"
rights that are stated explicitly or implicitly in the
Constitution.

They may also be part of the culture and

heritage of the American people.

"Substantive due process"

provides that these rights may not be diminished without a
compelling justification.
This study analyzing the "due process" rights for non-

1984. Additionally, these authors analyzed the law ·and
underlying theories from a different perspective entirely.

6

public school students included a determination of whether
these students are entitled to "procedural" or "substantive"
due process, which will vary, depending on the approach
taken.

If private school students are entitled to the same

"due process" rights as public school students, then they
may enjoy only "procedural due process.

1111

One goal of

this study, however, was to describe the value of providing
"substantive due process" for both groups of children.
Definition of Terms
For the purposes of this study, the following
definitions were used:
Private School:

any school which is not part of the
public school system of the state or
school district in which it is located.
It may be maintained by private
individuals or organizations.

It may

also be referred to as "non-public."
Administrators:

anyone responsible for the governance of
the school's students and teachers.
They are often ref erred to by such
titles as, Principal, Vice Principal,
Headmaster, Headmistress, Head.

11

See Goss, 419 U.S. at 574.

7

Substantive Due Process: "the constitutional guaranty that
no person shall be arbitrarily deprived
of life, liberty, or property; the
essence of substantive due process is
protecti.c5n from arbitrary unreasonable
action,"
(1979)),

(Black's Law Dictionary 1281
or that "all legislation be in

furtherance of a legitimate governmental
objective."
(1984)).

(Gifis's Law Dictionary 146

Substantive due process refers

to what is done, as distinguished from

how it is done (procedural due process)
Procedural Due Process: how the process of depriving someone
of life, liberty or property is
carried out; how it is done.

The

minimal requirements of constitutional
due process are (i) notice of charges,
(ii) an opportunity to be heard, and
(iii) an impartial tribunal.
Due Process:

itself has no fixed meaning.

Justice

Frankfurter wrote that due process is
compounded of history, reason, and the
past course of judicial decisions.

It

8

is a delicate process of adjustment
involving the exercise of judgment by
those whom the Constitution entrusted
with the unfolding of the process. 12
Procedural Fairness: is anotlfer term for "due process."
"Fundamental" Right: is a right that is explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed in the federal or
state constitution.
Strict Scrutiny:

is a test of constitutional validity of
a statute.

If a "fundamental" right is

affected then the state must show that
there is a compelling state interest
that validates affecting the
"fundamental"

right and that no less

intrusive means are available to
accomplish the same goal.
Property Right:

is a generic term which refers to any
type of right to specific personal
property, tangible or intangible.

Liberty Right:

is a right protected by the "Due
Process" clauses of the Fifth and

12

see Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

9

Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution, including interests
created by legislation.
State Action:

an action that can be properly construed
as that of the state.

State action will

be found in such cases as when there is
meaningful state participation in a
particular activity, the state is
entwined with the regulation of private
conduct, or there has been a delegation
of what was traditionally a state
function to a private person or
institution.
Statute:

an act of the legislature, adopted by
prescribed means such that it becomes
the law.

Statutes are enacted in

general to promote the public good and
welfare.

(Gifis, supra p.6, at 453).

Public/Private Distinction: A legal distinction to maintain
the difference between public
institutions and private individuals.
The distinction was drawn in response to
the Fourteenth Amendment, after the

10

slaves were freed, to assure the
population that the government would not
limit or control purely private
behavior.

The distinction is related to

the "stat'e action" doctrine.
Natural Law:

includes certain principles of justice
which have prevailed since time
immemorial.

They are the first

principles of reason, with their origin
in nature itself.

Even God cannot

change the natural laws.

The

responsibility to live by natural laws
creates "natural rights" for the people.
Positive Law:

is man-made law for the purpose of
creating an orderly civilized society.
It is expected to reflect natural law as
much as possible.

When man follows

positive law he may be on the highest
level of perfection according to those
who believe that the state is the
highest level of perfection, or he may
be headed to disaster if the positive
law does not have a significant

11

component of natural law absorbed in it.
Research Methodology
The traditional tools of scholarly research were used
as well as those specific to legal research.

The primary

methodology and terminology used were, with the exception of
the chapter on Natural Law, specific to legal research and
analysis.
Volumes of International Dissertation Abstracts were
reviewed manually, as were The Education Index and Index to
Legal Periodicals.
All volumes of West's Education Reporter were examined
and cases reported were examined for possible relevance.
The Journal of Law and Education was particularly useful, as
were various publications of National Organization on Legal
Problems of Education.
Court cases were reviewed from West's National Reporter
System; Shepard's Citations were useful to follow the
history of a case.
The chapter on Natural Law called for more traditional
educational sources in the disciplines of philosophy,
history, and law.
Overview of Remaining Chapters
Chapter II provides an historical background of the

12

notion of Natural Law.

It will be shown that Natural Law

remains a part of the American legal system to this day.
"Due Process" is one of the natural rights that issues from
Natural Law, so that the constitutional requirement of
"state action" is not a relevant concern.
Chapter III accepts the notion of "state action," but
tries to show that there is significant jurisprudence
regarding other constitutionally recognized rights as well.
These constitutional rights have a direct bearing on
education.

These rights are important enough that, taken

individually or

collectively, they bring with them a

requirement for "due process" before the right to education
is limited, regardless of the presence of "state action."
Chapter IV deals with the often-debated question of
education as a "fundamental right."

The United States

Supreme Court decided in 1973, by a 5 - 4 vote, that
education is not a federally recognized "fundamental
right,

1113

but there have been significant developments

since that time.

Most important has been the recognition by

an impressive number of state supreme courts of education's
"fundamental" nature.

13

This is especially meaningful because

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973).

13

education is the single most important function of the
state, such that "fundamentality" may be best shown, and

education best served, on the state level.

The particular

significance for this study of a showing of constitutional

...

"fundamentality" is that the limitation of education for
disciplinary reasons will then carry with it a requirement
for "due process."

This is because constitutionally

"fundamental" rights may not be abridged without standing up
to "strict scrutiny," which would call for, at a minimum,
procedural fairnesses.
The next chapter, Chapter v, discusses the issue of
private schools that serve a "public function."

This means

that, although a close enough nexus between the school and
the state may not be found, and a finding of "state action"
not forthcoming,

the private school may be seen as having

the same mission as a public school and accomplishing the
same academic and behavioral goals.

Thus, the private

school may be seen as taking on the character and
requirements of the public school.

Accordingly, the private

school would be required to offer constitutionally mandated
"due process" to its students even without a finding of
"state action."
Chapter VI deals directly with the ''state acticin"

14

doctrine. It suggests that the doctrine should be
reinterpreted, with its positive qualities maintained.
There are even those who suggest doing away with the
doctrine entirely, preferring to look at the merits of the
two sides rather than their public or private character. The
result, for this study, of these changes in the "state
action" doctrine would be that private school students would
be entitled to "due process" before suffering disciplinary
action.
Chapter VII provides a summary of the reasoning and
theories pointing to the provision by private school
administrators of constitutional procedural fairness to
their students. Specific issues and questions to research
are provided for further study.

CHAPTER II
NATURAL LAW AND DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
This chapter will present an historical survey of
Natural Law, beginning with the early genesis of this
concept.

It will show that natural law has a well-respected

background, spanning the millennia from antiquity until the
modern age.

Natural law has maintained this respect because

its notions of right and propriety are those that are
usually accepted.

This respect has been articulated in the

decisions of various courts.

Natural law is a legal

doctrine that carries with it certain legal requirements,
including the provision of the due process of law.

This

study will argue that "due process" is a requirement of
natural law, applicable to all people and institutions.
Indeed,

"due process" is applicable to young people as well.

It is a right to which students are entitled, regardless of
tbe governance of their school.

The existence of "state

action" has no bearing on the provision of the student right
to fundamental fairness from the perspective of natural law.
The theory of natural law posits that there are certain
principles of justice which are entitled to prevail because
of their own excellence.

"Natural law, abiding and

permanent, has existed from the dawn of humanity as an
15

16
instinct of the understanding and knowledge of the first
principles of reason.

111

Thus, for example, Sophocles (496-

406 B.C.) has the heroine of Antigone justify her
overstepping of the king's law by appealing to a higher law:
"The unchangeable, unwritten .. code of heaven;/ this is not of
today and yesterday,/ but this lives forever, having origin/
whence no man knows ... " 2
According to natural law proponents, law has its basis
in nature.

Humankind has an inborn capacity to know right

and wrong, and law

at its very essence

rests not upon

the arbitrary will of a ruler or upon the decree of a
multitude, but upon reason, i.e., upon humankind's use of
reason to identify and codify innate ideas.

These ideas

cannot be abrogated by man, for their author is the "Divine"
itself. 3

1

Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy,
trans. E. I. Watkin
(NY: Sheed and Ward, 1962), 101.
2

3

Sophocles, II Antigone 450 - 60.

Cicero, Laws, I, xvi, trans. C. W. Keyes,
Harvard University Press, 1948), 345 - 47.

(Cambridge:

17
THE EARLY CONCEPTS OF NATURAL LAW
In the early periods of civilization, mores and laws
were undifferentiated from religious norms,

4

and all mores

and laws, therefore, were seen as stemming from God.

The

·~

social orders under which people lived, which were based on
society's mores, could not be changed unless God, perhaps
through a prophet, had ordered them changed.

Human

ordinances that did not reflect natural law lacked moral
substance and were not considered legally binding.
The idea of "natural" law is best understood when it is
contrasted to another, human, law.

Once humans moved away

from their narrow view of law as entirely God-given, then
they could begin to distinguish between the various types of
law.

Humans went beyond their narrow view when they used

critical reason to look back over history and note the
profound changes that had occurred in the realm of law and
mores.
As man became aware of the diversity of legal and moral
institutions of his people in the course of its history,
especially in comparison to earlier generations, he was
finally able to discern the distinction between divine and

4

Heinrich A. Rommen, The Natural Law, trans. Thomas R.
Hanley (St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1947), 3-9.

18
human law.

Man concluded that much of law was man-made or

human law, appropriate to particular situations and
societies.

A notion of divine law remained, however,

especially as a criterion for the moral value of man-made
·~

This distinction has remained to this day. 5

laws.

Early man learned that the standards by which his
society's laws were to be judged were found in an eternal
immutable law.

This law contains certain principles of

right and justice which are entitled to prevail "of their
own intrinsic excellence ... Such principles are made by no
human hands; indeed, if they did not antedate deity itself,
they still so express its nature as to bind and control
it ... they are eternal and immutable." 6

In relation to such

principles, human laws are" ... merely a record or
transcript, and their enactment an act not of will or power,
but one of discovery and declaration. 7
As humankind developed, so did the notions of natural
law.

The classical Greek philosophers drew a distinction

6

Edward S. Corwin, "The 'Higher Law' Background of
American Constitutional Law," Corwin on the Constitution,
ed. Richard Loss, 2 vols. (Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1981), 1:81.

19

between two conceptions of the natural law which have
survived to this day.

One conception sees a natural law

that focuses on the individual citizen.

This citizen freely

enters into a contract with the state for social and
utilitarian purposes.

The s·tate itself and its laws are

artificial and arbitrary, of no intrinsic necessity.

The

other conception sees the state as the path to reach the
highest ideals.

The citizen is to subordinate himself to

the state and its laws.

The state's laws, firmly based on

nature and natural justice, help the citizen reach his
authentic self.

Because it is a human value for a person to

try to reach a state of perfection, the person is morally
bound to follow the state's laws.

The notion of God as

supreme Lawgiver is ultimately connected with this latter
conception.

Both of these tendencies are already plainly

visible in the first Sophists and in Heraclitus, the
forerunner of Plato.
Heraclitus of Ephesus (cir. 536 - 470 B.C.), in holding
the later conception, opined that there is a fundamental and
universal law, not chance, that rules over the world and
establishes order.

Man's nature, as well as his ethical

goal, is to subordinate his individual and social lives to
the general law of the universe.

This is the primordial

20

norm of moral being and conduct.

Heraclitus believed that

all human laws are nurtured by the divine law.

Indeed, the

laws of men are but attempts to realize the divine law and
legislate accordingly, sharing in the eternal intellect .
."

With Heraclitus, the idea of a natural law for the first
time emerged as a natural unchangeable law from which all
human laws draw their binding force. 8
The Sophists (Greece, Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.),
were proponents of the former conception.

They believed

that the relationship between the individual and the
government was created by a social compact.

This compact

was for utilitarian purposes, with no value intrinsic to the
state's laws and statutes themselves.

These laws and

statutes were accepted by the populace so as to avoid
injury.

For the perception was that, before these laws were

legislated and the agreements entered into, man behaved
haphazardly and lawlessly.
"Positive," Law.

Now, law was entirely man-made,

This brought the Sophists to a crisis,

wherein their laws seemed to lack any quality of natural
morality.

They attempted to resolve this crisis by showing

that there was due consideration for "natural law."

Thus,

for example, they believed that "might is right," and that
8

See Rommen,

The Natural Law, 5-7.

21
this is a natural law.

Witness the animal kingdom and

warring countries, where the stronger animal or country
overcomes the enemy.

This, they believed, was a natural

occurrence and proof for a natural law of ''might is
right." 9
Regarding the role of the state, the Sophists started
from the freedom of the individual who had to be liberated
from the political bonds of the state.

Plato (427 - 347

B.C.), in contrast, saw the state and its laws as the
indispensable means for realizing the highest ideals of
humanity.

This followed Plato's notion that there are

certain abstract forms or ideas that represent the true
quality of the doctrine.

It is humankind's responsibility

to copy the idealized heavenly version of the idea on Earth.
Thus, Plato believed that the laws of this world are
entitled to exist only to the extent that they recapitulate
the eternal idea.

Man, as craftsman and artist, is to copy

these heavenly ideas.
area of law.

This is especially the case in the

Humanly-made law may be judged good or bad

based on the extent to which it copies the law of heaven.
Positive law is legitimate to the extent that it reflects
9

These ideas of the Sophists are discussed in George H.
Sabine, A History of Political Theory, (NY: Henry Holt and
Co., 1937), 25-34.
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natural law.
Legitimate positive law has its moral basis in natural
law.

Accordingly, one who follows such a body of positive

law would be moral and just.

Thus, the state and its laws

provide the foundation for the idealized state of man.

The

state, as great pedagogue of man, helped man realize his
perfected form.

Plato was optimistic that a person would

use natural law to define and delimit positive law.

He

cherished positive law and the state for its potential to
lead man toward the highest ideals.

The Sophists, on the

other hand, were pessimistic about man's use of positive
law, fearing that he would use it for his own corrupt
purposes.

They disdained positive law and the state that

supported it. 10
Aristotle (384 - 322 B.C.), agreeing with Plato that
positive law wishes to reflect natural law, introduced the
principle of equity.

Human law, because of life's intricate

diversities, could not fill all cases.

Thus, human judges

were to fill in those gaps with equitable solutions.

Equity

required that the judge decide the case in accordance with
justice, as contained in the natural law.

10

Plato's views on natural law are presented in Rommen,
The Natural Law, 11 - 16.
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Both Aristotle and Plato said noticeably little about
the content of natural law.

Their main contributions were

to define the legal legitimacy of positive (human) law based
on the closeness of its connection with natural law, and the
moral imperative to realize this closeness . 11
The Stoics (Greece, c. 350 - 250 B.C.) were
individualists, like the Sophists, but they assimilated some
of the teachings of Heraclitus, Plato, and Aristotle.

Most

significantly, the Stoics emphasized how to determine the
content of the natural law.

They believed that man could

have clear perceptions and make correct judgements through
rational insights into his essential nature.

Man had simply

to prevent himself from succumbing to the excesses of his
passions to identify the natural law, for they believed that
reason and nature were one.

Man may discover the content of

natural law when he lives in harmony with himself, with
rational thought. 12
11

12

This is the meaning of Cicero's

Id. 16 - 20.

Now we may understand Cicero's speech regarding
natural law: "This, therefore, is a law ... not written, but
born with us, which we have not learnt or received by
tradition, or read, but which we have taken and sucked in
and imbibed from nature herself; a law which we were not
taught, but to which we were made, which we were not trained
in, but which is ingrained in us." Cited by Rommen, The
Natural Law, 23, n. 10. Later, the content of the law of
nature included rules touching such areas as marriage and

24

statement,
[W]e can perceive the difference between good laws
and bad by ref erring them to no other standard
than Nature ... For since an intelligence common to
us all makes things known to us and formulates
them in our minds, honourable actions are ascribed
by us to virtue, and dishonourable actions to
vice; and only a madman would conclude that these
judgments are ... not fixed by Nature. 13
Thus far, we have seen that the basic elements of the
doctrine of natural law already existed in antiquity.

The

issues at the beginning of the Common Era, and still the
issues of today, included such themes as: Law is Will (human
will and passion initiate the legislation of laws) versus
Law is Reason (human reason is used to identify the laws of
nature that are innately present); Law is Truth (truth and
morality existed before the state was formed, and transcend
the state) versus Law is Authority (a function of the state,
the state's legislation of laws creates and defines
morality).

Additionally, the doctrine of an original state

of nature also appeared early, especially among the Sophists

family, good faith, adjustment or weighing of interests, the
original freedom and equality of all men, and the right to
self-defense. Id., 28.
13

Cicero, Laws, I, xvi. Cicero (106 - 43 B.C.) was the
interpreter and transmitter of the Stoic doctrine of natural
law.
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and the Stoics. 14
The alternative to natural law is human or positive
law.

As we saw above, positive law can be a consequence of

the doctrine of will or passion.
."

Positive law views law as

the codification of man's passions.

It sometimes renounces

the efforts to know the essences of things and their
hierarchy of values.
for higher values.

There are no imperatives, no concern
Positive law may reflect or include

natural law, which would give positive law a moral standing.
But as positive law moves further away from any natural law

14

As for the concept of a Christian natural law that
was developing at around this time, Rommen cites a German
author, Johannes Messner, who writes that there was little
difference between the existing understanding of natural law
and the "Christian" understanding of natural law. Messner
writes: "[w]hen we speak of a 'Christian' natural law, that
does not mean that the natural law knowable by us through
reason alone is replaced or amplified by one derived from
supernatural revelation, but that our knowledge of its
existence, its essence and its content is confirmed and
clarified through the guidance of reason by faith." Rommen,
The Natural Law, 34 - 35, n. 1. Thus, the Church continued
to espouse the use of reason to determine the content of
natural law, but it was the Church that was to be accepted
as the infallible expounder of natural law. Also, the
addition of faith into natural law put God as facilitator of
the understanding of reason and natural law in society.
It
is God: supreme reason, unchangeable being and omnipotent
will who inscribes rational nature in the hearts of man.
See Id., 34-39.
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basis it loses its moral rectitude and claim to
legitimacy. 15

15

See John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights
(Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1980), 351-352, who
writes that this is a "subordinate theorem" of the theory of
natural law.

27
THE CONTENT OF NATURAL LAW
Natural law had systematically developed as a concept,
but its content was still unclear.

This was to change with

St. Thomas Aquinas (1225 - 74), who presented a description
of the content of natural law.
This is the first precept of law, that good is to
be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided.
All other precepts of the natural law are based
upon this; so that all the things which the
practical reason naturally apprehends as man's
good belong to the precepts of the natural law
under the form of things to be done or avoided. 16
"Good is to be done, evil is to be avoided."

This is

the maxim by which St. Thomas became known as a major
proponent of natural law.

St. Thomas also relied on man's

reason to determine the specific content of the natural law.
If his previous statement was not sufficiently clear, St.
Thomas continued, in the same section of his Summa, with a
more practical statement.
[M]an has a natural inclination to know the truth
about God, and to live in society; and in this
respect, whatever pertains to this inclination
belongs to the natural law: e.g., to shun
ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one
has to live, and other such things regarding the
above inclination. 17

16

a.2.

St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica,

Ia, IIae, q.94
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Here, St. Thomas expressed his belief that man can
identify the specific content of the natural law by being in
touch with his natural inclinations.

Thus, for example, the

preservation of life and the avoidance of obstacles are part
of the natural law.

Aquinas ''would also include the

education of offspring ("to shun ignorance") in this group.
Educating their young is something which even the animal
kingdom does naturally!

Other specific ingredients of the

natural law include the precepts of the Decalogue. 18
Later, Hugo Grotius (Holland, 1583 - 1645) was to be
hailed as "the father of natural law theory," a title
undeserved. 19

Grotius did make an important contribution

to the natural law theory in the area of international law.
It was Grotius who pointed to the moral necessity of natural
law even while at war. 20

In addition, Grotius spoke about

using human judgment to determine that which falls under the
rubric of natural law.

His salient point was that reason

determines the content of natural law, but necessity must be

18

This is because the Decalogue contains the very
intention of God the Lawgiver.
Summa, Id., q. 100, a.8.
19

Rommen, The Natural Law, 70-74.
Earlier authorities,
such as Aquinas, seem more deserving of this venerable
title.
20

Id.
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part of the equation:
the natural law.

There is a moral necessity to follow

One is either required to do what reason

declares to be good, or one is prohibited from doing what
reason declares to be evil. 21

In addition, Grotius taught

that bad acts are evil, not b'ecause they are intrinsically
at variance with God's essence, but because they are
forbidden by God. 22

This view of good and evil looked at

the further question of why God so decreed as beyond human
reason.
John Locke (England, 1632 - 1704) taught that the
objective of natural law theory was to establish as
inalienable the rights of the individual.

Once the state

has been created, these inalienable rights do not vanish,
but are preserved to serve as an ultimate criterion for
judging the acts of the government.

Locke seemed to put

ideals in their proper perspective: The rights of life,
liberty, and property make the law, the law does not create
them.

The rights of the individual are prior, and in them

21

Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights 44, quoting
Grotius's De Jure Belli ac Pacis I, c. i, sec. 10, paras. 1,
2.
22

Rommen, The Natural Law 72.
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originates whatever (governmental) order exists. 23

It was

here that the natural law doctrine was transformed from a
theory·concerning duties exclusively, to a theory framed
also in terms of rights.

23

Id., 88-91.
1:119-121.

See also Corwin on the Constitution
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WHY DOES HUMAN LAW INCORPORATE NATURAL LAW?
Until now, we have surveyed the classical background of
the theory of natural law.

This is an important step in

preparation for the inclusion of this doctrine in the
philosophical underpinnings that were to make up the nascent
American jurisprudence.

Natural law is also important of

its own merit, and proudly carries its moral imperative in
every institution of our society.

By way of summary of our

odyssey through the teachings of the great philosophers who
supported and developed the notion of natural law, we may
ask ourselves a question which must arise from our study:
Why was natural law formalized and codified within the
corpus of positive law?

In other words, we may ask why

human law sought to incorporate natural law as part of its
legislated laws and statutes.
We shall propose five answers to this question of why
natural law was included in subsequently legislated positive
law.
(i) To provide a connection to God: As we saw above,
the natural law was perceived as the law of Paradise.

One

gains a taste of Paradise, a communion with the divine, when
one follows these natural law statutes.

Man found a way to

formalize and guaranty a touch of heaven as he follows the
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mundane laws of this world.
(ii) Positive law that subsumes the natural law also
guarantees morality.

A legislature that sought to assure

that its citizenry would live moral lives would require, by
statute, that morality be followed.

Also, people whose

consciences dictated to them that they should live moral
lives would find it easier if they could simply fulfill the
dictates of the positive law.
(iii) To give meaning to social institutions: Man is a
social being.

He seeks to create social institutions for

himself and his fellows.

The institutions need guidance on

what policies to set and what missions to fulfill.
Incorporating the natural law and, by extension, natural
rights into the social institutions will vouchsafe these
moral policies and goals.
(iv) To provide a connection to secular values: One of
the basic principles of natural law is "agreements must be
kept. " 24

In every society one finds certain agreements

that are made between people and between institutions and
their constituencies.

The creation of a legal structure

that incorporates the requirement that agreements be kept,
24

See Thomas Hobbes (England, 1588 - 1679), Leviathan
(1651) . Hobbes was an early proponent of the Positive
School.
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as well as other principles of natural law, will make
certain that these fundamentals of society are fulfilled.
(v) To provide a connection to the self: We learned
that the fulfillment of natural law helps people realize
"

their natural states, states uncorrupted by the vicissitudes
of daily life.

It is, indeed, a noble yet onerous and

perplexing accomplishment to realize one's natural and pure
state.

It is also an accomplishment to be respected and

emulated.
goal.

Some people search for ways to accomplish this

By following the positive law which is inclusive of

natural law, and we are obliged to fulfill the positive law
in any event, we are led through the thicket to that
original state of purity and grace.
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THE IMMUTABILITY OF NATURAL LAW
It is important and worthwhile to incorporate natural
law into human or positive law.

This natural law was seen

as discernible by humankind so that they might incorporate
it into their legal system.
immutable, not changing.

Natural law was seen as

In fact, God had put certain laws

into nature, and even He could not change certain natural
laws and rights that all people shared and cherished.
Grotius believed in this so strongly that he said that even
God Himself, having put this law into nature,

"could not

make twice two anything but four. " 25
If natural law does not change, then several Bible
stories raise serious questions regarding this doctrine of
immutability.

For example, scholars asked how God could ask

Abraham to offer his son Isaac on an altar 26 and how God
could command Hosea to marry a women who would be
promiscuous as his wife. 27
Various answers were suggested, but none was truly
effective.

It is, indeed, very difficult to explain why God

veered away from His own laws. Alexander of Hales (d. 1245),
25

Corwin on the Constitution 1:118.

26

See Genesis 22.

27

See Hosea 1 .
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following the Stoic tradition, explained that we must
distinguish between the natural law before the original sin
and the natural law after the original sin.

The Stoics

believed that, had man not sinned, the second Tablet of the
Decalogue (i.e., the last seven of the Ten Commandments)
would have been unnecessary.

It was only after man was in a

fallen state, and human and property relations were not
well-respected, that man needed the protection of these
Commandments. 28

Thus, the question is, perhaps, resolved.

The commandments that God apparently abrogated in His own
case (against murder and adultery) were post-sin
commandments, implemented for man, but not incumbent upon
God. 29
For some, the question was not yet resolved because the
goal was to find an ethical explanation for actions of the
Biblical God that apparently were contrary the natural
order.

Alexander of Hales was forced to resort to the

doctrine of primacy of God's will.

God transcends all laws.

One cannot possibly ask questions about God's behavior based

28

29

See Remmen,

The Natural Law 42-44.

This was because God maintained His pre-sin perfect
status, to speak in human terms.

36

on His laws, for God's laws do not apply to Him. 30
are, rather, for people to follow.
laws they reach perfection.

They

When people follow God's

God, who is already perfect, is

not required to follow these laws.

.

Again, the answer

remained unsatisfying to some who were searching
specifically for an ethical explanation.
St. Thomas Aquinas held that the notions of justice
contained in the Decalogue are eternal and unchangeable.

At

the same time, their specific application to a specific
problem may change from time to time.

Sometimes this change

is by divine authority alone, such as in matters pertaining
to divine institutions such as marriage or life and death.
Sometimes this change may be done by human authority, in
such areas that are part of human jurisdiction. 31

When God

appears to dispense with His natural law, He is acting not
as Lawgiver, but as Lord and Master, with dominion over
human life.

Thus, He may instruct His prophets, Abraham and

Hosea, to suspend the prohibitions of murder and adultery
respectively, in favor of opposite commands.

Because human

life and the institution of marriage are God's jurisdiction,

a.3.

30

Rommen, The Natural Law 44.

31

St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica,

Ia IIae, q.100,
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God is "free" to change the applicability of His laws
previously stated.

This was St. Thomas Aquinas's response

to the question of immutability of natural law raised by the
particular Bible stories.

God the Sovereign could do what
,,

God the Lawgiver could not, and without rescinding the
natural law.
To sum up our discussion of the question regarding
divine dispensation of natural law, let us look through the
practical eyes of the educational administrator.

At times,

an administrator may be tempted to suspend the provision of
rights to a student, much as God apparently suspended His
natural law when "needed."

The review of God's dispensation

with natural law yields three comments to indicate that the
administrator may not suspend natural law and natural
rights. 32
sin.

i) We are living in an era after the original

The second tablet of the Decalogue, and all of God's

justice legislated after the original sin, apply to us
today.

Natural law must be followed at all times, without

abrogation.

ii) God legislated His laws to help humankind

reach perfection.
32

God may change His laws, for His inherent

It goes without saying that the administrator should
not use the natural law itself, God's word from heaven to us
on Earth, as identified by man's rational thought, to
justify his actions viz., the suspension of natural law.
God surely does not want to be his partner in sin!
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perfection puts Him beyond the need for these laws.
Humankind, however, has no claim or right to change what is
in God's domain for this would detract from our path to
perfection.

Thus, we are not entitled to learn from God's

example; we may not abrogate natural law.
change His laws when He sees fit.

iii) God may

This is because He is

God, and retains the quality of Sovereign, in addition to
Lawgiver.

Humankind does not possess this quality of

Sovereign, such that they are not in a position to change
God's laws.

Natural law must be upheld at all times.

that in all cases the conclusion is the same.

Note

Whatever the

underlying explanation, the administrator, as humankind, is
obligated to follow the natural law.
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NATURAL RIGHTS LEGISLATED INTO LAW: LORD COKE'S INFLUENCE
We have reviewed the conception of classical antiquity
that a law of nature is discoverable by human reason.

This

reason, when uninfluenced by passion, forms the ultimate
source and explanation for positive law.

Thus, legislators

were challenged to use their intuition and reason to
legislate laws that corresponded to the natural law at all
times.

The closeness of this correspondence was the measure

of successful legislation.
Natural law is considered to have made its entree into
legislation with the Magna Charta, in 1215. 33

Magna Charta

Chapter 39 recognized the fundamental right of each person
to certain rights, per legem terrae, according to the law of
the land.

Magna Charta does not provide a definition for

the phrase "according to the law of the land," but this
phrase has been interpreted as a requirement for procedural
fairness in the administration of justice. 34

Specifically

the procedures included offering the criminal:
before execution;

(i) judgment

(ii) a judgment of peers; and,

(iii) that

no free man be punished except in accordance with the law of

33

Charles G. Haines, The Revival of Natural Law
Concepts (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1930), 166.
34

Id.

I

104.
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England - - the law of the land. 35
England continued to refer to the Magna Charta for many
years.

One of the more important uses of this "Great

Charter" was by Lord Edward Coke in The Case of the College
of Physicians, commonly called Dr. Bonham's Case. 36

Lord

Coke presided at this trial as Chief Justice of the Common
Pleas. 37

His salient point, destined to be debated for

many years, was that any law that goes against the common
law, or natural law, 38 goes against the Magna Charta's

36

Dr. Bonham's Case, 8 Co. 114a (C.P. 1610). Dr.
Bonham was judged by the (English) Royal College of
Physicians to be deficient in his knowledge of medicine and
told that he could not practice medicine in London until
approval by the Royal College.
In addition, Dr. Bonham was
fined, with half the fine going to the king, and the other
half going to the Royal College. Lord Coke said that the
fact that the Royal College's receipt of part of the monies
made them not only judges, but also parties in any cases
that came before them. Lord Coke then invoked the common
law maxim that no man can be a judge in his own case. His
decision was that common law controls judgments, and that
any judgment that goes against the common law cannot be
fulfilled and is immediately void.
37

Coke claimed the concurrence of Justices Warburton
and Daniel, and also the extra-judicial support of Sir
Thomas Fleming, Chief Justice of the King's Bench.
8 Co.
117a, 121a.
38

English common law is to be understood as natural
11
law.
[T]he early common lawyers treat the common law
itself as the embodiment of the jus naturale in the guise of
'reason' . 11 Theodore F. T. Plucknett, Statutes and their
Interpretation in the First Half of the Fourteenth Century,

41
requirement of justice according to "the law of the land"
and must be considered void. 39

Of course, the kings were

not pleased with such a ruling; future judges (who were
employed at the behest of the kings) found it difficult to
insist on following Lord Coke's ruling. 40

We find,

nonetheless, in Blackstone's Commentaries, when he discusses
"The King's Duties," that,

"The principal duty of the king

is to govern his people according to law. " 41

Blackstone

explains the reason for the king's following the law: "for
the law maketh the king. " 42

This means that the king holds

his position only because the law grants it to him.
must, therefore, never put himself above the law.

He
To

Cambridge, 1922, p. xxiii, cited by Haines, The Revival of
Natural Law Concepts 28.
39

Daniel Webster cites Lord Coke (at Co. Ins. 46) as
interpreting the Magna Charta's "law of the land" as the
modern day "due course and process of law." Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 581 (1819).
It should be
noted that although Webster quotes the Magna Charta's
Chapter "29," it should be corrected to Chapter "39." See
The Guide to American Law Appendix (St. Paul: West
Publishing Co., 1985), 11:250-51 for translated text of
Magna Charta.
40

See Theodore F. T. Plucknett, Bonham's Case and
Judicial Review, 40 Harvard Law Review 30, 52, 59 (1927)
41

Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of
England, Vol. 1, ed. Thomas MuCooley (Chicago: Callaghan and
Co., 1899) Book I, Chapter 6, Section 234.
42Id.

42

ascertain that the king and all subjects understood the
proper priorities, Blackstone continues
that the laws of England are the birthright of the
people thereof: and all the kings and queens who
shall ascend the throne of this realm ought to
administer the government of the same according to
the said laws; and all their officers and
ministers ought to serve them respectively
according to the same: and therefore all the laws
and statutes of this realm, for securing the .. .
rights and liberties of the people thereof ... are
ratified and confirmed accordingly. 43
We have seen that the government is required to follow
the natural law.

This is a law that preceded the government

and granted it its power.
should be considered void.

Acts that defy the natural law
As we have seen, the natural law

includes procedural fairness.

Thus, it is understood that

the various extensions of the government must provide
procedural fairness.

Further, individuals must also provide

procedural fairness.

For, although our Constitution speaks

explicitly about the state, 44 that is only in relation to
the state's governmental responsibilities.

These

responsibilities reflected the natural law that was in place
for many years -- not to the exclusion of the individual,

43
44

Id.

Consti tu ti on, amend. XIV § 1: " [N] or shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." (Emphasis added.)

43
but rather to the inclusion of the state.

All persons and

institutions must assure that procedural fairnesses are
followed at all times.

This is a law of nature, not a

recent requirement of society's institutions.
The tradition of natural law made its way to the
American shores in the seventeenth century.

In the early

years of colonization, with statutes and laws frequently
lacking, judges had little else to guide them in the handing
down of decisions save their English common law foundation
and the precepts of natural justice and law. 45

As positive

legal precepts were developed, these precepts got their
validity from their conformity to the ideal body of perfect
laws demonstrable by reason and part of the common law. 46
There is an earlier case on record where positive law
was found to be void when it conflicted with fundamental

45

46

Haines, The Revival of Natural Law Concepts, 52.

Roscoe Pound, "The Theory of Judicial Decision," 36
Harvard Law Review 802 (1923). Also, Plucknett, 40 Harvard
Law Review at 60, writes that the settlers brought their
English tradition with them as a start to the development of
a new legal system. There are records of the Colonists
ordering copies of Coke's works from England.
Also, the
Colonists had set out in parallel columns their own laws and
the "fundamental and common lawes and customes of England"
to show that they were keeping as closely as possible to the
system of the parent country.
1 Hutchinson Papers (Prince
Soc. 1865) 197-247, cited by Plucknett, Id.

44
law, 47 but the notion took hold two generations later
around the Stamp Act of 1765.

The Massachusetts State House

in Boston has preserved a statement by Lieutenant-Governor
Hutchinson from September, 1765.

Hutchinson said,

" ... our

friends to liberty take the advantage of a maxim they find
in Lord Coke that an Act of Parliament against Magna Charta
or the peculiar rights of Englishmen is ipso facto void. " 48
Further, Hutchinson specifically called the Stamp Act an
"Act of Parliament which deprives the people of their
natural rights" 49 and, the "Act of Parliament is against
Magna Charta and the natural rights of Englishmen, and
therefore according to Lord Coke null and void.
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The popularity of the concepts of natural law and
natural rights increased with the American Revolution.
Positive law could not be mustered to legitimize revolution,
for human law -- especially that legislated by the ruling
47

Giddings v. Browne, cited in 2 Hutchinson Papers
(Prince Soc. 1865) 1-15.
Plucknett assures us, "It is a
cardinal fact that to the eighteenth-century American the
doctrine of a fundamental common law was familiar, and
regarded as quite consistent with the common law scheme of
things." 40 Harvard Law Review at 70.
48

26 MS. Archives of Massachusetts, ff. 153-54.
by Plucknett 40 Harvard Law Review at 61.

so Id.

Quoted

45
party -- obviously prohibited such acts.

Some of the great

leaders of the American Revolution referred to the natural
rights doctrine extensively. 51

They used the doctrine to

support the right of rebellion against the arbitrary
exercise of governmental powers.

51

For example, Haines, The Revival of Natural Law
Concepts, 54, quotes John Adams (that there are "rights
antecedent to all earthly government --Rights, that cannot
be repealed or restrained by human laws --Rights, derived
from the great Legislator of the Universe." Works, ed.
C.F. Adams (Boston, 1865), III,449.) and Journals of the
Continental Congress (Washington: Ford Edition, 1904), I:
67) (where it was asserted that colonial rights were based
on "the immutable laws of nature, the principles of the
English Constitution and the several charters or compacts")

46

NATURAL LAW INCORPORATED INTO THE LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
The Declaration of Independence of the United States
finally formalized the acceptance of the natural law
doctrine as part of the American heritage.

It was natural

justice to which Jefferson referred when he wrote that men
are "endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit
of Happiness.
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This Declaration soon made Coke's

doctrine unnecessary. 53
vague concept.

Common rights or common law is a

Once the Declaration of Independence stated

the United States' commitment to natural rights, with
specific assurances soon to follow by the Federal
Constitution, Coke's doctrine, and its check upon
legislative action, was overshadowed.
At the time of the American Revolution,

"natural rights

were on their way to becoming national rights. " 54
Nonetheless, the specific assurances of the Federal
Constitution were slow in coming.

A brief review of the

history of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment
is useful.
52

The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).

53

Plucknett, 40 Harv. L.R. 30, at 68.

54

Corwin on the Constitution, 1:133.
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When the United States Constitution was drawn up in
1787 it lacked any statement regarding the rights of the
citizens and safeguards against any undue governmental
interference.

After the Revolutionary War there was great

popular demand to define the rights and limits of the new
government in the form of a bill of rights.

While several

states had composed their own bills of rights, none was
included in the U.S. Constitution.

Ratification of the

Constitution by the states lagged until promises were made
that a Bill of Rights would be added in the form of
amendments to the Constitution.
When the first Congress met in 1789, James Madison
presented a bill of rights.

Twelve various amendments were

proposed, ten of which were accepted.
became the Bill of Rights in 1791.

These ten amendments

Professor Corwin details

what had happened over the course of history: "From [Coke's]
version of Magna Charta, through the English Declaration and
Bill of Rights of 1688 and 1689, to the Bill of Rights of
our early American Constitutions the line of descent is
direct. " 55

The amendment that is particularly relevant for

this study is the Fifth Amendment which provides that no
person shall "be deprived of life liberty or property
55

Id.,

117.
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without the due process of law."
The Bill of Rights accomplished its goals of defining
the rights of the people and safeguarding against undue
governmental interference.

It related, however, to the

federal government only; it offered no protection against
the same interference by the states.

This problem was

overcome after the Civil War, when, in 1868, the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution was passed. 56
This amendment directed the Federal government to protect
the citizens of the states against arbitrary actions of the
state governments.

56

U. S. Const. amend. XIV, §1 states: " ... No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ... "
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EARLY JUDICIAL OPINION REGARDING THE PRESENCE AND POWER OF
THE NATURAL RIGHTS DOCTRINE IN UNITED STATES LAW
Earlier in this chapter, the distinction was drawn
between natural law and positive law.

Natural law comes

from man's reason as he tries to determine the ideal law and
life that God prefers for humankind.

Positive law is on a

much lower plane, being of man's invention, though natural
law requires positive law to be based on the natural law
doctrine.

An understanding of the direction that positive

law has taken in America is important for this study.

A

review of the development of positive law will indicate the
underlying philosophy of American legal philosophers and
legislators.

We will also see that institutions and their

officers who were thought to be beyond the reach of the
United States Constitution are still very much within its
grasp.
Once the Fifth Amendment was in place it became
necessary to define its constitutional guaranty of the "due
process of law.''

It would not take long for legal opinion

to provide that definition.

In accordance with the natural

rights that he believed were the birthright of all, Daniel
Webster demanded "a law which hears before it condemns,
which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after

50
trial." 57
As to the implied right and responsibility of the
judicial branch when the natural rights of an individual
were invaded, Justice Green did not require any explicit
statements.

He used the due process guaranty to affirm his

judicial right to override the legislation.

He wrote,

"Some

acts, although not expressly forbidden, may be against the
plain and obvious dictates of reason.
says Lord Coke [8 Coke, 118],
void.

'The common law,'

'adjudgeth a statute so far

1158

Subsequently, Justice Field, in his dissent in The
Slaughter House Cases,

59

continued this tradition when he

expressed his view of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Justice

Field held that it was the intention of the Fourteenth
Amendment to "protect the citizens of the United States
against the deprivation of the common rights by state
legislation." 60

When he needed to define these common

57

Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 581
(1819) .
58

Bank of State v. Cooper, 2 Yerg. 599, 603 (1831)
(This early case was decided in the Supreme Court of
Tennessee.)
59

The Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 83
(Field, J., dissenting).
60

Id.,

at 89.

(1872)
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rights, the Justice applied the "theories of the Declaration
of Independence and eighteenth-century natural rights.

1161

At one of the first opportunities to explain his views
of the nature of "fundamental" rights, Justice Field did so.
He believed wholeheartedly that the Declaration of
Independence simply declared the rights that the people were
entitled to by virtue of their very birth.

Justice Field

provided a commentary on the words of the Declaration:
"We hold these truths to be self-evident" -- that
is, so plain that their truth is recognized upon
their mere statement -- "that all men are endowed"
-- not by edicts of Emperors, or decrees of
Parliament, or acts of Congress, but "by their
Creator with certain inalienable rights"
that
is, rights which cannot be bartered away or given
away, or taken away except in punishment of crime
-- "and that among these are life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness, and to secure these" -not grant them, but secure them -- "governments
are instituted among men, deriving their just
powers from the consent of the governed. 1162
Even as Justice Field discussed "inalienable rights,"
he believed that the Fourteenth Amendment did not have the
power to interfere with the state's power to do what it

61

Id., at 95.
Also, see Id., at 104: "The common law
of England is the basis of the jurisprudence of the United
States.
It was brought to this country by the colonists ...
and was established here."
62

Barbier v.

Connolly,

113 U.S. 27, 31 (1885).
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believed it needed to do. 63

With time, the prevailing

opinion of the Court was reversed.

The minority opinions

became the majority opinion, perhaps in the wake of the
passing of the Fourteenth Amendment.

In Monongahela

Navigation Co. v. United States, Justice Brewer stated that

the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to protect "those
rights of person and property which by the Declaration of
Independence were affirmed to be inalienable rights. " 64
And Justice Harlan wrote,

"the power of the legislature in

these matters in not unlimited. " 65
What was becoming more and more evident and accepted
was the notion that the Creator endowed each person with
certain rights which neither an individual nor a government
may curtail.

Among these rights,

"due process" or

procedural fairness was certainly to be counted.

Thus, it

is clear that no school administrator should deprive a
student of an education, or for that matter of almost
anything, without first explaining why and listening to a
rebuttal.

63

Id . , at 31- 3 2 .

64

Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S.
312, 324 (1892).
65

Norwood v. Baker,

172 U.S. 268, 278 (1898).
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JUDICIAL DECISIONS THAT PERPETUATE THE NATURAL RIGHTS
DOCTRINE
We have seen that the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution guarantee due process to all
citizens because of its inherent importance.
or procedural fairness,
entitled.

Due process,

is a natural right to which all are

The doctrine of natural rights and universal

entitlement has continued throughout American history into
the twentieth century.

We shall review several Supreme

Court decisions of this century that include the natural
rights doctrine, thereby indicating that the doctrine is
still very useful and relevant.
Over the years, the Court has confronted the term "due
process of law."

In Twining v. New JerseyE 6 ,

the Court

said that few phrases of the law are so elusive of exact
definition.

At the same time, the Court has declined to

give a comprehensive definition of "due process of law,"
preferring that its full meaning be ascertained gradually by
"inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decisions of
cases as they arise.

1167

The Twining Court also discussed certain general
66

Twining v. New Jersey,

67

Id.,

at 100.

211 U.S. 78 (1908).
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principles which help in reaching the proper conclusions
regarding due process.

These principles grow out of the

proposition universally accepted by American courts on the
authority of Coke,

"that the words 'due process of law' are

equivalent in meaning to the words 'law of the land'
contained in that chapter of Magna Charta which provides
that 'no freeman shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised,
or outlawed, or exiled, or any wise destroyed; nor shall we
go upon him, nor send upon him, but by the lawful judgment
of his peers or by the law of the land.'

1168

Thus, Twining

returns our focus to Lord Coke and the time-honored notion
of "law of the land."

Most significant, and still in use

today, is the dictum that we use a "process of inclusion and
exclusion" to ascertain the exact parameters of the doctrine
of due process.
In seeking to further clarify the doctrine of "due
process of law," the Twining Court sends us back to the
"settled usages and modes of proceedings existing in the
common and statute law of England before the emigration of
our ancestors ... and having been acted on by them after the

55
settlement of this country." 69
While the Court has purposely kept unclear the concept
of due process of law, it has also continued to recognize
the role of natural justice.
Twining,

71

states,

Holden v. Hardy,

70

cited in

"This court has never attempted to

define with precision the words 'due process of law.'

It is

sufficient to say that there are certain immutable
principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government which no member of the Union may disregard." 72
In further recognition of the view that natural law
preceded positive law, and that the government's role is to
reflect natural law in its legislation, the Court has said,
"· .. in a free representative government, nothing is more
fundamental than the right of the people, through their
appointed servants, to govern themselves in accordance with

69

Id.
Twining, at 101, indicates that this definition
of due process (reviewing the historical usages in England
and on these shores) was actually articulated earlier, by
Justice Curtis, in Den ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land and
Improvement Company, 18 How. 272, 280 (1856).
Justice
Matthews recommends the same test in Hurtado v. California,
110 U.S. 516, 528 (1884).
70

Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366 (1898).

71

Twining,

72

Holden, 169 U.S. at 389.

211 U.S. at 102.
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their own will ...

1173

Although it was not the majority decision, some
Justices of the Supreme Court ruled in Adamson v.
California 74 that the entire Bill of Rights is incorporated

in the Fourteenth Amendment. 75

This means, according to

them, that none of the rights listed in the first ten
amendments may be restricted without the due process of law.
Specific reference was made to the right to due process
stated in the Fifth Amendment, noting its inherent natural
importance.
Additionally, judges were urged to be mindful of the
"historic meaning" of due process,

76

though the Justices

refused once again to define the notion completely.

Justice

Frankfurter remained ambiguous when he stated that the
standards of justice to be used by judges "are not
authoritatively formulated anywhere as though they were
prescriptions in a pharmacopeia.

The judicial judgment in

applying the Due Process Clause must move within the limits

73

Twining,

74

Adamson v.

75

Id., at 68.

76

Id.,

211 U.S. at 106.

at 67.

California,

332 U.S. 46 (1946).
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of accepted notions of justice.

1111

An important difference of approach was discussed by
the Adamson court.

Justice Murphy agreed with Justice Black

that the entire Bill of Rights should be carried intact into
the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment.

At the same

time, however, Justice Murphy was not willing to limit the
due process clause to the Bill of Rights exclusively.

He

believed that the Bill of Rights is a "floor" to the rights
to which Americans are entitled.

Others on the Court

believed that the Bill of Rights was the "ceiling'' of rights
that may be incorporated in the due process clause. 78

In

either event, there remains little question that every
American is entitled to due process before his rights are
curtailed.

Again the Supreme Court recognized the natural

rights to which we remain entitled and that the Due Process
Clause guarantees.
In Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,

79

Justice Frankfurter repeated his recognition of the right to
77

Id., at 68.

78

Kenneth L. Karst, "Invidious Discrimination: Justice
Douglas and the Return of the 'Natural Law - Due Process'
Formula," 16 University of California at Los Angeles Law
Review 716, 726 (1969).
79

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
U.S. 123 (1951).

341

58

be heard as a right "basic to our society.

1180

He also

stated that "fairness can rarely be obtained by secret onesided determinations of facts decisive of rights.

1181

Justice Frankfurter then raised the issue of communal trust
of the judicial process.

He discussed the importance of

generating the feeling in a democratic society that justice
is being done,

82

quoting from Daniel Webster, that

11

In a

government like ours, entirely popular, care should be taken
in every part of the system, not only to do right, but to

80

Id., at 168 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).

81

Id., at 170.
Lest one suggest that the prevailing winds in England
favoring the notion of natural law had changed, Justice
Frankfurter cited various English cases as well.
Board of
Education v. Rice, [1911] A.C. 179 is the leading case that
emphasized the importance of an opportunity to be heard.
There, Lord Loreburn said, "I need not add that ... [the Board
of Education] must act in good faith and fairly listen to
both sides, for that is a duty lying upon everyone who
decides anything ... always giving a fair opportunity to those
who are parties in the controversy for correcting or
contradicting any relevant statement prejudicial to their
view." Id., at 82. The Committee on Ministers' Powers
reported in 1936 that while in administrative determination,
a minister 11 • • • ought not to depart from or offend against
'natural justice.' 11 Three principles of natural justice
were stated to be that "a man may not be a judge in his own
case," that "no party ought to be condemned unheard," and
that "a party is entitled to know the reason for the
decision." Report of Committee on Ministers' Powers, Cmd.
4060, pp. 75-80. McGrath, at 170, n. 17.
82

Id . , at 172 .
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satisfy the community that right is done. " 83

Frankfurter

also quoted an opinion of the Lord Chief Justice of England
who wrote in a similar vein,

"Time and again this court has

said that justice must not only be done, but must manifestly
be seen to be done. " 84
A similar line of reasoning applies in the case of a
disciplinary hearing in a non-public school.
must be done.

First, justice

This can only be accomplished, as Justice

Frankfurter reminds us, by assuring the student's natural
right to hear the charges against him and rebut those
charges.

Second, the student, and his guardian parents,

should perceive that justice is being done.

A school that

wants and expects its students to trust its educational and
disciplinary system must provide a system that offers the
student every opportunity to exonerate himself.

This is

especially true when the student risks the stigma of
expulsion and the specter of limited education.
Justice Douglas's dissent in Poe v. Ullman 85 adds his
83

Id., n. 19, quoting Daniel Webster, 5 The Writings
and Speeches of Daniel Webster 163.
84

Rex v. Bodmin JJ [1947] 1 K.B. 321, 325.
See
McGrath, 341 U.S. at 172 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
85

Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 515 (1961) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting) . This case dealt the significance of an accused
criminal who "pleaded the Fifth Amendment" in a state court.
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name to the list of those who would use the Fourteenth
Amendment to incorporate the entire Bill of Rights. This is
because of his belief that the original intent of the
Framers of the Constitution was to enshrine certain rights
in the Constitution.

The rights to be enshrined were those

that have been deeply etched in the foundations of America's
freedomsB 6 and experience has indicated were indispensable
to a free society.B 7

These rights have also gained content

from the emanations of other specific guarantees.BB

All of

this constitutes Justice Douglas's view of what is to be
included under the rubric of "due process of law."

Justice

Douglas also remarks that "[t]his has indeed been the view
of a full court of nine Justices, though the members who
make up the court unfortunately did not sit at the same

Since the Fifth Amendment is a federal, not state, right,
the question was raised whether the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated the Fifth to protect against self-incrimination
in a state court.
B6 See Justice William J. Brennan Jr., "The Bill of
Rights and the States," 36 New York University Law Review
761,

776
B

7

(1961).

Poe V.

Ullman, 367 U.S. at 516.

BBid. at 517, citing N.A.A.C.P. v. State of Alabama,
357 U.S.

449,

460

(1958).
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time.

1189

Justice Harlan wrote his own dissenting opinion. 90

He

once again points to the origin of due process: Magna
Charta's "per legem terrae."

This doctrine was added to the

Constitution to embrace those rights "which are
fundamental; which belong ... to the citizens of all free
governments,

91

for the "purposes of securing which men

enter into society." 92
Justice Harlan also opined that the fact that the Fifth
Amendment of the Constitution provided for due process, and
this Amendment is subsumed by the Fourteenth Amendment,
there must be some discrete meaning to each guaranty of due
process.

He felt that due process is a discrete concept

that subsists as an independent guaranty of life, liberty,
and procedural fairness, more general and inclusive than the

89

Id. Justice Douglas lists the nine as: Justices
Bradley, Swayne, Field, Clifford, and Harlan. Also, Brewer,
Black, Murphy, Rutledge, and himself. Poe v. Ullman, Id. n.
8.
90

Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 522 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) .
91

Id. at 541, citing Corfield v. Coryell, Fed. Cas. No.

3,230.
92

See Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 385, 388 (1798).
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specific prohibitions of the Bill of Rights. 93

At the same

time, Harlan maintained the Court's hesitation to reduce due
process to a formula.

He preferred to interpret the Court's

decisions as the continuing balancing of demands for respect
for the individual and for the liberties and demands of
organized society. 94

A tradition was beginning to develop

which indicated that due process fit on a continuum of
freedom from all arbitrary impositions and purposeless
restraints. 95
We see clearly that many Supreme Court justices have,
over the years, pointed to an American tradition for the
proffering of due process.

Moreover, every institution that

is in a superior position over a subordinate individual
would seem to fall under the rubric of this offering.
Natural justice requires that the institution should make
sure that procedural fairnesses are followed to prevent the
denigration of the subordinate.

This seems to be the

acceptable way for balancing the competing demands for selfexpression, especially in a private school.

On the one

hand, the school should be free to exist and be run
93

Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. at 541.

94

Id. at 542.

95

Id. at 543.
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according to the private will of its governors.

On the

other hand, the student also deserves an opportunity for
self-expression.

If the two values collide, the conflict

can be resolved through open, two-sided communication.
Allowing specifically for due process in a non-public school
serves as a guaranty that the disciplinary action is,
indeed, not arbitrary or capricious.
Griswold v. Connecticut 96 raised the question of the
fundamental privacy of the marital relationship.

This

relationship was not recognized by the Bill of Rights
explicitly.

Justice Goldberg, writing in concurrence,

stated that the "liberty" rights guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause are "not confined to the specific terms of
the Bill of Rights.

1197

Justice Goldberg believed that

"this Court has never held that the Bill of Rights or the
Fourteenth Amendment protect only those rights that the
Constitution specifically mentions by name. 98
One of the significant points of Griswold is its study

96

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The
case discussed the state's right to limit the use of
contraception by married couples.
97

Id. at 486.

98

Id. n. 1.
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of the Ninth Amendment. 99

The conclusion is drawn that the

language and history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the
Framers of the Constitution believed that there are
additional "fundamental" rights, protected from governmental
infringement, which exist alongside those "fundamental"
rights specifically mentioned in the first eight
amendments . 100

Although the Constitution does not state

explicitly what these rights may be, perhaps it is
tradition, experience, or the requirements of a free society
that may bring other rights to the fore.

101

Whatever these

rights may be, and however they are accurately defined, the
due process clause is said to include them.
in dissent,

102

Justice Black,

provides the reader with a long list of

cases where the Due Process Clause was used to protect
against any abridgement of natural justice . 103

He

99

U.S. Constitution amend. IX, ratified in 1791,
states: "The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people."
100

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 488.

101

See Poe, 3 67 U.S. at 517 (Douglas, J. , dissenting) .

102

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 511 (Black, J., dissenting)

103

These include, for example: The Court may forbid
state action which "shocks the conscience," in Rochin v.
California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952), or goes against the
"decencies of civilized conduct," Id. at 173, or has "some

65
concludes with the suggestion that the "clearest, frankest,
and brief est explanation of how this due process approach
works is ... that this Court is to invoke the Due Process
Clause to strike down state procedures or laws which it can
'not tolerate.'

11104

It is this writer's belief that

suspension from a non-public school is certainly within the
"catchwords and catch phrases" 105 used by the Supreme
Court.

Denial of such a time-honored and universal practice

as due process should shock our collective conscience.

We

should protest the disciplinary action that would occur
without the provision by the school administrators of the
"fundamental" right of due process.
We have seen that the doctrine of natural rights and
justice is still very much alive in our judicial

principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked fundamental," in
Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934) or cannot
be involved in the "denial of fundamental fairness, shocking
to the universal sense of justice," in Adkins v. Children's
Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 561 (1923).
See Griswold, 381 U.S.
at 512, n.4 (Black, J., dissenting).
104

Griswold, Id., citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S.
618, 631 (1964).
105

Id. at 511,

n. 4.
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culture. 106

This doctrine assures the realization of this

study's goal of finding the private school student's right
to Due Process.

The Due Process Clause has been shown to

serve as the constitutional assurance for fundamental
fairness that must legally be provided to these students at
all times.

When a private school student would come before

a court claiming disciplinary expulsion without due process,
the court would be required to reverse the expulsion.
Because of the doctrine of natural law, the court must
insist on the provision of due process to all, by all.
Thus far,

this study has looked at "due process" rights

as the right to procedural fairness.

Each student has a

natural right to an impartial hearing and an opportunity for
rebuttal before being punished.

These fairnesses have

become known as "procedural due process."
decision of Lochner v. New York,

107

Since the 1905

the United States

Supreme Court has recognized the category of "substantive
due process."

This category protects all rights stated

106

Justice Stevens, dissenting in Meachum v. Fano, 427
U.S. 215, 229 (1975) (Stevens, J., dissenting), reminded us
of our commitment to the notion "that all men were endowed
by their Creator with liberty as one of the cardinal
inalienable rights.
It is that basic freedom which the Due
Process Clause protects ... " See Id. at 230.
107

Lochner v. New York,

198 U.S.

45

(1905).
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explicitly, or implicitly, by the Constitution against being
diminished without a compelling reason.
Where do the protections of the two types of "due
process" fit in the doctrine of natural law?

In this

writer's judgment, the historical development of natural
law, from Magna Charta to Lord Coke to the Declaration of
Independence to specific judicial decisions point to the
natural right of fundamental fairness.

Every student is

entitled to a hearing in front of objective judges, with the
opportunity for rebuttal and perhaps the testimony of
witnesses before disciplinary action is imposed upon them.
These fundamental fairnesses comprise "procedural due
process."
At the same time,
part of natural law.

"substantive due process" is also
The same doctrine of natural law that

allows for nullification of legislation that is contrary to
natural justice finds expression in the constitutional
protections of "substantive due process."

Daniel Webster

quotes Lord Coke that a law that goes against one's natural
rights is immediately void; Blackstone writes that even the
King of England must follow the existing law.

This

overriding power of natural law is included in the modern
day notion of "substantive due process."

The requirement to

68

show a compelling reason to allow the limitation of one's
natural ("fundamental") rights is the Constitution's
equivalent to Lord Coke and Blackstone.
contemporary aspects of due process,

Thus, both

"procedural" and

"substantive," include the requirements of natural law.
As school administrators implementing a discipline
program, it is more common to face issues of "procedural due
process."

An administrator who refuses to follow the proper

procedures has severely limited the student's natural right.
The consequence of this limitation should be nullification
of the administrator's decision.

Couple the student's

natural right to procedural fairness with the natural right
to education, to be discussed in the next section of this
chapter, and nullification of the disciplinary action is
clearly warranted.
As administrators facing the possibility of a student's
long-term suspension or expulsion, the larger issue of
natural rights to due process in general and education in
particular are invoked.

Then "substantive due process" is

appropriate to show why the needs of the school, and perhaps
the student, are fulfilled only with the student's removal
from the school responsible for providing the "fundamental"
benefit of education.
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THE NATURAL RIGHT TO EDUCATION
There remains the natural right to education that must
be reviewed.

The Due Process Clause, as the "protector" of

natural rights should also protect the student's
"fundamental" right to education.
Education is a universal value . 108

All human

societies educate their young in matters practical (e.g.,
avoidance of dangers) and also speculative or theoretical
religion).

(e.g.,

St. Thomas Aquinas taught that there are

several "first" principles and general precepts of natural
law.

After "human life," he lists the coupling of man and

woman and the education of the young . 109

Aquinas is quite

clear that education is a natural right of the young.

If we

couple this natural right to know with Aristotle's teaching,
that all people have a desire to know,

110

then it becomes

clear that education should be protected, by the tenets of
due process and natural law, from limitation.
Further, Aristotle said that the best thing for a

108

John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, Oxford,
England: Clarendon Press, 1984), 83.
109

St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica I-II q. 94, a.
2c. Aquinas also lists "to shun ignorance" as part of
natural inclinations.
Id.
110

Aristotle, Metaphysics, I, 1: 980a22.
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person to know is the highest good in the whole of nature;
this is God. 111
problem:

The reader will immediately sense the

Children have a natural interest to learn, society

wants them to learn its ways, and these ways include
knowledge of God.

If the school accomplishes its most

desirable goals, it will be teaching about God to actively
involved students who are absorbing the teachings and
implementing them in society.
There is no problem with this multiple accomplishment
in a private sectarian school.

The realization of these

goals is often the very reason parents enroll their children
in this type of school.

They will be pleased to see their

children learning about God and living by His word in
society.

But there is a major problem in the public non-

sectarian sector!

Thomas Jefferson spoke of the "wall of

separation" that must separate between church and state,
religion and the government . 112

The public schools cannot

constitutionally teach the very educational goals and
natural rights of Aristotle and Aquinas.
Accordingly, if a private school takes disciplinary
111

Id.,

112

I, 2:982b7-8.

cited in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,
16 (1947)
citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 u.s.· 145,
164 (1878), citing 8 Thomas Jefferson's Works 113.
I
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action against a student and the student leaves in favor of
a public school, then the education the student will receive
has changed dramatically.

As a public school student he

will be deprived of his natural rights to learn about God
and live a religious lifestyle.

Deprivation of such natural

rights should not be done without procedural fairness.
The Pierce court held that the religious rearing of
their children is a "fundamental" right of parents. 113

For

a private school to deprive the parents of this opportunity,
and for students to lose their enriched education, may
warrant more than simple procedural fairness.

The school

should seriously consider showing that the student has
"earned" this expulsion and that all other, less traumatic,
solutions were futile.
Certainly, a public school student could study
religious teachings in the privacy of home, thus obviating
the spiritual distress of expulsion from a religious school.
This is, however, not necessarily the case.
not be the best place for this study.
polis (state) is the "great pedagogue."

The home may

As Plato taught, the
It is, therefore,

the state's function to educate the child, not the

113

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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parent's . 114

According to Aristotle, 115 it is the polis

that must ultimately provide whatever is necessary for the
full and complete development of the person. 116

It is the

school, as the professional extension of society for the
education of its young, that is responsible to teach, not
the home . 117
The school, as an extension of society, non-sectarian
or sectarian, must teach its society's values. 118

In

addition to the knowledge component that the school must
114

Plato, Polis VIII, I: 1337a23-32.

115

Cited in Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights, at
closing note on VI.6, p. 160.
116

This is the underlying reasoning of the doctrine of
parens patriae, where the state may use its authority and
guardianship of the child to assure that he is properly
educated.
See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944)
and Gardner v. Hall, 26 A.2d 799 (1942).
117

Aristotle' s notion of the state's ultimate
responsibility to prepare the child for adult citizenhood
need not be seen as contradictory to the United States
Supreme Court decision in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925), that the parents have a natural right to
rear their child as they please.
Pierce is a free exercise
of religion decision, indicating that parents may select the
school they prefer. But the children must get educated, as
the state has an interest in educated citizens who can
participate in our form of democracy and be self-reliant and
self-sufficient participants in society. This was also the
state's argument in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
and was accepted by the Court at 221.
118

absent a contradictory value, as discussed above,
such as the separation of Church and State.
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impart, it must also teach such social values as mutual
respect.

Since the best teaching is by example, procedural

fairness should be followed so that the student who is being
disciplined and his schoolmates learn about respect.

The

lesson to the students will be clear: Even a student who is
being punished deserves to be treated with respect!
There is a further consideration for the school before
its personnel expel a student.

The school is acting on

behalf of the student's political or religious governing
board.

One of the objectives in the founding of this

communal institution was for its members to realize the
highest ideals of the "good life."

A student whose behavior

contradicts those ideals, or who prevents others from
realizing their's, is often censured.

The board is usually

given the right to perform this censure, according to
certain guidelines and procedures.

The censuring should be

done at the level of the "highest ideals.

11119

This

undoubtedly includes the providing of the "higher order"

119

This is especially the case if the censured child is
being excluded from membership or participation in the
group. Abraham Maslow has written extensively (beginning in
the 1950's, with Motivation and Personality, New York:
Harper and Row, 1954) about the natural need that people
feel for belongingness to a group. To affect that natural
and basic need of belonging to a group without the
protection of procedural fairnesses cannot be countenanced.
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right of due process to the affected student.
This chapter surveyed over two thousand years of
thinking on the subject of natural law and rights.

From the

earliest of time, man believed that there are certain laws
of nature that must be upheld at all times.

Man does not

create these laws, but discovers God's laws in nature.
This notion remained in effect even after Positive
(human) Law was codified.

The balance between positive and

natural law was that man is morally bound to follow the
natural law for the sake of reaching perfection.
Concurrently, good positive law reflects God's idealized
version of law and gains legitimacy from its approximation
to natural law.
The Magna Charta is seen as the early code of justice
that led eventually to our United States Constitution.

The

Magna Charta requires certain procedural fairnesses that
have remained in effect ever since.

The Magna Charta also

taught, with clarification by Lord Coke, that a law that
violates a natural law is automatically void.
The content of natural law has remained vague.

In

general, man is to use his power of reason to determine the
content of natural law.

Even in today's jurisprudence,

where the natural law is often reflected in the modern "due

75

process," the Supreme Court has purposely not given a
specific delineation of what due process rights entail.
This chapter also reviewed the importance of including
natural law in the codification and implementation of
positive law.

It looked at ways to interpret the apparent

changes in natural law that God commanded.
It was determined that natural law is still very much a
part of the American legal heritage.

This began with the

"inalienable rights" clause of the Declaration of
Independence and has continued well into our century.
Various Supreme Court decisions have renewed America's
commitment to the notion of an ideal law and world which is
ours to discover.
Special analysis was suggested, showing that the right
to education itself is a natural right.

This brought us

squarely to the contention that disciplinary action in a
private school requires procedural fairness before it will
be legitimized or accepted by a court of law.

In essence,

both due process and natural law are natural rights of our
personhood.

If they must be diminished, natural law

requires that basic procedural fairness,

such as a hearing

and opportunity for rebuttal, be forthcoming.

It was also

suggested that where the door of education is completely
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closed to students, a higher level of "due process" should
be required.

This level, similar to "substantive due

process," would require the school to show that no better
option was available to it save expulsion.
As for the claim that the United States Constitution
requires that due process be provided only if there is
"state action," it was shown that natural law supersedes
these constitutional requirements.

Thus, the constitutional

rights of "due process," that are derived from natural law,
apply to public and private school students alike.
Constitution was formalized,

When the

it included natural law in its

precepts -- not to the exclusion of the individual, but to
the inclusion of the state.

CHAPTER III
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS IN CASES OF DEPRIVATION OF
PROPERTY AND LIBERTY RIGHTS FOR PRIVATE SCHOOL STUDENTS
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that
public school students have a constitutional right to due
process of law. 1

This decision is based on the language of

the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution:
" ... [N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law."

Public

schools are considered extensions of the state and, thus,
must provide all of the usual constitutional safeguards. 2
Public school students "do not shed their rights at the
schoolhouse door." 3
What is the law regarding the constitutional rights of
private school students?

This question has never been

addressed by the Supreme Court.

Lower courts, however, have

typically found that constitutional rights do not apply to

1

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).

2

Id. at 572.

3

Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393
U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
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non-public school students. 4

This is because of the

particular wording of the Fourteenth Amendment: " ... Nor
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law." 5
This chapter will address the question of whether
constitutional rights that have been accorded public school
students are applicable to non-public school students.

The

decisions in the public school cases as well as various
private school cases will be reviewed.

In addition,

alternate ways of looking at the same legal background will
be proposed in an attempt to secure constitutional rights
for private school students.
As background for these decisions, we shall review the
doctrine of "due process" in the United States Constitution.
This study's chapter on Natural Law describes the
historical, social and moral aspects of "due process."

This

chapter deals with its place as a protector of the
"property" and "liberty" rights of education.
The concept of "due process of law" appears in the Bill
of Rights, specifically in the Fifth Amendment to the United
4

The original decision, followed by many state courts,
is Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind. 1970),
445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971).
5

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Emphasis added.
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States Constitution.

There we find,

"nor [shall any person]

be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law."

As explained in the chapter on Natural

Rights, the Fifth Amendment applies only to the federal
Government.

However, the phrase "due process of law" was

later made applicable to state governments by the Fourteenth
Amendment, Section One, which states: "Nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law."
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"DUE PROCESS OF LAW"

A DEFINITION

An accurate and exact definition of "Due Process of Law" has
never been provided by the United States Supreme Court.

The

phrase has been studied, with ongoing attempts at
determining a clear definition of its meaning.

It is clear

that "due process of law" is related to a fundamental
fairness that must be provided before the government
deprives someone of his property or liberty.

The Supreme

Court has generally held that "due process" requires that
notice and the right to a fair hearing be provided before
the deprivation. 6

The Court has preferred to leave "due

process" without

a fixed meaning, and allow it to expand

with jurisprudential attitudes of fundamental fairness.

7

Furthermore, what fairness must be accorded is not
specifically mandated.

Instead, "considerations of what

procedures due process may require under any given set of
circumstances must begin with a determination of the precise
nature of the government function involved as well as the
private interest that has been affected by governmental
action. 0

Justice Frankfurter recognized the historical and

6

See Frank v. Mangum,

7

See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937)

0

See Goldberg v. Kelley, 397 U.S. 254, 262-63

237 U.S. 309 (1915).

(1970)
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legal importance of due process, and explained why it has
not been defined with precision.
The requirement of "due process" is not a
fair weather or timid assurance.
It must be
respected in periods of calm and in times of
trouble; it protects aliens as well as citizens.
But "due process," unlike some legal rules, is not
a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances.
Expressing as it does in its ultimate analysis
respect enforced by law for that feeling of just
treatment which has been evolved through centuries
of Anglo-American constitutional history and
civilization, "due process" cannot be imprisoned
within the treacherous limits of any formula.
Representing a profound attitude of fairness
between man and man, and more particularly between
the individual and government, "due process" is
compounded of history, reason, the past course of
decisions, and stout confidence in the strength of
the democratic faith which we profess. Due
process is not a mechanical instrument.
It is not
a yardstick.
It is a delicate process of
adjustment inescapably involving the exercise of
judgment by those whom the Constitution entrusted
with the unfolding of the process. 9
The Justices of the Supreme Court are telling us to
define the Due Process Clause by what it does, not by what
it is.

This is why Justice Frankfurter also wrote,

"Due

process of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of
respect for those personal immunities which are so rooted in
the tradition and conscience of the nation as to be ranked

9

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath,
U.S. 123, 162-63 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(emphasis added) .
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as implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.

1110

Justice Frankfurter wrote his comments in the context
of Chief Justice Taft's historical note.
wrote,

Chief Justice Taft

"The legislative power of a State can only be exerted

in subordination to the fundamental principles of right and
justice which the guaranty of due process in the Fourteenth
Amendment is intended to preserve ...

1111

Chief Justice Taft was relating to the primary concern
of the people at the time that the national government was
being formed.

This concern was that the nascent national

government would be unconstrained by common-law principles.
The people feared that the federal government might impinge
upon liberties in ways that private entities could not,
simply by invoking sovereign immunity.

Thus, the Bill of

Rights was added to the Constitution to formalize what was
already common policy for all, including individual persons.
If we, purposely, do not have a clear definition of Due
Process of Law, we do, at least have an historical context.
This context provides us with some detail of the notion's
importance and applicability.

When the federal government

was required to provide "due process," as stated in
10

Rochin v.

11

Truax v. Lorrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 329 (1921)

California,

342 U.S. 165 ( 1952) .
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Amendment V, then we know that this had also been incumbent
upon all private individuals as well.
Rights did not create new rights.
rights that had been extant.

For the Bill of

Rather, it codified the

Thus, Due Process of Law,

although a constitutional requirement, was also a person-toperson requirement of equal importance. 12

An historic

vision of constitutional rights would require nongovernmental schools to provide the same "fundamental"
rights guaranteed by the governmental schools.
We know what the Due Process Clause does.
essential freedoms and liberties.

It protects

It may not be clear which

rights actually merit a place in the hierarchy of essential
freedoms and liberties included in the ''Due Process" Clause,
but few would disagree that a person is entitled to notice
and an opportunity to be heard. 13

We also know that the

Due Process Clause protects "fundamental" rights from
encroachment, though there may be disagreements regarding
which rights may claim "fundamentality."

All agree,

however, that the rights included in the first eight
Amendments to the United States Constitution are
12

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, 341 U.S. at

163.
13

0' Brien, 3 Journal of Law and Education 175, 188
(1974) .

84
11

fundamental.

14

1114

Adamson v.

California,

232 U.S. 46

(1947).
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"DUE PROCESS" AND "FUNDAMENTAL" RIGHTS
Experience has taught us that constitutional rights
evolve.

The United States Supreme Court has defined rights

that were not included in the original wording of the
Constitution, nor were they necessarily part of the Framers'
original intent.

In recent years, the Supreme Court has

identified and defined what may be considered new rights in
such areas as privacy, 15 desegregation,
rights,

17

16

women's

and the right to travel. 18

There are certain rights that were always understood as
the basic rights of our society.

These rights, often

referred to as "fundamental" rights, were shared by each and
every resident of the land.

The Court did not rely on the

common law alone to provide protection for these values
considered "fundamental."

Rather, it read these

"fundamental" rights into the Constitution.

Where it was

once thought that certain rights were protected from
invasion by sources such as the common law, and in no other
need of safeguarding, it became clear that those socially
15

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

16

Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483

17

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).

18

United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966).

(1954).
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important rights needed better protection.

The Court

provided that protection when it judged certain rights to be
"fundamental."
"Due process" provides this higher level of protection.
The ''state action"

doctrine has been used to "allow" abuses

of certain rights by insulating individuals from the
requirements of "due process."

These abuses weaken

important rights. To buttress the protection that due
process rights provide, the "state action" requirement
should be removed.

This would preserve the original intent

of the Framers who were careful to include the "due process"
protections in the Bill of Rights.
"Due process" carries a glorious and well-respected
past.

All residents of the United States are entitled to

the fundamental fairness guaranteed by the "Due Process"
clause.

Thus, we find,

"[Due Process] is a rule founded on

the first principle of natural justice, older than written
constitutions, that a citizen shall not be deprived of his
life, liberty, or property without an opportunity to be
heard in defense of his rights.

1119

Surely, private school

children should be accorded the fairness guaranteed by the

19

Stewart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, 190, 30 Am. Re·p. 289
(1878) .
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Constitution itself if not its history and subsequent
adjudication.

Although the case history may not be

available to prove all children's right to due process
before sustaining disciplinary action in school, the
Fourteenth Amendment should be seen as flexible enough to
accommodate such a possibility.
It is true that the literal language of the Fourteenth
Amendment would make it seem that providing "due process"
rights is the obligation of the state only, to the exclusion
of private parties.

This is the common interpretation of

the Due Process Clause. 20

However, in United States v.

Guest we find dicta by six justices that Congress can
legislate to apply the Fourteenth Amendment restrictions to
private parties as well. 21

In accordance with the Guest

dicta, legal reasoning will be suggested to extend "due
process" rights to non-public school students.

Nor shall any state deprive any person of
liberty or property without the due process of law."
Const. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
2011

21

Guest, 383 U.S. at 762 (Clark, J., concurring).

U.S.
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STUDENTS' "DUE PROCESS" RIGHTS IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Public schools are considered an arm of the state, with
very specific requirements applying to them.

The theory

behind these requirements will be reviewed for its
applicability to non-public schools.
As stated earlier, the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution guarantees due process of law if
governmental action interferes with the life, liberty, or
property of an individual.

This guaranty of due process was

extended to juveniles in 1967 when the Supreme Court
recognized that minors have the same constitutional rights
as adults. 22
An earlier case, in a lower court, may have been the
harbinger of these rights.

In Dixon v. Alabama State Board

of Education, a case involving college students who had been

disciplined for participation in a sit-in protest, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
declared:
The question presented by the pleadings and evidence,
and decisive of this appeal, is whether due process
requires notice and some opportunity for hearing before
students at a tax supported college are expelled for
misconduct. We answer that question in the

22

In re Gault, 3 8 7 U. S . 1

( 19 6 7) .
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affirmative ... 23
Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that college
students attending a state university were entitled to the
constitutional rights of due process before they could be
expelled.

The court also discussed what procedure should be

expected from the schools in the provision of "due
process.

1124

It was not until 1975 that the United States Supreme
Court decided a case of due process rights for pre collegeaged students.

Goss v.

Lopez25 is the landmark case in the

area of student discipline and expulsions, holding that
public school students are entitled to "due process" before
being suspended for ten days or less.

Goss v. Lopez

involved students from Columbus, Ohio, who were suspended
from their public high schools for up to ten days without a
hearing.

The students brought a class action suit against

their school officials seeking a declaratory judgment that
the Ohio statute permitting such suspensions was
unconstitutional.

A three-judge District Court agreed with

23

Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F.2d
150, 151 (5th Cir. 1961) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1962).
24

Id. at 159.

25

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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the students, declaring that they were denied due process of
law when they were suspended without a hearing.

The Supreme

Court upheld the District Court's finding, and held that (i)
Public school students have property and liberty interests
that qualify for protection under the Fourteenth
Amendment 26 and (ii) Due Process requires, in connection
with a suspension of ten days or less, that students be
given oral or written notice of the charges against them.
If they deny these charges, they must be given an
explanation of the evidence against them and an opportunity
to present their side. 27

Generally the notice and hearing

should precede the suspension.

If this is not feasible, as

in a case where the student needs to be removed from the
school premises immediately, then the hearing should be held
as soon as practicable. 28
The Goss case, then, guarantees due process rights for
public school students.

The courts have not yet recognized

the same rights and procedures for private school students.
Below, we shall review aspects of this Supreme Court
decision in depth to see where the nuances of public and
26

Id. at 574.

27

Id. at 581.

28

Id. at 582-3.
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private education may interface.
As we have seen, the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the
state to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without the due process of law.

An important Supreme Court

decision gave meaning to "liberty" and "property."

The

Court stated in Board of Regents v. Roth, 29 that property
interests "are not created by the Constitution.

Rather,

they are created and their dimensions are defined by
existing rules or understandings that stem from an
independent source such as state law -- rules or
understandings that secure certain benefits and that support
claims of entitlement to these benefits." 30

"Property" is

protected by the Constitution, but the definition of this
"property" comes from existing laws and statutes.
Public education is an excellent example of a
"property" right protected by the United States
Constitution.

The constitution of every state guarantees

free public education to its children.

Public education

thereby, after the Roth decision, became a "property" right
of the children.

When a school seeks to suspend a child

from participation in this "property" right, the school, in
29

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).

30

Id. at 577.
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accordance with the Fourteenth Amendment, must provide the
child with procedural fairness, or the "due process of
law. " 31

Because of this property right, the Goss Court

ruled that,

" ... [O]n the basis of state law,

[these high

school students] plainly had legitimate claims of
entitlement to a public education.

1132

And, these claims

could not be withdrawn "on claims of misconduct absent
fundamentally fair procedures to determine whether the
misconduct had occurred. " 33
The Court viewed education as a "property" right of the
students.

When a school imposes disciplinary action to

limit that property right, it must provide fundamental
fairness.

The Goss Court's decision outlined the content of

these procedures. 34

Had the Court decided that education

31

A broader reading of Goss would indicate that if a
state deprives a citizen of the level of education to which
state law has entitled that citizen, then the state must
provide notice and a hearing to explain the deprivation. See
Allan W. Hubsch, "Education and Self-Government: The Right
to Education Under State Law. 18 Journal of Law and
Education 93, 110 (1989).
32

Goss, 419 U.S. at 573.

33

Id. at 574.

34

For suspensions from school of ten days or less, the
Goss Court required that the public school provide the
student with: "Oral or written notice of the charges against
him, and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence
the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side
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is a "fundamental" right of children, then the errant
student would have been entitled to much more.

If the San

Antonio v. Rodriguez35 decision had been that education was

a constitutionally protected "fundamental" right, then the
Court would require the school to present a compelling
reason why a student should be suspended. 36

This

"fundamental" right is a more serious constitutional right,
and better protected from abridgement.

Goss was decided

after Rodriguez, and the Court was consistent in approach.
of the story." Goss, 419 U.S. at 581.
35

San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).

36

The procedure of finding a compelling reason to
justify the abridgement of a "fundamental" right is called,
in constitutional terms, "substantive due process."
The Fifth Circuit used this procedure in Debra P. v.
Turlington, 644 F.2d 397, reh'g denied, 654 F.2d 1079 (5th
Cir., 1981), when it required the state to provide
substantive justification for its deprivation of due
process.
"The due process violation potentially goes deeper
than deprivation of property rights without adequate notice.
When it encroaches upon concepts of justice lying at the
basis of our civil and political institutions, the state is
obligated to avoid action which is arbitrary and capricious,
does not achieve or even frustrates a legitimate state
interest, or is fundamentally unfair." Ibid., 644 F.2d at
404.
The court's requirement was based on the connection
between education and "our civil and political
institutions."
Thus, even if education may not be found to be a
fundamental right under the equal protection clause, it is a
fundamental interest under the substantive protections of
the due process clause.
See Hubsch, Supra note 163, at 113.
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According to Rodriguez, education is a "property" right, not
a "fundamental" right, so the only protection it needs is
"procedural due process. " 37
In addition to concluding that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment protects public school students
from the arbitrary deprivation of the property right to an
education, the Goss Court also held that it forbids the
arbitrary deprivation of a student's liberty rights. 38
Court cited Wisconsin v. Constantineau: 39

The

"'When a

person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at
stake because of what the government is doing to him,

140

the minimal requirements of the Clause must be
satisfied. " 41

The Goss Court found that the "Liberty"

right of a person to maintain his good reputation was at
stake when charges are brought that would cause his
suspension from school.

This "Liberty" right, like a

37

In these cases, "procedural due process" guarantees
only that a fair hearing will be provided the student before
the disciplinary action is affected.
38

" • • • [N] or shall any State deprive any person of
life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; ... "
(Emphasis added.)
39

Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433

40

Id. at 437.

41

Goss,

419 U.S. at 574.

(1971).
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property right, may not be withdrawn without fundamentally
fair procedures.
recorded,

42

The Court declared that "If sustained and

those charges could seriously damage the

students' standing with their fellow pupils and their
teachers as well as interfere with later opportunities for
higher education and employment. " 43

Thus, public school

students are entitled to due process based on their liberty
rights as well as their property rights.

They have a

property right to education, created by the state; they have
a liberty right to a good reputation and to a lack of social
stigma. 44
A further reason for the Goss Court extending due
process rights to these students is that students maintain
their rights as persons even within the classroom and school
building.

As decided in Tinker v. Des Moines School

District, 45 students do not "shed their constitutional

42

Regarding the consequence of inclusion in the
student's permanent record and his loss of a "liberty"
right, see Note, "Developments -- Academic Freedom" 81
Harvard Law Review 1045, 1153-54 (1968).
43

Goss, 419 U.S. at 575.

44

Regarding the social stigma attached to the
expulsion, see Note, Supra note 42, at 1138.
45

Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
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rights" at the schoolhouse door. 46

Additionally, the

Supreme Court has required public school districts to follow
all constitutional guidelines, recognizing schools to be
creations of the state: "The Fourteenth Amendment, as now
applied to the States, protects the citizen against the
State itself and all of its creatures -- Boards of Education
not excepted. " 47

46

Goss, 419 U.S. at 574 (quoting Tinker,

393 U.S. at

506)
47

Id. (quoting West Virginia Board of Education v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943)).
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THE APPLICATION OF THE GOSS DECISION IN THE PRIVATE SCHOOL
Much of the judicial reasoning in public school cases
applies to private school students as well.

Justice White,

in writing on behalf of the majority in Goss, deals with the
importance of openness in the disciplinary hearings.
Providing a hearing and an opportunity for students to
defend themselves are critical, because it is so difficult
to ascertain the truth without these hearings.
"Disciplinarians, although proceeding in utmost good faith,
frequently act on the reports and advice of others; and the
controlling facts and the nature of the conduct under
challenge are often disputed.

The risk of error is not at

all trivial, and it should be guarded against ... " 48
Quoting Justice Frankfurter in Anti-Fascist Committee

v. McGrath,

49

Justice White reminds us that "Fairness can

rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided determination of
facts decisive of rights ... " 5 °
stated,

Further, Frankfurter

"Secrecy is not congenial to truth-seeking and self-

righteousness gives too slender an assurance of rightness.
No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth
48

Id. at 580.

49

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, 341 U.S .. 123.

50

Id. at 170.
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than to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of
the case against him and opportunity to meet it. " 51
Justice White was referring to public schools in his
Goss opinion.

What he wrote regarding public schools

applies equally to private schools.

Private school

administrators will want to ascertain the true facts.

They

may always work in good faith, but this will not remove the
possibility of error.

The procedures that have helped

public school administrators find the truth and punish
accordingly will undoubtedly succeed in the private sector
as well.
Further, Justice White believes that the extent to
which the Court requires the provision of due process rights
to students is " ... [I]f anything, less than a fair-minded
school principal would impose upon himself in order to avoid
unfair suspensions.
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Here, again, Justice White was speaking of public
schools.

Justice White may be seen, however, to have chosen

an ambiguous expression,

"a fair-minded school principal,"

to extend his remarks to all schools and principals.

51

Goss, 419 U.S. at 580 (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee, Id., at 171-172).
52

Id. at 583.

Although Justice White never discussed private schools
explicitly, it appears that he would ask, if not demand, of
private school principals to be "fair-minded" and "impose
[procedural fairness] upon [themselves]
unfair suspensions.

in order to avoid
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There is an additional educational effect that may be
accomplished when all schools provide procedural fairness.
Many private schools boast of their teaching of democratic
ideals and American values.

An excellent way to teach a

concept is to show students how it is expressed in real
life.

The school personnel, regardless of the school's

governmental status, will undoubtedly want to employ due
process procedures and avoid unfair suspensions.

In this

way, the school will have inculcated within its students

on~

of the central ideas of American democracy: due process.
While Justice Powell wrote on behalf of the dissent in
Goss 54 because he believed that courts should not involve
themselves in the daily operations of the schools, he
nonetheless spoke to the importance of education in our
society:
Education in any meaningful sense includes the
s3Id.
54

(Goss v. Lopez was a 5-4 decision.)
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inculcation of an understanding in each pupil of the
necessity of rules and obedience thereto. This
understanding is no less important than learning to
read and write. One who does not comprehend the
meaning and necessity of discipline is handicapped not
merely in his education but throughout his subsequent
life.
In an age when the home and church play a
diminishing role in shaping the character and value
judgements of the young, a heavier responsibility falls
upon the schools ...
The lesson of discipline is not merely a
matter of the student's self-interest in the
shaping of his own character and personality; it
provides an early understanding of the relevance
of the social compact of respect for the rights of
others. The classroom is the laboratory in which
this lesson of life is best learned. Mr. Justice
Black summed it up:
"School discipline, like parental discipline, is
an integral and important part of training our children
to be good citizens -- to be better citizens." Tinker,
393 U.S., at 524 (dissenting opinion) . 55
As educators, Justice Powell contends, it is the
administrators responsibility to teach discipline and
responsibility-taking.

This includes the responsibility to

determine the truth when rules are broken.

Carefully

outlined procedures to determine the truth of an accusation
against a student are basic to any disciplinary system;
their exclusion would simply represent poor education.
Without studying about -- if not experiencing -- due
process, students lose the important lessons of citizenship:
to be responsible for one's actions, to trust the

55

Goss, 419 U.S. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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administrators that they will ascertain who was guilty and
to what extent, and that students will have a chance to
defend themselves.

The loss of such important a lesson in

citizenship is difficult to replace.

The lessons of

citizenship are important, regardless of the venue of
education.

Apparently, Justice Powell would have private

school administrators provide due process procedures as part
of their curriculum on "taking responsibility."
After Goss, it became established that students
attending American public schools are entitled to due
process before sustaining the punishments of a suspension of
ten days or less.

(The Court also said that suspensions of

longer duration or outright expulsions would warrant further
constitutional protections 56 . )

We have reviewed the

reasoning of Goss and found it to apply equally to private
schools.

The conclusion to draw is that private school

students are entitled to the same procedural fairness as
their public school counterparts.
The Goss court found education itself to be both a
"property" right 57 and a "liberty" right 58 of public school
56

Id. at 584.

57

Id. at 573.

58

Id. at 574-75.

102

students.

Goss relied on Board of Regents v. Roth 59 to

conclude that the state statutes regarding compulsory
education and each child's entitlement to free education
make education a property right.

These statutes and

entitlements apply to all children.

Some children happen to

fulfill the compulsory education requirement by attending
private schools. 60

Thus, we may say that private schools

are in the position of offering their students the
fulfillment of their state-guaranteed right to an education.
Logic should dictate that this state-guaranteed requirement
and attendant right should not be removed or hindered
without first providing due process.

59

60

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573

(1972).

The right of students to attend private schools was
resolved by the Supreme Court long ago, in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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PROVIDING "DUE PROCESS" AS A QUID PRO QUO
At least one writer makes a further argument for "due
process" rights for private school students based on the
state's requirement that children be educated.
requirement establishes a right to education,

61

Because this
then,

arguably, the state must also provide a quid pro quo 62 of
quality education and fundamental fairness before this
education is limited.

It would be unsightly to require a

child to attend an educational program, only to provide him
with a poor quality program.

Of course, the program may be

judged poor on academic standards or administrative
procedures.

To deprive the student of this compulsory (if

not quality) education without due process would be
unacceptable. 63

If the private school happens to be the

venue of this statutory fulfillment,

then it, mindful of the

quid pro quo, should provide due process before a student's

61

As seen above in Goss, 419 U.S. 565, and Roth, 408
U.S. 564.
62

" [S] omething for something
... that which the party
is promised in return for something he promises, gives,
or does ... " Steven H. Gifis, Law Dictionary, p. 381,
Woodbury, NY: Barron's Educational Series (1984).
63

Charles M. Masner, 21 Washburn Law Journal 555, 568571 (1982).
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expulsion or suspension. 64

64

Id. at 577-78.
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THE STATE'S PARENS PATRIAE ROLE IN EDUCATION
Yet another reason applies for recognizing private
school students' due process rights.

The state is

responsible to ensure that its children are educated.

This

is part of the state's role of parens patriae, where the
state is considered the ultimate guardian of children. 65
The state considers a child not as absolute property of a
parent, but rather a "trust" reposed in a parent by the
state. 66

Indeed, it is this reasoning which facilitates

state regulations of private schools. 67

Even as the right

to private education was recognized, in lieu of state
supported and administered schools, the state continues to
remain partially responsible for children's education in
private schools.

If the state is responsible for education,

and education (as described in Goss) includes the values of
citizenship and discipline, then the state should ensure
that an expanded notion of due process education is applied
to private schools.

Thus, when a student brings a suit

against a private school for expulsion without a hearing,
65

West Virginia v. Pfizer, 440 F.2d 1079, 1089 (1971).

66

Gardner v. Hall,

67

26 A. 2d 799, 809 (1942).

Cynthia Wittmer West, "The State and Sectarian
Education: Regulation to Deregulation," 1980 Duke Law
Journal 812.
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the court may reasonably require such a hearing as an aspect
of the quality education for which states are legally
responsible.
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IMPOSING "DUE PROCESS" TO PROTECT THE PARENT'S RIGHT
TO DIRECT THE CHILD'S EDUCATION
There is yet another approach to assuring due process
rights for private school students.

This approach is based

on the decisions in Pierce v. Society of Sisters 68 and
Board of Regents v. Roth. 69

The Pierce decision focused on

parents' "fundamental" right to rear their child according
to the tenets of their faith.

Private schools are an

acceptable alternative in the parents' fulfillment of the
compulsory education statutes.

Roth said that a statute

(such as compulsory education) could create a
constitutionally recognized property right.

Taken together,

these cases say that parents has a property right to rear
their child as appropriate, and to send this child to a
private school.

Moreover, it is a personal liberty of

parents to send their child to the school of their
choice. 70

Even if students have no inherent right to

attend a certain school, their parents may have a
"fundamental" right to send them to that school.

This right

68

See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) .
69

70

Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).

Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1397 (N.D.
Ind., 1970) .
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is based on the parents' "fundamental" right to rear their
child as they feel appropriate.

As noted above, in the

discussion of "substantive due process," "fundamental"
rights cannot be abridged without Due Process.

Thus, if the

private school wishes to curtail this important right of
parental prerogative and privacy, it must first establish
that its

decision is valid, by following due process

procedures.

The school must provide these procedures before

it limits the parents' "fundamental" right.
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"DUE PROCESS" AND THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO CONTINUANCE
IN THE PRIVATE SCHOOL
Another aspect of students' "property right" to an
education comes from contract law.

The nature of the

relationship between private schools and their students has
traditionally been defined as "contractual.

1111

Schools

present their students with certain publications and
guidelines before they register for enrollment.

Once they

register, they are seen as accepting the terms of
enrollment, which are described in schools' handbooks and
other publications.

Accordingly, the courts will generally

uphold the terms of the contract of enrollment.
This contract of enrollment, which defines the extent
of the legal relationship between schools and students, may
create certain rights for students.

This principle was

recognized in an early case, decided by a state court.
Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College,

72

In

the court found

that "when one is admitted to a college, there is an implied
understanding that he shall not be arbitrarily dismissed

71

See John B. Stetson University v. Hunt, 102 So. 637
(1924) and Samson v. Trustees of Columbia University, 167
N.Y.S. 202 (1917).
72

Booker v. Grand Rapids Medical College, 156 Mich. 95,
120 N.W. 589 (1909).
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therefrom." 73

Further, the Booker court stated,

"There is

no good reason why the law should not recognize, as growing
out of these relations, a right of realtors resting in
contract to be continued as students. " 74

Booker

establishes certain rights, of continued enrollment, for the
student who has maintained proper tuition payments and
academic good standing.

Once the student has earned these

rights, they should not be limited without the benefit of
due process.
Indeed, Ewing v. Board of Regents of University of
Michigan relied on Booker and concluded that a student has a

"property interest" in his continuance in his academic
prograrn. 75

Thus, a contractual understanding of continued

education in the private school rose to a constitutional
right, for property interests are mentioned in the United
States Constitution.

Relying once again on Roth, the United

States Supreme Court found that "property interests, which
may give rise to constitutional protections, are created and
defined by existing rules or understandings which stern from

73

Id.,

74

Id., 156 Mich. at 100, 120 N.W. at 589.

75

156 Mich. at 99, 120 N.W. at 594.

Ewing v. Board of Regents of University of Michigan,
742 F.2d 913, 915 (1984).
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independent sources, such as state law." 76

The Court has

also held that these property interests can arise from
explicit contractual provisions or "other agreements implied
from promiser's words or conduct in light of the surrounding
circumstances." 77
We have seen that, as long as students remain "in good
standing" at the school, they have a constitutionally
protected property right to continued education.

This right

is an outgrowth of the implied provision of continuance in
the contracts of enrollment.

This contractual right,

recognized by state law, creates a federal property right.
As such, it is clear that this right should not be curtailed
without first providing some justification for its
curtailment.

Procedural fairness should be forthcoming.

This chapter reviewed the right to "due process" of
public school students who face disciplinary action.

The

goal was to see if private school students are entitled to
the same constitutional procedures of fairness, even without
a finding,

in the private school, of "state action."

76

Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 577 (1972).
77

Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02

(1972).
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Goss, 70 the leading case in public education, found
that public school students are entitled to "due process"
rights.

This is because public schools are considered

extensions of the state, and have the requisite "state
action. " 79

Bright, 00 the leading case in non-public

education, found that private school students are not
entitled to "due process" for a failure to show "state
action."
This chapter undertook the formidable task of
overcoming the lack of "state action."

Seven approaches

were presented to neutralize the claim that private schools
lack "state action," and, consequently, have no
constitutional protections for their students' rights to
"due process."

These seven approaches include:

(i) The importance of "due process" in the American
tradition.

Sources were brought to show the inherent

importance of "due process" as well as its instrumental use
for protecting other constitutional values and rights.
78

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).

79

Thus, the public schools fulfill the literal
requirement of U.S. Const. amend. XIV§ 1: "· .. nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ... " Emphasis added.
00

Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F.Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind.
1970), 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971).
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The "Due Process" Clause was shown to be a protector of
rights that are themselves incorporated in the Constitution.
Justice Frankfurter wrote that,

"Due Process of Law is a

summarized Constitutional guarantee of respect for those
personal immunities which are so rooted in the tradition and
conscience of the nation as to be ranked as implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.
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The right to "due process" has been viewed by some to
be "fundamental."

This is a term of constitutional analysis

used when referring to a right so basic to our society that
it must almost always be provided.

If a "fundamental" right

must be limited, then it must be shown that there was an
overriding and important reason.

U.S.

v. Guest suggests

that Congress should apply "due process" rights to private
parties as well. 82

This would require all people and

private institutions to provide "due process" rights at all
times.
(ii) The private school student's constitutional
interest in education (as per Goss).

Even if the students'

private education itself is not protected by constitutional
protections for lack of "state action," education is still a
81

Rochin v.

82

United States v.

California,

342 U.S.

Guest,

165

383 U.S.

( 1952) .

745

(1966).

114

fulfillment of "liberty'' and "property" rights.

These

rights are constitutionally protected from limitation, and
should not suffer any change without procedural fairness.
Following these fairnesses will help to make certain that
the administrator's decision was correct and proper.

They

will teach the student a basic procedure in this country,
which teaches good citizenship as well.
Roth 83 indicates that property rights (which are
constitutionally protected) can be created by nonconstitutional sources, such as state statutes.

Statutes in

every state create a student's property right to education.
It should be irrelevant that the student happens to pursue
his state mandated education in a private school, as his
property right is protected.
(iii) Students' "liberty" right in education is also
protected.

This constitutionally recognized right preserves

the student's good name and reputation.

Because

disciplinary action at school often tarnishes a student's
reputation, the student is entitled to procedural fairness
before the action is implemented.
(iv) The state always maintains an interest in the
child's education.
83

This is by virtue of the state's role of

Roth, 408 U.S. 564.
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parens patriae.

It is this role that allows for state

regulation of private schools.

The point is that the same

allowance for state regulation to ensure quality academics
should also be brought as an ensurance by the state that
there is quality governance.

This quality might be

measured, in part, by the existence of procedural fairness
rules in the school.
(v) The quid pro quo of education.

This approach says

that if a state is requiring a student to attend a school,
then the school must provide certain procedural fairness in
return.

The compulsory education statute carries with it an

implied statement that the child fulfilling the statute will
be provided a quality program in return.
elementary administrative fairness,

Quality includes

regardless of the amount

of "state action" in the private school where the student
happens to fulfill the statute.
(vi) The parents' property right.

The parents have a

property right to send their child to a private religious
school. 84

If the child is expelled from school, then the

parents have lost their ability to fulfill their property
right to send their child to the specific school.

This

property right of the parents should not be diminished
84

See Pierce,

268 U.S. 510.
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without "due process."
(vii) The property right to have contracts fulfilled.
This property right looks at the contract of enrollment
agreed upon by the school and the student.

If the contract

calls for "due process" rights, then these rights must be
fulfilled.

Ewing8 5 concluded that students have a property

right in their continuance in their academic programs.

This

right is unrelated to "state action" and the school; it
focuses on the contractual relationship between the parties.
As every property right, it may be removed only after
procedural fairnesses have been followed.
In conclusion, it is reasonable and appropriate to
apply constitutional protections to a private school
student's right of attendance.

Although the prima facie

belief was that, in the absence of "state action,"
procedural fairness did not apply, we have seen that there
are many other constitutionally-related reasons why these
fairnesses should be brought to bear.

05

Ewing v. Board of Regents of University of Michigan,
742 F.2d 913 (1984).

CHAPTER IV
A STUDENT'S "FUNDAMENTAL" RIGHT TO AN EDUCATION AND THE
FULFILLMENT OF "DUE PROCESS" REQUIREMENTS
This chapter will address the question of whether
education may be considered a "fundamental" right of every
student.

If we may show that the right to an education is

considered a "fundamental interest" in a constitutional
sense, then a court will require "strict scrutiny" whenever
this right is diminished or abolished. 1

Of course,

education is not explicitly included in the United States
Constitution as a "fundamental" right.
v. Thompson,

2

However, in Shapiro

the United States Supreme Court concluded

that the "fundamental" rights doctrine extends strict equal
protection review to rights not necessarily found in the
letter of the Constitution.

Because "fundamental" status

may be extended to rights not explicitly stated in the
1

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-631, 634
(1969).
Earlier, Justice Douglas wrote in Harper v.
Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1969), "We
have long been mindful that where fundamental rights and
li:perties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause,
classifications which might invade or restrain them must be
closely scrutinized and carefully confined."
It must be
noted that the Equal Protection Clause is the second clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, immediately following the Due
Process Clause of the same Amendment.
2

Shapiro v. Thompson,

Id.
117
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Constitution, we must determine whether education may enter
this charmed circle of "fundamental rights."
A finding that the right to an education is
"fundamental" means that "substantive due process" rights
would apply.

"Substantive due process" protects liberties

and values explicitly or implicitly included in the
Constitution and long a part of the American heritage.

This

protection would subject the school to "strict scrutiny" of
its actions.

A long-term suspension or expulsion could only

be justified if the school had a compelling and overriding
reason for such a serious limitation on the "fundamental"
right to an education.

The mere reasonableness of a

school's decision would not be sufficient justification for
serious disciplinary action.

Also, a simple showing that

the school had followed procedural fairness

(also called

"procedural due process") would not justify the limitation
of the "fundamental" right to education.

Understandably,

the strict scrutiny of the court will include a review that
whatever procedures were followed by the administration were
open and fair.
A finding of "fundamentality" for education requires
that "substantive due process" norms be followed.

This is a

very strong statement about the importance of education and
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its protection.

It is unrelated to the public or private

school a student attends.

A finding of "fundamentality"

will achieve "due process" rights for private (and indeed
public) school students without a finding of "state action."
Under the court's additional scrutiny,

"state action" will

be an insignificant factor as the school tries to explain
its compelling reasons for limiting the student's
"fundamental" right to education.
Our study of the "fundamental" right to education will
review the majority and minority opinions of two United
States Supreme Court decisions related to this topic.

It

will also cite numerous state court decisions that have come
down in favor of the "fundamentality" of education on a
state level.

The state level is more appropriate for

decisions regarding education because education is a state,
not Federal, responsibility.

The chapter concludes with a

survey of judicial opinion explicitly including education as
a "fundamental" right of students, with all the
constitutional privileges and protections pertaining
thereto.
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THE LANDMARK SAN ANTONIO V. RODRIGUEZ DECISION
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that
education is not a "fundamental" right.

This decision was

reached in San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez. 3

This case tested the constitutional validity

of unequal funding of school districts within the state of
Texas, and found that this funding plan was constitutionally
valid.

One of the issues the Rodriguez Court discussed in

its landmark decision was education as a "fundamental"
right.

The Court concluded that education was not a

"fundamental" right of the student, though the final vote of
five justices to four indicates that the justices were
almost evenly divided on the question.

As a non-

"fundamental" interest, any scheme that limits the education
of some children must only pass the lenient standard of
rationality. 4

This means that the education of some

children may be limited (e.g., a student expelled) by the
state by the mere showing of rationality and non-capricious
decisions.

It also means that any laws and statutes in the

area of education need not pass any strict standard of review.

3

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973)
4

Id. at 98.
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The majority opinion in this decision was based in part
on administrative considerations.

One factor prompting the

Court to deny the "fundamental" status of education was the
perception that local property tax finance systems would not
pass muster under "strict" scrutiny. 5

The Justices feared

that classifying education as "fundamental" would lead to
invalidation across the country of all interdistrict
disparities in per pupil expenditures.

Requiring "strict

scrutiny" of per-pupil expenditures might also invalidate
virtually all systems of local budget control.

Of course,

this budgetary argument does not deal with the substantive
question of education as a "fundamental" right.

Instead, it

seems to indicate that the Court might have been prepared to
recognize this "fundamentality," were it not for the vexing
problem of interdistrict disparities.
The Rodriguez decision, focused on interdistrict
budgetary disparities, related to the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 6

One might think that

the Equal Protection Clause is unrelated to the Due Process
Clause.
5

6

This is not the case.

Two important points are

Id. at 16, 17 and n.41.

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 states: "
[N]or [shall
any state] deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws ... "
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explained at the end of Chapter V:

(i) The analysis that

applies to one clause of an amendment applies to other
clauses of the same amendment.

Both "due process" and

"equal protection" are clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
(ii) Once someone attempts to diminish a constitutional
right, special protections must be mustered to nullify the
attempts.

The protection against limitation of one

constitutional right will be applied equally to other
constitutional rights.

Jurisprudentially, there is no

significant difference between Equal Protection and Due
Process analyses.

This is discussed further in the section

on analysis of Rodriguez.
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JUSTICE MARSHALL'S IMPORTANT DISSENT
Our road to the "fundamentality" of education would
seem to have reached a dead end with the Supreme Court's
decision in Rodriguez.

Justice Marshall's dissent 7 shows

us an alternate path which raises other important issues
deserving of our renewed attention.

The majority had

claimed that "fundamental" rights must be stated explicitly
in the Constitution.

They wrote,

"fundamental interests,

which call for strict scrutiny of the challenged
classification, encompass only established rights which we
are somehow bound to recognize from the text of the
Constitution itself." 8

Justice Marshall fervently

disagreed with this contention.

He cites the Court's

findings of "fundamental interests" in cases regarding
interstate travel,

9

a state election. 11

procreation, 10 and the right to vote in
In all of these cases, the rights

delimited were not stated explicitly in the Constitution,
yet the Supreme Court found them to be "fundamental"
7

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

0

See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 99.

9

Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634.

10

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).

11

Reyn.o1ds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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interests nonetheless.

Justice Marshall concludes from

these disparate cases that the question of finding a
"fundamental" interest is not a textual one per se'.
Rather, the question must be resolved based on the quality
of the issue.

He wrote

The task in every case should be to determine the
extent to which Constitutionally guaranteed rights
are dependent on interests not mentioned in the
Constitution. As the nexus between the specific
Constitutional guarantee and the nonconstitutional
interest draws closer, the nonconstitutional
interests becomes more "fundamental" and the
degree of judicial scrutiny applied when the
interest is infringed on a discriminatory basis
must be adjusted accordingly . 12
Further, Justice Marshall bids us to pay close
attention to cases where "discrimination against important
individual interests with Constitutional implications and
against particularly disadvantaged or powerless classes is
involved. " 13

Such an approach seemed to be, according to

Justice Marshall,

"a part of the guarantees of our

Constitution and of the historic experiences with oppression
and discrimination against discrete, powerless minorities

12

Rodriguez,

dissenting) .
13

Id . at 10 9 .

411 U.S. at 102-103 (Marshall, J.,
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which underlie that document.

1114

The constitutional importance of education forced
Justice Marshall to see education as a "fundamental"
interest of the student.

"[T]he fundamental importance of

education is amply indicated by the prior decisions of this
Court, by the unique status accorded public education by our
society, and by the close relationship between education and
some of our most basic Constitutional values." 15
As support for his claim that education is a
"fundamental" right in our American society,
Marshall cites what he calls "this

Court~s

Justice

most famous

statement on the subject:"
Today, education is perhaps the most important
function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great
expenditures for education both demonstrate our
recognition of the importance of education to our
democratic society.
It is required in the
performance of our most basic public
responsibilities, even service in the armed
forces.
It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument
in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his

Id. It would appear to this author that a student
relative to the school may be compared to a powerless
minority relative to the government. Hence, the same
requirement and consideration should apply.
14

15

Rodriguez,

411 U.S. at 111.
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environment ... 16
Further, the Court has recognized that "[p]roviding
public schools ranks at the very apex of the functions of a
state." 17

Indeed, "[n]o other state function is so

uniformly recognized as an essential element of our
society's well-being.

111

s

Justice Marshall's opinion was clearly in line with
Justice Frank Murphy's dissenting opinion in Adamson v.
California. 19

Justice Murphy opined that other

"fundamental" rights, in addition to the specific guarantees
of the Constitution, must also be protected.

For Justice

Murphy, the Bill of Rights was just a constitutional
floor.

20

Subsequently, Justice William 0. Douglas adopted
Justice Murphy's view in Poe v. Ullman,
opinion.

Justice Douglas wrote,

21

in his dissenting

"Though I believe that 'due

16

Id. at 111-112, quoting Brown v. Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
17

1

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213

(1972).

sRodriguez, 411 U.S. at 112.

19

Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 123 (1947)
(Murphy, J., dissenting)
20

Id. at 124.

21

Poe v. Ullman,

367 U.S. 497

(1961).
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process' as used in the Fourteenth Amendment includes all of
the eight amendments, I do not think it is restricted or
confined to them ... "Liberty" is a conception that
sometimes gains content from the emanations of other
specific guarantees ... or from experience with the
requirements of a free society. " 22

Justice Douglas

buttressed his argument in a footnote, quoting from a
lecture delivered by Justice Owen J. Roberts,

"Due process

follows the advancing standards of a free society as to what
is deemed reasonable and right. " 23
We have seen that there is judicial justification for
extending "due process" rights beyond the specifically
stated rights of the Constitution.

In great measure,

however, Justice Marshall preferred to base his opinion
(that education is a "fundamental" interest) on the
instrumental importance of education.

The Yoder court had

clearly articulated the importance of education regardless
of its venue, public or private school.

Education is so

essential that the Yoder Court had said "some degree of
education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate
effectively and intelligently in our open political
22

Id. at 516-17

23

Id. at 518 , n . 9 .

(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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system ... ," and that "education prepares individuals to be
self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in
society.

1124

Thus, we find a "substantial relationship which
education bears to guarantees of our Constitution.

1125

Justice Marshall found that education is necessary for a
child to participate fully in the "marketplace of ideas" 26
and fully exercise his First Amendment rights of free speech
and association. 27

Indeed, it is education that opens up

the child to the cultural experiences that are central to
being an American.

Education is "the dominant factor

affecting political consciousness and participation." 28

24

Yoder,

25

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 112.

26

Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603

406 U.S. at 221.

(1967) .
27

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 113.

28

Id. at 113.
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AN ANALYSIS OF RODRIGUEZ
A theoretical response to Justice Marshall's arguments
is that he pointed only to the importance of a minimum of
public education.

Perhaps Justice Marshall viewed education

as "fundamental" only until it is provided according to
whatever minimal level is proffered at a public school.
Justice Marshall, however, does not accept minimalist
levels.

In an important footnote, Justice Marshall deals

with the Court's suggestion that the children are getting
sufficient education (in minimally funded public schools)
for them to enjoy the benefits of constitutional rights.
This would remove any requirements for stricter scrutiny in
education.

He writes,

"There is ... no limit to the amount

of free speech, or political participation that the
Constitution guarantees.

It is thus of little benefit to

an individual ... to have "enough" education if those around
him have more than "enough.

1129

Certain cases, such as Rodriguez, may appear relevant

29

Id. at 113, note 72 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Note
that Justice Marshall seems to be including education as a
member of the first amendment family of values. This
inclusion would again warrant strict scrutiny before the
right to education is limited. See Frank I. Goodman, "De
Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis," 60 California Law Review 275, 350-51 (March,
1972) .
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only to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and not the Due Process Clause.

These cases

include situations where there is either unequal funding
between school districts or some other disparity between
groups.

They are, however, not necessarily to be viewed

only as questions affecting this Equal Protection Clause.
This was discussed earlier in this chapter, in the section
on the San Antonio v. Rodriguez decision.
We may also view Equal Protection cases as questions
affecting the Due Process Clause.

Firstly, as education

becomes a "liberty" or "property" right,

30

its abridgement

may impinge on the Due Process Clause of the Amendment. 31
Secondly, the Due Process Clause deals with the denial of
rights, while the Equal Protection Clause deals with the
discrimination that prevents the realization of a right.
Those who are denied the right to an education due to
administrative fiat do not suffer from the fact that others

30

See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)
The "liberty" and "property" rights to education were
discussed in Chapter III above.
31

"Due process and equal protection grounds are also
interchangeable in situations ... where denial of some
public benefit places collateral burdens on an independently
protected constitutional liberty." Frank I. Goodman, "De
Facto School Segregation," 60 California Law Review 275,
355, n. 273 (1972).
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receive it; it is the deprivation, not the discrimination,
which carries the sting. " 32

Thus, it is really the Due

Process Clause, not the Equal Protection Clause, that is at
issue.

An analysis that wins education rights for the poor

or disadvantaged, such as Justice Marshall suggested, may be
considered part of a Due Process analysis.
Moreover, we should not allow administrative decisions
to stand in the way of principled thought.

If education has

a place within the charmed circle of "fundamental" rights,
as apparently some were willing to concede in concept, 33
then it must be included.

Side issues, such as

implementation or budgetary considerations, must be pushed
aside in favor of the proper and principled conclusions.
This is a logical conclusion as well as an extension of the
substantive "due process" requirement for a compelling
reason to limit a "fundamental" right.
If the Court were to accept Justice Marshall's opinion
today that education is a "fundamental" right of every
school child,

34

it would thereby grant "substantive due

32

Id. at 359.

33

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 16, 17 and n.41.

34

(mindful that the original decision was based on a 5
to 4 vote of the Justices)
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process" rights to all children, regardless of their school
of attendance.

This is because, as a "fundamental"

interest, Shapiro v. Thompson 35 and other cases require the
courts to review the limiting of this interest with "strict
scrutiny."

This means that public and private schools

alike, may not significantly suspend or expel a student
without first offering a compelling reason why the student's
rights should be limited.

Absent such an offer, there must

be serious doubt whether any school, public or private, may
expel a student.
Another reason discussed in the legal literature for
considering education to be a "fundamental interest" is
today's vision of what should be acceptable in a utopian
view of the United States.

We want everyone to be educated,

to participate in our cultural values, and to be gainfully
employed.

Thus, we find commentators who refer to the

unlisted "fundamental" rights: "[s]ome classifications
although far from irrational [are] nonetheless
unconstitutional because they produce inequities that are
unacceptable in this generation's idealization of

35

Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 634.
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America.

1136

It is education that will overcome these

inequities, thus, education should be considered
"fundamental."
This approach to "fundamentality" is, obviously, not
limited to the specific wording of the Constitution, nor is
it overly concerned with the Framers' intent.

Rather, this

approach looks to modern day interpretation of the
Constitution to give it contemporary meaning and relevance.
Considering the growing attention to the inherent and
instrumental importance of education, we should use recent
judicial decisions -- combined with the need to breathe new
life and vision into the Constitution -- to protect
education as a "fundamental right."

36

Kenneth L. Karst and Howard W. Horowitz, "Reitman v.
Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection." 1967
Supreme Court Review 39.
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THE NEW ERA OF "HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY" AFTER PLYLER V. DOE
As noted above, the United States Supreme Court found
that education is not a "fundamental" right under the
federal Constitution. 37

Since that decision, however,

another case, Plyler v. Doe was decided.

Some commentators

believe that the Plyler decision marked the end of the

Rodriguez holding.
Plyler v. Doe38 was another five-to-four decision of
the United States Supreme Court.

The case involved the

children of illegal aliens in this country who claimed they
were entitled to free public education.

The State of Texas

claimed that they were not required to provide free
education to illegal residents.

The Court decided that the

Fourteenth Amendment forbids the State of Texas to "deny the
undocumented school-age children the free public education
that it provides to children who are citizens of the United
States or who are legally admitted aliens. " 39

For,

" [i] f

the state is to deny a discrete group of innocent children
the free public education that it offers to other children
residing within its borders, the denial must be justified by
37

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1.

38

P1y1er v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).

39

Id. at 205.
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a showing that it furthers some substantial state interest.
No such showing was made here.
said,

1140

In addition, the Court

"[d]enial of education to some isolated group of

children poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal
Protection Clause.

1141

Justice Marshall, this time in the majority, wrote a
concurring opinion referring to his dissent in San Antonio
v. Rodriguez.

He wrote quite explicitly,

"I continue to

believe that an individual's interest in education is
fundamental ... " 42
Justice Marshall's main point in his concurrence was
that the Plyler decision finally adopted a "sliding scale"
test for unconstitutionality under the Equal Protection
Clause.

This was the same "sliding scale" that he had

suggested in San Antonio v. Rodriguez43 and Dandridge v.
Williams. 44

The sliding scale looked at three levels or

40

Id. at 230.

41

Id. at 222.

42

Id. at 230.

43

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 98-110, 124-30.

44

Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 519-21 (1970)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). One commentator has
distinguished the issues raised in Dandridge from the issue
of education. Dandridge deals with "economics and social
welfare," which may be governed by conventional equal
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"tiers" of scrutiny by courts studying suspect
classifications.

These three tiers include (1)

"strict

scrutiny" for state action burdening "fundamental" rights;
(2)

"heightened scrutiny" for quasi-suspect classifications;

and (3)

"rationality" for all the rest. 45

The Plyler Court used the middle-tier test for the
first time in a case regarding education.

It used

"heightened scrutiny" because of the nature of the
classification, alien children, but also because of the
interest affected by the classification.
clearly, education.

This interest is,

Thus, we see that the right to an

education deserves "heightened scrutiny."

In addition, the

fact that must be noted: Rodriguez (the decision that
protection standards. Education, on the other hand, deals
with knowledge -- not nourishment of the body, but of the
mind -- and should follow a higher standard of equity.
See
Goodman, supra note 247, at 347-350.
45

It was actually Craig v. Boren, 419 U.S. 190 (1976),
that introduced a middle tier classification under the equal
protection clause.
"Strict scrutiny" applied to suspect
statutory classifications and state action burdening
fundamental rights.
"Heightened scrutiny" applied to quasisuspect state classifications.
"Rationality" applied to all
the rest.
Plyler purported to apply the middle-tier test
because of the nature of the classification and the interest
affected by the classification.
Plyler, 457 U.S. at 230
(Marshall, J., concurring). The "state action" requirement
may be fulfilled either through the "public function" theory
or through a new understanding of the "state action"
requirement. These are discussed infra, in Chapters V and
VI, respectively.
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education is not a "fundamental" right) was mentioned in
each of the five opinions filed in Plyler,

"although

everyone except Justice Marshall came to bury it, not to
praise it. " 46
Specifically, the Plyler Court conceded that education
was not a "fundamental" right,

"[b]ut neither is it merely

some governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other
forms of social welfare legislation. " 47

Indeed, in

creating a middle tier (of "heightened scrutiny," situated
between "strict scrutiny" and "mere reasonableness") Plyler
accomplished what Rodriguez had not.

For Rodriguez gave us

only two tiers of judicial review of state action, and
refused to allow education into the upper tier of "strict
scrutiny."

Now that Plyler has created a middle tier, and

included education in this level of "heightened scrutiny,"
we have made an important stride forward for education
rights.

Because education has been recognized as deserving

of "heightened scrutiny" the decision of Rodriguez "is now a
constitutional relic whose only significance is its holding;

46

Dennis J. Hutchinson, "More Substantive Equal
Protection? A Note on Plyler v. Doe," 1982 The Supreme
Court Review 170.
47

Plyler 457 U.S. at 221.
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as a doctrine, it is irrelevant." 48
The Plyler decision discussed the original intent of
the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.

The decision

quoted Senator Howard, the floor manager of the Amendment in
the United States Senate.
Fourteenth Amendment,

Senator Howard said that the

"if adopted by the states,

[will]

forever disable every one of them from passing laws
trenching upon those "fundamental" rights and privileges
which pertain to citizens of the United States ... " 49

Plyler then decided that illegal aliens' children are
entitled to an education, based on the Fourteenth Amendment.
This must, at a minimum, hint at the Court's belief that
education is some kind of a "fundamental" right, protected
by the Fourteenth Amendment.

For, if not, why discuss the

"original intent" of the Amendment drafters, and then
conclude that the Amendment pertains?
Education, even if not a "fundamental" right, is surely
of "heightened" interest

to the student.

Indeed, one

commentator concluded from the Plyler decision that

48

Hutchinson, supra note 262, at 192.

49

Plyler, 457 U.S. at 215.
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education is "almost a fundamental right.
Court's decision states,

1150

The Plyler

"Education has a fundamental role

in maintaining the fabric of our society." 51

Accordingly,

if the student's claim to an education, even that offered by
a private school, is limited by suspension or expulsion, he
is entitled to the protections of "substantive due process."
Considering the inherent good of knowledge, as well as the
instrumental value of education for the student and society
at large, these protections are important to provide before
a constitutionally-recognized "fundamental" right is
diminished.

50

Ronna G. Schneider, "The 1982 State Action Trilogy, "
60 Notre Dame Law Review 1150, 1155 (1985).
(Emphasis
added.)
51

Plyler,

457 U.S. at 221.
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EDUCATION AS A "FUNDAMENTAL" RIGHT IN STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Were one to try to resolve the question of education as
a "fundamental" right, he would be forced to concede that
the decision in San Antonio v. Rodriguez52 has never
formally been reversed by the Supreme Court.
the theoretical arguments presented above.

This, despite
The Rodriguez

Court concluded that education is not a "fundamental" right
of students.

Thus, litigants have been better advised to

seek redress for denials of education benefits elsewhere,
without reliance on a claim of "fundamentality."
Specifically, litigants have relied extensively on education
clauses in state constitutions.
For the purpose of this study, we shall review some
relevant education law decisions of several states.

While

the Supreme Court has not reversed Rodriguez, so as to
consider education rights as "fundamental," the courts of
several states have been more understanding.

These courts

have concluded that their state constitutions do include
education as a "fundamental" right.

Accordingly, we may

judge education to be in a unique category of "fundamental"
right within various states, while not on a Federal level.
As "fundamental," state education rights deserve close or
52

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1.
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"heightened" scrutiny before they are abridged within the
state. 53

In this way, we have garnered support for

students who seek fundamental fairness before being expelled
or suspended from even their non-public schools.
Moreover, if more states view education rights as
"fundamental," then the chances increase dramatically that
the Federal courts will begin to see education in the same
way.

The states' decisions may cause the United States

Supreme Court to rethink its Rodriguez decision.
Ultimately, it may be of little consequence that the
Federal court does not view education as a "fundamental"
right of the United States Constitution.
state responsibility and right. 54

Education is a

Indeed, the existence of

strong state rights to education provided a persuasive
reason for the Supreme Court's denial of federal guarantees
to education. 55

Further, every state constitution contains

an education clause. 56

As a state responsibility, it is

53

The notion of "heightened scrutiny" for education, as
discussed above, is developed at length in Rodriguez, Id.,
based on Shapiro, 394 U.S. 618.
54

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 35.

55

Id. at 45-54.

56

"Developments - - State Constitutions," 95 Harvard Law
Review 1324, 1446 (1982).
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the individual state which must decide the
of each right it proffers.

"fundamentality"

Those states that consider

education to be a "fundamental" right require "substantive
due process" rights for all students; those states that do
not yet consider education to be a "fundamental" right might
require only "procedural due process rights."

At a minimum,

"procedural due process" rights should be applicable in all
states before a school suspension of less than ten days. 57
This is due to the inherent and instrumental importance of
education, as discussed above.
We shall cite various states where education was judged
by the local judiciary to be a "fundamental" right of
students.

These decisions were reached after San Antonio v.

Rodriguez was decided by the United States Supreme Court in
1973 and indicate the various states' interpretation of
their own constitutions.

Specifically, because these

decisions indicate that education is a "fundamental"
interest, strict scrutiny and procedural fairness (due
process) must be followed before education may be limited.
The Connecticut Supreme Court issued a landmark

57

This was the Supreme Court's decision in the public
school case of Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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decision in Horton v. Meskill. 58

There, the court held

that education is a "fundamental" right under the
Connecticut state constitution. 59

And,

"any infringement

of ... [it] must be strictly scrutinized.

1160

To buttress

their holding, the Connecticut court also found that
education was sufficiently important to society to be
classed as a "fundamental" right even without referring to
the text of its state constitution. 61

Judge Bogdanski, in

his concurring opinion, articulated the "fundamentality" of
education:
I would add further that the right of our
children to an education is a matter of right not
only because our state constitution declares it as
such, but because education is the very essence
and foundation of a civilized culture: it is the
cohesive element that binds the fabric of society
together.
In a real sense, it is as necessary to
a civilized society as food or shelter are to an
individual.
It is our fundamental legacy to the
youth of our state to enable them to acquire
knowledge and possess the ability to reason: for
it is the ability to reason that separates man
from all other forms of life. 62
The Connecticut Supreme Court recognized that it was
58

Horton v. Meskill,

59

Id. at 372-73.

60

Id. at 373.

61

Id.

62

Id. at 377.

376 A.2d 359

(1977).
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breaking with the United States Supreme Court in its Horton
v. Meskill decision.

Too, the state supreme court

considered the United States Supreme Court decisions
defining "fundamental" rights "to be afforded respectful
consideration. " 63

This case, however was different. For

the U.S. Supreme Court decisions were to be considered by
the Connecticut courts "only when they provide no less
individual protection than is guaranteed by Connecticut
law.

n64

In the State of Missouri, the Missouri Supreme Court
decided Concerned Parents v. Caruthersville School
District. 65

Here, the school district was charging a small

registration fee for students.

The school district

justified the charge for economic reasons, claiming that it
was a negligible amount for each individual family.

The

court rejected the district's claim, relying on the United
States Supreme Court decision that poll taxes
unconstitutionally infringe upon the "fundamental" right to

63

65

Id. at 359.

Concerned Parents v. Caruthersville School District,
548 S. W. 2d 554 (Mo. 1977) (en bane) .
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vote. 66

The Missouri court found that, even though the

district's system waived payments for the poor, it operated
like a poll tax.

Further, because education, like voting,

was "fundamental" under the state constitution,
analysis as in Harper applied.

67

the same

No one could now be charged

a registration fee. More importantly, education had been
made an integral part of voting, thereby gaining for
education the status of a "fundamental" right.
In New Jersey, the state's Supreme Court found that
rights to a free education were explicit in the state
cons ti tution 68 and a "fundamental" right. 69

This Levine

decision, reached in 1980, was based on education being a
predicate to democratic government. 70

Subsequently, the

66

Id. at 562-63, quoting Harper v. Virginia State Board
of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 665 n.2 (1966).
67

Education is an integral part of the right to vote.
A citizen cannot be expected to make meaningful choices in
the voting booth if he has not made himself aware of the
issues. He makes himself aware of the issues by reading the
literature prepared by the candidates and the media.
Hence, literacy and critical thinking are seen as
instrumental in the fulfillment of the fundamental right of
voting. Other courts have also accepted this reasoning, as
discussed below.
68

Levine v. New Jersey Dep' t

418 A.2d 229, 241-42 (1980).
69

Id. at 242.

70

Id. at 237.
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and Agencies,
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New Jersey Supreme Court heard Robinson v. Cahill. 71

This

case was the first post-Rodriguez decision to overturn a
state's system of financing public education.
The issues of the Robinson case, regarding the interdistrict unequal state's support of its schools, were
similar to those of Rodriguez, and the Robinson court was
fully aware of its departure from the Rodriguez precedent.
The Robinson decision was based on the court's
interpretation of its state constitution which promised
"equal educational opportunity" 72 and it upheld the
plaintiffs' objections to property tax finance. 73
Regarding "equal educational opportunity," which is an
extension of the constitutional assurance of "equal

71

Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, supplemented, 306
A.2d 65, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973), and modified on
reh'g, 351 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913 (1975).
72

The New Jersey State Constitution's wording of "equal
educational opportunity" raised the question of "equal
protection."
("Equal protection" is a Federal law and the
subject of the second clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.)
New Jersey has its own "equal protection" clause in its
state constitution. The judges felt that the state may be
more demanding than the Federal courts in interpreting its
own "equal protection" clause. These judges recognized that
the U.S. Supreme Court has other considerations to weigh,
such as the unnecessarily harsh effect its decisions may
have on all fifty states, some of which were in no need of a
major change in law and policy. Robinson, 303 A.2d at 282.
73

Id . at 2 9 5 - 9 8 .
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protection," the Robinson court made a reference to Natural
Law in a significant footnote:
The concept of equal protection antedates the
Fourteenth Amendment.
It is implicit in a
democratic form of government. The Declaration of
Independence proclaimed that "All men are created
equal," which must mean equality at the hands of
government. There inheres in the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment a guarantee of equal
protection. 74
The Robinson court also argued that the United States
Supreme Court's textually oriented approach to finding
"fundamental" rights, as used in San Antonio v.
Rodriguez, 75 was not useful as a matter of federal law.

They wrote:
But we have not found helpful the concept of a
"fundamental" right. No one has successfully
defined the term for this purpose.
Even the
proposition discussed in Rodriguez, that a right
is "fundamental" if it is explicitly or implicitly
guaranteed in the Constitution is immediately
vulnerable ... And if a right is somehow found to be
"fundamental," there remains the question as to
what state interest is "compelling" and there,
too, we find little, if any, light ... Ultimately, a
court must weigh the nature of the restraint or
the denial against the apparent public
justification. 76
This Robinson dictum points to the non-usefulness of

74

Id. at 277, n.1, quoting Shapiro, 394 U.S. at 641-42.

75

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1.

76

Robinson, 303 A. 2d at 282.

148
the Rodriguez text-based test of "fundamentality,

11

and

prefers an individualized decision by the court in each
case.
Ohio,

This dictum has been applied by courts in Oregon,
78

Idaho,

79

and Georgia. 00

77

In all cases, the

question at bar was the legality of the school finance plan
between districts within the respective states.
Interestingly, all of these states have similar
requirements regarding education in their respective state
constitutions.

New Jersey requires a "thorough and

efficient system of public schooling;

1101

Oregon requires a

"uniform and general system of common schools;" 82 Ohio
requires a "thorough and efficient system of common
schools;

1103

Idaho requires a "uniform system of private

77

0lsen v. State ex rel. Johnson, 554 P.2d 139, 144-45
(1976) .
70

Board of Education v. Walter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 818-19
(1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980).
79

Thompson v. Engelking, 537 P.2d 635, 644-45 (1975),
quoting Robinson, 303 A.2d at 282.
00

McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 166-67 (1981),
quoting Robinson, 303 A.2d at 284.
01

Robinson, 303 A. 2d at 276.

82

0lsen, 554 p. 2d at 140.

83

Walter,

390 N.E.2d at 816.
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schools; " 94 and Georgia requires that the state government
provide an "adequate education. " 05

In all of these cases,

the respective courts chose to follow the recommendation of
Robinson.

We find,

for example, that the Olsen decision was not

at peace with Rodriguez, because it apparently felt,
with Serrano,

96

in line

that education should be considered a

"fundamental" right.

At the same time, the Olsen court did

not want to go against the subsequent United States Supreme
Court decision in Rodriguez, which apparently reversed
Serrano, deciding that education was not a "fundamental"

right.

Instead, Olsen elected to cite Robinson and resolve

the matter with an alternate line of reasoning.
Thus, we find several courts who have decided cases in
direct opposition to Rodriguez, finding that education may
be considered a "fundamental" right within their state.
Further, we have other courts who have expressed serious
doubts about the holding in Rodriguez (that education is not
to be considered a "fundamental" right).

The implication

for this study is that, in recent years, after Rodriguez,
94

Thompson, 537 P.2d at 636.

95

McDaniel,

06

Serrano v. Priest, 487 P. 2d 1241 (1971).

285 S.E.2d at 157.
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education has made great strides toward being considered a
"fundamental" right.

The Rodriguez knot appears more and

more to be corning undone.

151

JUDICIAL DECISIONS FAVORING
THE "FUNDAMENTAL" STATUS OF EDUCATION
There is important and explicit judicial opinion in
opposition to Rodriguez.

This is helpful in our goal of

overcoming the Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision and
showing education to be a "fundamental" right.

In Ohio,

Justice Locher of the state Supreme Court, writing in
dissent, found that his state should consider educational
opportunity as a "fundamental" interest.

This is because of

(i) the wording of the Ohio Constitution;B 7 (ii) the nexus
to the right to participate in the electoral process and the
rights of free speech and association; and (iii) as the
foundation to success and realization of the American
dream. BB

As a "fundamental" interest, education deserved

strict scrutiny before it is affected.B 9
In Mississippi, the state Supreme Court found that,
although there is no Federally created "fundamental" right
to education, there is such a right within the state.

They

wrote that the "right to a minimally adequate public

B7 "The general assembly ... will secure a thorough and
efficient system of common schools ... " Ohio Const. art. VI.
BB Walter,

390 N. E. 2d at 827.
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education created and entailed by the laws of this state is
one we can only label fundamental.

1190

A number of state courts have criticized Rodriguez91
because of its holding regarding the "fundamentality"
question.

These courts did not necessarily look at their

own state constitutions.

Instead, they commented on what

they perceived as flawed reasoning by the United States
Supreme Court.

These courts believe that the connection

between education and political participation is sufficient
to render education a "fundamental" right.

They reasoned

that one cannot fulfill his civic responsibility as a voter
without an education.

A voter is responsible to read and

study the issues in an election before casting his ballot.
Accordingly, education is necessary to assure a learned and
well-read voting public who fulfill their constitutional
rights to the fullest.
The California Supreme Court, for example, has argued
"that the Rodriguez majority had considerable difficulty
accommodating its new [textually oriented] approach to
certain of its prior decisions, especially in the area of

9

°Clinton Mun. Sep. School District v. Byrd, 477 So.2d
23 7 (Miss. 1985) .
91

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1.
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fundamental rights." 92

This Serrano court held that

"education is a unique influence on a child's development as
a citizen and his participation in political and community
life. " 93

The conclusion was, therefore, forced,

that "the

distinctive and priceless function of education in our
society warrants,

indeed compels, our treatment of it as a

"fundamental interest." 94

Accordingly, the State of

California would continue to apply strict scrutiny to laws
impinging "on those individual rights and liberties which
lie at the core of our free and representative form of
government. " 95
Similarly, a West Virginia court has written,

"[O]ur

research ... indicates an embarrassing abundance of
authority and reason by which the [Rodriguez] majority might
have decided that education is a fundamental right of every
American. " 96

92

Serrano, 557 P.2d 929, 951 n.44

93

Serrano, 487 P.2d at 1256.

94

Id. at 1258.

95

Id. 557 P.2d at 952.

96

Pauley v. Kelly,

1979) .

(1976).

255 S.E.2d 859, 863 n.5

(W. Va.
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In an Opinion of the Justices, 97 the New Hampshire
Supreme Court never mentioned the state constitution's
education clause.

It did incorporate Justice Marshall's

dissent into its analysis of state law,
San Antonio v. Rodriguez.

98

ruling against

Specifically, the decision was

that, although Rodriguez might authorize a failure to
provide the minimal education necessary to facilitate the
rights of suffrage and free speech, the state constitution
clearly would not. 99
Judges in Colorado also spoke against San Antonio v.
Rodriguez.

The issue of interdistrict financial inequities

was raised again, and decided like Rodriguez.

Nonetheless,

Justices Dubof sky and Lohr 100 agreed, in dissent, that they
would "subject all aspects of school financing to an
enhanced level of scrutiny based on the favored status
explicitly accorded education in this state. " 101

The case

concluded with a finding that the rights to vote and

97

0pinion of the Justices, 387 A.2d 333 (1978).

98

Id. at 335-36.

99

Id. at 335.

100

Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education, 649 P. 2d
1005, 1032 (en bane., 1982), (Lohr, J., dissenting)
101

Id. at 1030

(Dubofsky, J., dissenting).
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petition the government, both guaranteed in the state
constitution, generated a "fundamental" state constitutional
right to equal educational opportunity . 102

As a

"fundamental" right, education was entitled to "heightened
scrutiny."

This decision was independent of Rodriguez and

based on the Colorado court's ability to interpret equal
protection rights under the Colorado constitution
differently from the United States Supreme Court's analysis
under the United States Constitution . 103

Under Colorado's

heightened scrutiny, the state's school finance scheme would
fail. 104
The State of Washington recognized the importance of
education for "promoting a free society, intelligent and
effective participation in an open political system, and
preparation for the exercise of First Amendment rights." 105
The Washington state court analyzed education to be a
constitutional right, arising from the constitutionally
imposed duty of the state to educate its youth, and

102Id.

103

104

105

Id.
Id.

n. 1.

Seattle School District No. 1 of King County v.
of Washington, 585 P.2d 71, 94 (1978).

State
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requiring heightened scrutiny before this education may be
abridged. 106
The State of Wyoming has also found that education for
its children is a matter of "fundamental" interest.

As

such, education has earned the category of "strict scrutiny"
by the courts before it may be limited to the child living
in Wyoming. 107
The education clause in the state constitution of
Montana presents an interesting study of judicial
interpretation.

We may also use judicial opinion as

expressed in Montana to better understand the core issues
involved in determining whether the right to an education is
to be viewed as "fundamental" in a particular state.
The Montana state Constitution states
It is the goal of the people to establish a system
of education which will develop the full
educational potential of each person.
Equality of
educational opportunity is guaranteed to each
person of the state .... The legislature shall
provide a basic system of free quality public
elementary and secondary schools. 10 s
Montana's Constitution clearly requires the state to

106

Id. at 91.

101

washakie County School District No.

606 P.2d 310, 333 (1980).
10

sMT Const.

art. X, § 1 (1972).

One v. Herschler,
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provide each citizen with quality education.

This

requirement is based, in part, on the time-honored McNair
decision,

109

which defined education as "the totality of

the qualities acquired through individual instruction and
social training, which further happiness, efficiency and
[the] capacity for social service.

11110

Al though the court

fell short of recognizing the right to education as
"fundamental", it did call for a quality education to be
provided for all children,

"one which meets contemporary

needs and produces capable, well-informed citizens.

11111

Similarly, Montana's Constitution also guarantees
"equality of educational opportunity."

This guarantee may

be seen as an extension of the state's equal protection
clause. 112
The question of whether Montana guaranteed education as
a "fundamental" right was raised in State ex rel. Bartmess
v. Board of Trustees.

113

As part of their analysis of the

109

McNair v. School District No.

110

Id. at 190.

111

Id.

112

MT Const. art.

113

II,

§

1,

288 P. 188 (1930).

4 (1972).

State ex rel. Bartmess v. Board of Trustees,
801 (1986).

726 P. 2d
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case, the Montana Supreme Court found two possible reasons
why a right might be considered "fundamental."
a right is "fundamental"

In Montana,

(i) if it is found within Montana's

Declaration of Rights, or (ii) if it is a right without
which other constitutionally guaranteed rights would have
little meaning. 114

The court concluded that "various

aspects of education under our Montana Constitution could be
considered "fundamental,
these aspects.

11115

but the court did not identify

The Bartmess court was quite aware of the

San Antonio v. Rodriguez116 decision, but read the language
of its own Montana state constitution as indicating a
different result. 117

The relevant words of Montana's

Constitution are the state's requirement to provide for the
realization of "the full educational potential of each
person. " 118

This court was willing to differ with the

United States Supreme Court's Rodriguez decision and adopt

114

Id. at 802.

115

Id. at 804.

San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
(Education is not a "fundamental" right under the United
States Constitution.)
116

117

Bartmess, 726 P.2d at 804. (The right to certain
aspects of education are fundamental.)
118

MT

Const. art. II,

§

1 (1972).
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its own analysis of education, if "independent state grounds
exist for developing expanded rights under our state
constitution.

11119

At least one commentator would have Montana take that
leap into rendering all of education a "fundamental
right.

11120

This is because of the explicit wording in the

state constitution mentioned above.

In addition, education

is necessary "for individuals to exercise other
constitutionally guaranteed rights ... such as the fundamental
right to vote.

11121

Further, Montana's wording is no

different than the Wisconsin Constitution's wording, where
education was found to be a "fundamental" right. 122

Also,

the Montana framers' intent (which is still readily analyzed
because of the recency of the Montana state constitution)
119

Bartmess, 726 P. 2d at 806 (Morrison, J., concurring)

120

Lori Anne Harper, "Classroom v. Courtroom: Is the
Right to Education Fundamental?" 51 Montana Law Review 509
(1990) .
121

122

Id. at 522.

In Wisconsin, the language of the state constitution
("equal opportunity for education") was interpreted by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court to mean that education is a
fundamental right in that state. See Buse v. Smith, 247
N.W.2d 141 (1976). The language in the Montana constitution
("equality of educational opportunity") is similar enough to
also be considered an indication of the fundamentality of
the education right.
See Harper, 51 Montana Law Review at
522.
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indicates clearly that they wanted education to be
considered a "fundamental" right.

The Constitutional

Convention Transcripts include: "Education occupies a place
of cardinal importance in the public realm ... Because of the
overriding importance of education, this committee
recognizes the awesome task of providing the appropriate
Constitutional provisions necessary to protect and nurture
the public educational system.

11123

All of this would seem

to indicate that education may be considered a "fundamental"
right in Montana.

If it is not considered a "fundamental"

right, then it must certainly be considered worthy of
middle-tier scrutiny, as clearly articulated in
Bartmess. 124
This chapter studied the question of "fundamentality"
of a child's right to education.

If the education right can

be considered "fundamental," then any limitation of it would
be subjected to the "strict scrutiny" of the courts.

In

disciplinary cases of expulsion or suspension, the court's

123

Harper, Id. at 522, quoting II Montana Constitutional
Convention Transcripts 721 (1972) .
124

"We conclude that the only standard of constitutional
review which allows a careful balancing of these competing
interests [relating to the fundamentality of extracurricular activities] is the middle-tier analysis."
Bartmess, 726 P.2d at 804.
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"strict scrutiny" would include ascertaining that the school
had substantial overriding reasons to limit a constitutional
right so crucial for success.

The school would be required

to provide "substantive due process."

The less important

"state action" requirement would be set aside in favor of
the "fundamental" right to education that deserves the
highest level of protection available.
The Supreme Court of the United States found that
education was not a "fundamental" right. 125

Since that

split decision of five justices to four, many lower courts
and legal scholars have tended to side with Justice
Marshall's dissent.

They have found in favor of granting

"fundamental" status to education.

These courts often took

note of the Rodriguez decision, but chose to disagree with
it.

Their reasons focus on the instrumentality and societal

importance of education.

Some have tried to counter the

Court's arguments with their own constitutional text-based
legal reasoning.
In the subsequent decision of Plyler v. Doe,

126

the

Supreme Court seemed to moderate its previous position
regarding the "fundamentality" of education.
125

Rodriguez,

126

Plyler v. Doe,

411 U.S. 1.
457 U.S. 202

(1982).

Plyler held
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that education was important enough to society and the
individual child to warrant the middle-tiered or
"heightened" scrutiny.

This level of judicial scrutiny

would still require that "substantive due process" be
fulfilled.
We have gathered significant judicial decisions and
scholarly commentary to put education squarely in the circle
of "fundamental" rights.

These are rights that cannot be

abrogated without compelling reason.

The "fundamental"

right to education applies to the student, not the school.
It bespeaks the knowledge and culture necessary to succeed,
to make the American dream into a reality.

It provides the

background necessary to make informed decisions in the
voting booth and everyday life.

The

11

fundamentality 11 of

education is a jewel in the crown of American life.

The

constitutional right of "substantive due process" must be
followed even in private schools where "state action" may
not be found.

CHAPTER V
THE "PUBLIC FUNCTION" THEORY
AND PRIVATE SCHOOL STUDENTS' RIGHTS
As noted above, the literal wording of Section I of the
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV, 1 suggests that
the due process requirement applies only to actions of the
state and not those of individuals.

This was the narrow

interpretation given in United States v. Cruikshank,

2

where

the Due Process Clause was interpreted in a way that would
last for over one hundred years.
stated,

Chief Justice Waite

"The fourteenth amendment prohibits a state from

depriving any person life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; but this adds nothing to the rights of one
citizen against another.

113

Eight year later, Justice

Bradley followed the same reasoning in the Civil Rights
Cases. 4

There Justice Bradley wrote explicitly:

11

[It]

is

State action of a particular character that is prohibited.
Individual invasion of individual rights is not the subject

1

(Amend. XIV was added to the Constitution in 1868.)

2

United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875).

3

Id. at 554-55.

4

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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matter of the amendment." 5

It is here that the term "state

action" was born.
The "state action" requirement of the Constitution is
the Court's way of saying that the Constitution applies only
to the government.

The Constitution limits governmental

activities and not those of private parties.
terms, this is true, almost by definition.

In general
Indeed, most

people applaud this traditional approach lest the police
peer into each home and arrest people out of their own
living rooms.

One author described the importance of the

"state action" doctrine as the constitutional guarantee that
the Court will not tell me who I may invite to a dinner
party in my home. 6

The "state action" doctrine says that,

as long as a private citizen is not acting on behalf of the
state, he is free to engage in discriminatory or otherwise
free behaviors at will.
There is a second approach to the "state action"
analysis.

This approach focuses on the "public" qualities

of the private enterprise.

If there are enough indicia of

public, specifically state, involvement in a private
5

6

Id. at 11.

Charles L. Black, Jr. "Foreword: 'State Action,' Equal
Protection, and California's Proposition 14." 81 Harvard Law
Review 69 (1967) .
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enterprise, then this enterprise may be said to be public.
State involvement may be seen by its financial support or
its delegation of an important state service.

State

involvement may also be found when a private person or a
group perform an essential service which might otherwise be
included in the state's panoply of activities.

The private

performer is seen as providing a "public function."
Where does the private school fit?
public institution?

Is it a private or

On the one hand, the private school is,

by definition, not a state school.

As such, it need not

follow the same strictures and dictates of the state
schools.

On the other hand, this private school is serving

the public.

It is fulfilling,

in alternative fashion, a

similar educational mission. Attendance by its students at
the private school fulfills the state's compulsory education
statute.

Does this make the private school similar enough

to the public school to require its fulfillment of the
public school mandates?
If we succeed at showing that private schools are
similar to public schools, and that this brings private
schools to the door of constitutional requirements, then we
have won "due process" rights for private school students.
Just as public school children are entitled to "due process"
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before disciplinary action, so would be their private school
counterparts.
With the "public function" theory we may circumvent the
entire issue of "state action."

The prevailing judicial

opinion is that private schools usually lack "state action"
unless the state has paid for the educational program or had
input in its implementation. 7

The school may, nonetheless,

be required to fulfill the same requirements, even without
"state action," if the school is judged to be a public
institution.

As a public institution it is wholly

appropriate that society expect the school to follow the
same guidelines it has set for other public institutions.
Once the private school is considered a public institution,
the question of how directly related it is to the state
should move toward irrelevance.
This chapter uses judicial decisions and scholarly
commentary to review the background of the "public function"
doctrine.

The similarities between this background, as

discussed in the related legal opinions, and private schools
should point to the appropriateness of this doctrine in
private schools as well.

7

The "state action" question will

Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F.Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind.
1970), 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971).
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have been eliminated, and "due process" requirements will
have been made applicable to private school students.
Once we apply the "public function" doctrine to private
schools and require "due process" rights for their students,
then the question is what procedure should follow.

It

appears that private schools would be required to provide
the same "due process" to their students as public schools
provide theirs.

This is "procedural due process," requiring

in suspension cases of ten days or less,

"oral or written

notice of the charges against [the student] , and if [the
student] denies them, an explanation of the evidence the
authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of
the story. " 8

8

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975).
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JUDICIAL DECISIONS REGARDING THE "PUBLIC FUNCTION" DOCTRINE
Beginning in the 1940's, the Supreme Court began to
expand the boundaries of the state action doctrine.

In

Marsh v. Alabama, the Court presented the new concept of

"public function." 9

Mr. Marsh was accused of trespassing

in the town of Chickasaw, Alabama, when he distributed
religious literature in the town without permission.

The

town of Chickasaw was owned by the Gulf Shipbuilding
Corporation.

Gulf claimed that, because the town belonged

completely to them,

Marsh was trespassing on private

property, and that he had no right to distribute his
literature.

They argued that "the corporation's right to

control the inhabitants of Chickasaw is coextensive with the
right of a homeowner to regulate the conduct of his
guests.

1110

The Court rejected this argument and found in

favor of Marsh. 11

Justice Black raised the issue of

private facilities serving a larger public in his majority
opinion.

He wrote

Ownership does not always mean absolute dominion.
The more an owner, for his advantage, opens up his
property for use by the public in general, the more do
9

Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).

10

Id. at 506.

11

Id. at 510.
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his rights become circumscribed by the statutory and
constitutional rights of those who use it. Thus, the
owners of privately held bridges, ferries, turnpikes
and railroads may not operate them as freely as a
farmer does his farm.
Since these facilities are built
and operated primarily to benefit the public and since
their operation is essentially a public function, it is
subject to state regulation. 12
Twenty year later, a similar case came before the
Court. 13

Part of a trust established by Senator Bacon

established a park in Macon, Georgia.

The trust provided

that the park, Baconsfield, was to be used by whites only.
Sensitive to the issues of racial discrimination involved in
fulfillment of this trust, the city resigned as trustee and
appointed a private trustee instead.
private park with racial restrictions.

Thus, there was now a
The Court found that

the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of discrimination
applied even in a private park.

Justice Douglas, writing

for the majority, explained that the public function theory
of Marsh v. Alabama 14 was applicable in this case.

Justice

Douglas saw the nature of a park as similar to a fire
department or police department that traditionally serves

12

Id. at 506.

13

Evans v. Newton,

14

Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).

382 U.S. 296 (1966).
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the community. 15

The park is clearly in the public domain

and must avoid all conduct proscribed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. 16

"The predominant character and purpose of

this park are municipal. " 17
Interestingly, Justice Harlan, in his dissent, 18
discusses the obvious conclusions from the Evans decision.
Justice Harlan believes that Evans forces one to conclude
that the "public function" notion applies to private
schools.

He stated

Like parks, the purpose schools serve is important to
the public. Like parks, private control exists, but
there is also a very strong tradition of public control
in this field.
Like parks, schools may be available to
almost anyone of one race or religion but to no others.
Like parks, there are normally alternatives to those
shut out but there may also be inconveniences and
disadvantages caused by the restriction.
Like parks,
the extent of school intimacy varies greatly, depending
on the size and character of the institution. 19
Justice Harlan continued,

"I find it difficult ... to

avoid the conclusion that this decision opens the door to
reversal of these basic constitutional concepts [that the

15

Evans, 382 U.S. at 301.

16

Id. at 302.

18

Evans,

19

Id. at 321.

382 U.S. at 315

(Harlan, J., dissenting).
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Fourteenth Amendment does not compel private schools to
adapt their admission policies to its requirements] ... while
making of every college entrance rejection letter a
potential Fourteenth Amendment question.

1120

Justice

Harlan's opinion was in dissent, and the Court never applied
his reasoning to private schools.

This notwithstanding,

Justice Harlan's opinion states clearly that elementary and
secondary schools serve a public function.

This public

function would require the fulfillment of constitutional
guarantees.
The 1970's brought two cases before the Supreme Court
demanding decisions in the area of "public function."

Both

of them have significant implications for the public
function of private education.
Metropolitan Edison Co.,

21

The first case, Jackson v.

seems to have dealt a death blow

20

Id. at 322. From a perspective of student rights,
this decision is not very helpful.
For the Court did not
seek to stop the offensive behavior of segregation.
Instead, it sought to disengage the State from participation
in the offensive act.
For the cause of increased liberty
rights for all, students as well as park attendees might be
better served by the Court clarifying the full extent of the
rights of privacy and freedom.
Then, we would know how to
respond to one of the underlying issues of this study: the
conflicting values of private institutions and individual
rights.
21

Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,

(1974).

419 U.S. 345
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to the public function of private schools, though only in
its majority opinion.

The case involved Catherine Jackson,

whose electrical service had been curtailed by Metropolitan
Edison Co. for alleged nonpayment for her electric service.
Metropolitan Edison held a certificate of public convenience
from the Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission empowering
it to deliver electricity to a specific service area. 22
Ms. Jackson now claimed that the company had curtailed her
service without proper notice and due process. 23

She

further claimed that Metropolitan Edison was serving a
"public function" in the delivery of electricity and was,
therefore, required to follow procedural due process
requirements. 24

Justice Rehnquist stated that the inquiry

in this case must be "whether there is a sufficiently close
nexus between the State and the challenged action of the
regulated entity so that the action of the latter may be
fairly treated as that of the State itself ." 25

Previously,

the Court had required only that the activity in question

22

Id. at 346.

23

Id.at347.

24

Id. at 348.

25

Id. at 351, quoting Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407

u. s. 163, 176 (1972).
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had to be one traditionally performed by a state entity.
Now, the Jackson Court was requiring that the function must
be one which not only had been traditionally but also
exclusively performed by the state. 26

The Jackson Court 27

judged that there was not a close enough nexus between the
actions of the state and those of the private utility
company for a finding of "public function.

1128

Justice Marshall, writing in dissent, proposed a less

26

Id. at 353.

27

Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, wrote the
following dicta regarding the Public Function theory and
schools:
It is difficult to imagine a regulated
activity more essential or more 'clothed with the
public interest' than the maintenance of schools,
yet we stated in Evans v. Newton, 382 U. S. 296,
300 (1966):
The range of governmental activities is
broad and varied, and the fact that
government has engaged in a particular
activity does not necessarily mean that
an individual entrepreneur or manager of
the same kind of undertaking suffers the
same constitutional inhibitions. While
a State may not segregate public schools
so as to exclude one or more religious
groups, those sects may maintain their
own parochial educational systems.
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U. S. at 354 n.9.
This dicta was interpreted as the Supreme Court's rejection
of the public function theory as applied to education in
Berrios v. Inter American University, 535 F2d 1330 (CAl
Puerto Rico 1976) .
28

Jackson, Id. 419 U. s. at 358-359.
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rigid standard to find "state action.

1129

He held that

state approval alone of a challenged conduct might warrant a
finding of "state action."

He wrote that in previous cases

"the Court suggested that if the State's regulation had in
any way fostered or encouraged racial discrimination, a
state action finding might have been justified.

1130

Further, Justice Marshall wrote
[I agree] that it requires more than a finding
that a particular business is 'affected with the public
interest' before constitutional burdens can be imposed
on that business. But when the activity in question is
of such public importance that the state invariably
either provides the service itself or permits private
companies to act as state surrogates in providing it,
much more is involved than just a matter of public
interest.
In those cases, the state has determined
that if private companies wish to enter the field, they
will have to surrender many of the prerogatives
normally associated with private enterprise and behave
in many ways like a governmental body. 31
Thus, Justice Marshall notes that if a state has
identified a service that is important for it to provide and
a private institution provides it too, then the private
institution must follow the same requirements as the state.
This kept alive the notion that private schools serve a
public function.

The state has identified education as an

29

Jackson, 419 U. S. at 369 (Marshall, J., dissenting).

30

Id. at 369 n.2.

31

Id. at 372.
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important service for it to provide, though it allows
private schools to act as its surrogate.

Were the private

schools not available, the state would provide educational
services to these students.

It follows,

then, that

according to Justice Marshall, the private schools must
provide the same rights provided by their public school
counterparts.
The second case involving "public function" is Flagg
Bros. , Inc. v. Brooks. 32

Here, Flagg Brothers, Inc. , a

warehouseman, proposed to sell Brook's stored goods to
satisfy a warehouseman's lien.

Mrs. Brooks had claimed that

the sale of her goods was "state action" because it was
being done under the Uniform Commercial Code and was a power
"traditionally exclusively reserved to the State. " 33
Further, she claimed that "the resolution of private
disputes is a traditional function of civil government. 1134
Justice Rehnquist noted that many functions were
traditionally performed by governments, but they were not
necessarily "exclusively reserved to the State. " 35
32

Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).

33

Id. at 157.

34Id.
35

Id. at 158.

176
Further, the proposed sale by Flagg Bros. was not the only
means of resolving a purely private dispute, so that the
exclusivity aspect was missing.
In Flagg Bros., the Supreme Court failed to use the
"public function" theory to require a private warehouse to
fulfill the governmental requirement of "due process."

The

decision in the case notwithstanding, the Court stated,

"We

would be remiss if we did not note that there are a number
of state ... functions ... which have been administered with a
greater degree of exclusivity by States...
such functions as education ...

1136

Among these are

Thus, even when findings

of public function were limited by the Court, education was
perceived as one of the instances in which a finding of
"public function" would be appropriate.
Justice Stevens, writing in the Flagg Bros. dissent,
disagrees with majority's requirement of "exclusivity"
before an action is considered a state function.

Justice

Stevens, joined by Justices White and Marshall, held that a
state function can be found even when a private body
performs an action not reserved exclusively for the
state. 37

He contends that this was the conclusion of Evans

36

Id. at 163.

37

Id. at 172-3 (Stevens, J., dissenting)

Emphasis added.
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v. Newton,

38

this case.

1139

"and is not even adhered to by the Court in
Most importantly for the purpose of this

study, Justice Stevens cited the majority's dicta regarding
education.

The majority opinion recognized the "wide range

of functions that are typically considered sovereign
functions,

such as education ...

1140

Justice Stevens pointed to the fact that education is a
typical governmental function that is often undertaken by
private parties.

Perhaps the most significant statement of

Justice Stevens' dissent in Flagg Bros. was,

"[I]t is no

longer possible, if it ever was, to believe that a sharp
line can be drawn between private and public actions. " 41
Further, Justice Stevens dissents from the majority opinion
that ''state action" should be found only when the state has
ceded one of its exclusive powers to a private party. 42
Justice Stevens is troubled by this description of "state
action" because it "does not even attempt to reflect the

Evans, 382 U.S. 296.
(A private school serves a
public function and may not discriminate between groups.)
38

39

Flagg Bros.,

40

Id. n.10.

41

Id. at 178.

42Id.

436 U.S. at 173.
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concerns of the Due Process Clause, for the state-action
doctrine is, after all, merely one aspect of this broad
constitutional protection.

1143

There is little doubt that

Justice Stevens would consider private education as serving
a public function.

If so, all the rights of public school

students should logically be granted to private school
students.
Professor Lawrence Tribe concluded that, under the
Court's public function test in Flagg Bros., it is a
"virtual impossibility [to suggest] criteria to determine
what is and what is not [an] inherently governmental
[function] . " 44

Professor Jesse Choper takes Professor

Tribe's statement of confusion this one step further.

He

asks, rhetorically perhaps, whether a private school would
be considered as serving a public function if it is the only
school in the community serving the educational needs of the
community's children.

This school is performing a function

traditionally exclusively reserved to the state.

Professor

Choper suggests that the private school's function of
providing public education gives this particular private

43

44

Id.

Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law,
(Mineola, NY: Foundation Press) 1979 Supplement 108, n.91.
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school monopoly power in the community.

In this case, the

school should be held to the constitutional responsibilities
of the state. 45

We may ask, rhetorically as well, how far

away a private school in a large community is from serving
the same function of educating at least some of their
children.

Should not the private school be held to the same

constitutional requirements as the state?

45

Jesse H. Choper, "Thoughts on State Action: The
'Government Function' and 'Power Theory' Approaches."
Washington University Law Quarterly 757, 778.

1979
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THE "STATE ACTION" TRILOGY AND "PUBLIC FUNCTION"
The decade of the 1980's brought three important "state
action" cases before the Supreme Court.

This trilogy of

cases, Blum v. Yaretsky, 46 Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,
Lugar v.

of 1982.

47

and

Edmondson Oil Co. 48 were all decided in the Summer

We shall review each of these cases for their

relevance to the "public function" aspect of private
education and their importance for ascribing "due process"
rights to private school students.
Blum v.

Yaretsky dealt with nursing home patients whose

stays in these homes were decided by the home without
offering the patients any notice or opportunity for a
hearing.

Because the stay was paid for by the state (of New

York) , through its Medicaid system, the patients claimed
that "state action" was present and, therefore, that they
should have the opportunity to be heard before any decisions
were reached, regarding their discharges or transfers.

The

nursing home responded that theirs was a private program, in
spite of the many state laws that regulated their
activities.
46

Blum v.

47

Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,

48

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,

Yaretsky,

457 U.S. 991 (1982).
457 U.S. 830 (1982)
457 U.S. 922

(1982)
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The Supreme Court agreed with the nursing homes,
finding that state regulations alone do not make a nursing
home into an arm of the state. 49

The Court relied on the

Jackson ruling, that "state action" will not be found until
"there is a sufficiently close nexus between the State and
the challenged action of the regulated entity so that the
action of the latter may be fairly treated as that of the
State itself.

1150

Thus, the patients could not hold the

state liable for the nursing home's actions.
The Blum Court also indicated when a state may be held
responsible for a private decision.

Normally, the state

will be held responsible when it has exercised coercive
power or has provided such significant encouragement, either
overt or covert, that the choice must in law be deemed to be
that of the state. 51

As Flagg Bros 52 and Jackson 53 teach,

mere approval of or acquiescence to the actions of a private
party are not sufficient to justify holding the state

49

Blum, 457 U. s. at 1003.

50

Id. at 1004, quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974)
51

Id. at 1004.

52

Flagg Bros., 436 U. S. at 164-165.

53

Jackson, 419 U.S. at 357.
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responsible for those actions under the terms of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Further, a finding of "state action" under the "public
function" doctrine requires that the private entity has
exercised powers that are traditionally the exclusive
prerogative of the state. 54

Justice Rehnquist found that

nursing homes do not perform such a function, as neither the
statutes nor the state constitution mandated the provision
of medical care.

He further stated,

"Even if respondents'

characterization of the State's duties were correct,
however, it would not follow that decisions made in the dayto-day administration of a nursing home are the kind of
decisions traditionally and exclusively made by the
sovereign for and on behalf of the public.

1155

The majority opinion would seem to close the door on
the notion that private school education might be considered
"state action."

Rarely would the state be so "closely

involved" in or give "significant encouragement" to a dayto-day decision of a private school that it would be held
responsible for the decision.

Nonetheless, Justice Brennan,

joined in dissent by Justice Marshall, seemed to leave the
54

See Id. at 353, and Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157-161.

55

Blum,

457 u. S. at 1012.
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door ajar.

He wrote

In an era of active government intervention to remedy
social ills, the true character of the State's
involvement in, and coercive influence over, the
activities of private parties, often through complex
and opaque regulatory frameworks, may not always be
apparent. But if the task that the Fourteenth
Amendment assigns to the courts is thus rendered more
burdensome, the courts' obligation to perform that task
faithfully [is] rendered more, not less
important ... [I]n deciding whether "state action" is
present in actions performed directly by persons other
than government employees, what is required is a
realistic and delicate appraisal of the State's
involvement in the total context of the action
taken. 56
We might reach a clearer conclusion regarding the
Court's view of non-public schools from a case dealing more
directly with this issue.

Rendell-Baker v. Kohn 57 was the

second "state action" case of the trilogy decided during the
Summer 1982 term.

Here, certain teachers had been dismissed

from a private school, allegedly for speaking publicly
against the school.

Although the school was private, it

received funding from Massachusetts
provide Special Education services. 58

under contract to
The teachers claimed

that, because of its unique funding situation, the school
was required to provide them with "due process" as a "state
56

Id. at 1012 - 1013.

57

Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. 830.

58

Id.

at 832.
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actor.

1159

After examining all of the alleged indicia of "state
action," Justice Burger concluded that the school was not
required to provide its teachers with federal constitutional
guarantees.

The Chief Justice emphasized that "state

action" can be found only when the state "has exercised
coercive power or has provided such significant
encouragement, either overt or covert, that the choice in
law must be deemed to be that of the State." 60
Similarly, the Chief Justice found that "the school's
receipt of public funds does not make the . . . decisions acts
of the state. " 61

Further, Justice Burger added,

school, like the nursing homes,

62

"The

is not fundamentally

different from many private corporations whose business
depends primarily on contracts to build roads, bridges,
dams,

ships, or submarines for the government.

Acts of such

private contractors do not become acts of the government by
reason of their significant or even total engagement in

59

Id. at 834.

60

Id. at 840.

61Id.
62

See Blum,

457 U.S.

991.
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performing public contracts.

1163

The teachers also claimed that the extensive state
regulation of their school made the school's actions those
of the state.

Justice Burger, however, rejected this

argument as well.

He wrote,

"[H]ere the decisions to

discharge the petitioners were not compelled or even
influenced by any state regulation.

Indeed,

... the various

regulators showed relatively little interest in the school's
personnel matters. " 64
As for the "public function" argument, that the private
school was doing the work of the state in its stead, the
Chief Justice was not impressed.

He cited the Jackson 65

criterion that the private party's action was to be the
exclusive prerogative of the state before a finding of

public function would be reached.

"There can be no doubt

that the education of maladjusted high school students is a
public function, but that is only the beginning of the
inquiry.

[While state law] demonstrates that the State

intends to provide services for such students at public
expense, that legislative policy choice in no way makes
63

Rendell-Baker,

64

Id. at 841-42.

65

Jackson,

457 U.S. at 841.

419 U.S. at 353.
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these services the exclusive province of the State." 66

The

majority opinion did not find private education to be the
fulfillment of a "public function" and, hence, an act of the
state.
Once again, Justice Marshall dissented.

He maintained

that this holding "simply could not be justified. " 67
Justice Marshall pointed to the heavy state funding of the
school as well as the regulation of the school by the State
of Massachusetts

Surely, he observed, this was a case of

very close nexus between the school and the state
government. 68

Moreover, he wrote, the fact that "the

school is providing a substitute for public education" 69
66

Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842.

67

Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 844 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) .
68

69

Id. at 849.

Justice Marshall, in his dissent, was clearly
concerned that the state might use private contractors to
circumvent the laws that applied "only" to the State. This
was not the first time that there was concern about using
the private domain to circumvent public statutes.
For
example, in as early a case as Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S.
323 (1926), the Court upheld private restrictive covenants
that prevented the sales of homes by white sellers to black
buyers. The Court failed to find a Constitutional issue,
judging these covenants to be private actions, and not
falling within the strictures of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id., at 330. The Corrigan decision was subsequently
reversed by the Court in Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1
(1948).
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seemed to be "an important indicium of state action.

1110

Further, he wrote, "I would conclude that the actions
challenged here were under color of state law, even if I
believed that the sole basis for state action was the fact
that the school was providing [statutorily mandated]
services." 71
In addition, Justice Marshall objected to the
comparison of the school to other contractors.

"Although

shipbuilders and dambuilders, like the school, may be
dependent on government funds, they are not so closely
supervised by the government.

And unlike most private

contractors, the school is performing a statutory duty of
the State." 72

Justice Marshall also stated that a finding

of state action may be justified, even if the state has not
traditionally and exclusively performed a function.

Such a

finding is justified when "a private entity is performing a
vital public function and other factors are present which
show "a close connection with the state. " 73
Justice Marshall further critiqued the majority's
70

Rendell-Baker,

71

Id.

72

Id.

73

Id. at 849.

457 U.S. at 851.
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decision because it focused on the "empty formalism" of the
categories of "state action" and "under color of law." 74
This formalism that Justice Marshall decried is a type of
legal analysis that starts with legal categories and tries
to fit facts into these categories.

Justice Marshall

appeared to be advocating a more realistic view of legal
analysis that would state policy choices clearly and openly,
rather than masking them in formalistic legal definitions
and rules.

With respect to "state action," it should be

possible to explore the policy rationales for and against a
finding of "state action" in each case.

In Rendell-Baker v.

Kohn, Justice Marshall's dissent focused on his view that

there were enough indicators of "state action" to warrant
such a finding regardless of how well the facts fit into the
formalistic category ("coercive power," "significant
encouragement," "exclusive prerogative of the state")
Justice Marshall, albeit in dissent, sees private education
as a "public function."

Accordingly, private educators must

provide their students with the same rights enjoyed by the
students of public education.

Private school students are

entitled to the full panoply of "due process" rights granted
to public school students.
74

Id. at 852.
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The Rendell-Baker decision related directly to teachers
of private institution.
found,

Regarding the teachers, the Court

in the majority opinion, that the private school was

not required to provide the usual constitutional safeguards
that public school teachers enjoy.

What would be the case,

however, if the plaintiffs were students?

There is judicial

opinion to the effect that the "public function" argument is
much stronger if students were the plaintiffs.

"The 'public

function' concept is strongest ... when asserted by those for
whose benefit the state has undertaken to perform a service,
or when the state has lent its coercive powers to a private
party. " 75

It appears that the ruling of Rendell-Baker,

relating to faculty at a private school, is not conclusive
regarding students in the same institution.

Students in a

private school that is publicly funded have a stronger claim
than their teachers for due process rights.
Additionally, some see the compulsory education
statutes as an agent for imposing the state within the
school.

After all, students are required by law to attend

school; each state has compulsory education statutes.

In

taking disciplinary action, the school is using authority
over the student, authority that is derived from state law.
75

Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,

641 F.2d 14,

26

(1981).
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It is clear, then, that the school is a state actor, acting
under "color of law," and must consider itself limited by
constitutional constraints. 76
The third case of the "state action" trilogy was Lugar
v. Edmondson. 77

Interestingly, Justice Rehnquist and Chief

Justice Burger, the authors of the majority opinions in Blum
and Rendell-Baker, were in the dissent in Lugar. 78

This

case uses the approach to public function that emphasizes
enough state involvement in private activities to make the
apparent private action into a public function.

The case

arose when Edmondson sued to collect a debt from Lugar, the
operator of a truck stop.

Ancillary to that action,

Edmondson sought prejudgment attachment of some of Lugar's
property for fear that Lugar might sell off this property in
order to avoid paying his creditors.

The attachment was

76

Milonas v. Williams,

77

Lugar v. Edmondson, 457 U.S. 922 (1982).

78

691 F.2d 931, 940 (1982)

Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell wrote
separate dissenting opinions in which they said that the
Court was expanding "state action" beyond its proper
boundaries. They did not believe that a finding of "state
action" was valid just because a state official was involved
in an essentially private action.
Id. 457 U.S. at 943
(Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Powell added that he
was opposed to ensnaring someone (Edmondson) who believed he
was acting in strict accordance with the law.
Id. 457 U.S.
at 945-46 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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affected by a state clerk and the county sheriff.

Lugar

continued to own his property, though the property was now
sequestered.

About one month later, a hearing was held to

determine the propriety of the attachment, only to discover
that there were no real grounds for it.

At this point,

Lugar sued Edmondson and its president, alleging that the
attachment deprived him of his property and was done without
due process of law.

This deprivation was clearly done

"under color of law," similar to "state action." 79

The

Supreme Court, in a five to four decision, ruled that
Lugar's claim was justified and the action could be
attributed to the state.
Writing for the majority, Justice White delineated a
two-part test for "fair attribution" of an act to the state.
First, in order for an act to be considered "state action,"
the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right
or privilege created by the state or by a rule of conduct
imposed by the state or by a person for whom the state is
responsible. 80

Second, the party charged with the

79

The similarity between the concepts of "state action"
and "under color of law" was discussed in United States v.
Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794, n.7 (1966), where it was resolved
that the legal analysis is the same for both concepts.
80

Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937.
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deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a
state actor. 01

This person may be a state official or

someone else whose actions are chargeable to the state.

The

Court's imposition of this test was necessary, according to
the Court, so that private parties not "face constitutional
litigation whenever they seek to rely on some state rule
governing their interactions with the community surrounding
them. " 82
Justice White explained that this two-part test appears
like one when a state official is involved.

However, when a

private party is involved, the second part of the test
prevents us from reaching a decision of "state action" even
when a state statute is involved.

Thus, Edmondson's use of

state officials to sequester Lugar's property warranted a
decision of "state action."

This was not the case in Flagg

Bros. 03 (where there was no finding of "state action")
because their lien was executed without the intervention of
a state official.

81

Id. at 939.

02

Id. at 937.

03

Flagg Bros.,

436 U.S. 149.
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LEGAL THINKING SINCE THE "STATE ACTION" TRILOGY
The Lugar two-part test is not helpful in our quest to
ensure student rights in private schools.
however, may help us accomplish this goal.

Its progeny,
The Lugar test

was relied upon in the recent New York case of Albert v.

Carovano. 84

Here, twelve Hamilton College students were

suspended for participation in a "sit in" against this
private college's rules.

These rules had been instituted

pursuant to New York State education law.

This law mandated

that colleges adopt rules for the maintenance of public
order.

Now that the rules were being enforced, the students

claimed that they were done so "under color of state law"
and that the state was involved.

Since these students were

involved in a state-required disciplinary action, they
claimed that they were entitled to due process rights which
they never received.
Carovano is noteworthy because of its different
decisions of the trial and two appellate courts.

The United

States District Court dismissed the case for the students'
failure to show action "under color of state law." 85
84

Then,

Albert v. Carovano, 824 F.2d 1333 (2d. Cir.),
modified 839 F.2d 871 (2d Cir. 1987), rev'd and vacated, 851
F.2d 561 (2d Cir. 1988) (en bane).
85

Carovano, 824 F. 2d at 1334.
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the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit overturned the
district court's decision, and remanded the case for a
determination of facts,
College. 87

86

citing Coleman v. Wagner

If the facts were to show that the students had

been deprived of a constitutionally-protected right, then as
a matter of law, the college had acted "under color of state
law" and that the students were entitled to "due
process. " 88

By citing Coleman, the appeals court was

stating that the first part of the Lugar test was satisfied
if the district court agreed with the students' claim that
the New York State law was intended to be and actually was
applied as

"a command to colleges to adopt a particular

system of regulation of conduct on campuses." 89
Proceeding to the second part of the Lugar test, the
court held that the college could fairly be considered a
state actor under a "state compulsion" theory. 90

The court

believed that the state's regulations were intended to

87

Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir.

1970) .
88

Carovano, 824 F. 2d at 1338.

89

Id. at 1341.
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encourage, if not require colleges to take a strong stand
against campus unrest. 91

This encouragement, which was

more than mere approval or acquiescence, seemed enough to
show that the state was involved in the expulsion
decision. 92

This encouragement would involve the state in

the school, and make the private college's activities into a
public function.

This would require that the school afford

its students the rights of public college students.
In 1988, on rehearing en bane, the Court of Appeals
reversed itself . 93

The court found that the college's

suspension of the students did not constitute "state
action."

This reversal was because Blum 94 had been decided

by the United States Supreme Court in the meantime.

If the

Blum court had not found "state action," and there was far

more state involvement there, then Carovano needed
reversal. 95

The Court of Appeals did not believe that

there was coercion by the state to mete out any particular
91

Id.

92

Id.

93

Albert v.

Carovano,

851 F.2d 561, 563 (2d Cir. 1988)

(en bane) .
94

95

Blum,

457 U.S. 991.

Albert v. Carovano, 824 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1987),
vacated, 851 F.2d 561, 570 (2d Cir. 1988).
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punishment, and the state could not be considered
responsible for the actions of the college. 96

The private

Hamilton College was not viewed as serving a public function
of educating the state's students.
Judge Oakes dissented because he considered the Lugar
test to have been fulfilled.

97

The first prong of the

Lugar test is whether the deprivation is caused by a state

policy. 98

Judge Oakes felt that the disciplinary policy

had clearly been narrowly tailored to address school
discipline, in fulfillment of the New York State mandate.
The second prong of the Lugar test is whether the defendant
can be called a state actor. 99

Here, the school was not

exercising its professional judgement on the best way to
discipline its students.

Rather, it was implementing a

specific disciplinary program that the state had coerced it
to adopt.

Thus, Judge Oakes argued that the school was

acting on behalf of the state, as required by Lugar, and

96

Carovano, 851 F. 2d at 571.

97

Carovano, 851 F.2d at 574 (Oakes, J., dissenting).

98

See Lugar,

99Id.

457 U.S. at 937.
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that Blum should not have been relied upon in this case . 100
Although the decisions in Rendell-Baker and Blum diminish
the opportunities for a finding of "state action," the Lugar
test demonstrates that the Supreme Court may be willing to
use the doctrine of "public function" to find "state action"
under certain circumstances.

In spite of the various

decisions against finding "state action," the notion remains
alive today.
For the purposes of this study, it should be noted that
throughout the various Carovano decisions, the courts
applied different "state action" tests, with little
agreement about which aspects of the case were important.
This is not surprising, considering that the Supreme Court
has failed to agree on a dispositive "state action" test
even after the 1982 State Action Trilogy. 101

There is

still much confusion over the nature and scope of the "state
action" doctrine and what constitutes "state action" in

100

It should be noted that the only question remaining,
according to Judge Oakes' dissent, was whether there was a
widespread and reasonable belief that schools were required
by the State to enforce the particular New York State rule.
If there was such a belief, then "state action" was
applicable and a trial on the merits of Carovano would have
been appropriate.
See Carovano, 851 F.2d at 577.
101

Lugar, 457 U.S. 922; Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. 830; and
Blum, 457 U.S. 991.
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private schools.

The United States Supreme Court has not

articulated a clear position on the topic.

It is hoped that

the lack of a clear position will not prevent private school
students from receiving the procedural fairness to which
they would be entitled if "state action" were found.

The

following of procedural fairness would undoubtedly prevent
potential serious educational and psychological harm to the
student.
Some legal scholars have suggested that various
specific concrete indicia should be used to determine if the
private school is acting on behalf of the state.

They would

look at state funding and state regulation of private
schools to indicate that these schools are closely aligned
with the state to make them the state's extended arm.

The

position advanced in this study is that, as arms of the
state, the actions of these schools would be considered the
private sector's serving a "public function," and a finding
of "state action" would be in order.

Students at these

schools should be able to demand "due process," just as
their public school counterparts do.
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SCHNEIDER'S CRITERIA FOR FINDING A "PUBLIC FUNCTION"
Professor Ronna Schneider, in discussing the "State
Action Trilogy," would maintain that the issue is not
whether state funding and regulation of an otherwise private
institution constituted a sufficient nexus to render that
institution's actions state action . 102

Rather,

"[T] he

focus of the inquiry should [be] upon the statutory
delegation and the precise nature of the task
delegated.

11103

And, if the state is statutorily required

to provide a service and it delegates this service to a
private provider, then an illogical result may result: "The
more effectively the state distances itself from the
performance of its statutory obligations, the less likely
that the intended beneficiary of that obligation will
receive the constitutional protections the state would have
been required to give it if the state had provided the
service directly.

11104

In other words, the state could

privatize the performance of its duties and relieve itself
of the responsibility of acting within constitutional

102

Ronna G. Schneider, "The 1982 State Action Trilogy"
60 Notre Dame Law Review 1150 (1985) .
103

Id. at 1163.

104

Id. at 1164.
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limits.

The state should not be allowed to do indirectly

what would be impermissible if done directly.

Similarly, if

the state action analysis focuses solely on the extent of
state involvement, the private entity performing the state's
obligation can also evade the limitations of the Fourteenth
Amendment.

Thus, an action based on the guarantee of the

Fourteenth Amendment could not be brought against either the
state or the private actor.

According to Professor

Schneider, this is unacceptable.

Ways must be found that

recognize the public role and responsibility of private
institutions.
Professor Schneider proposes four criteria to establish
"state action" within private institutions. 105

1) The

state has a legislative or constitutional mandate to provide
a particular service; 2) The state delegates to the private
entity the provision of that service which the state would
otherwise be obligated to perform itself; 3) The activity is
one which is traditionally, although not exclusively,
performed by the state.

Schneider believes that only these

kinds of activities generate a reasonable public expectation
that constitutional limits should apply.

When there is a

reasonable expectation that constitutional limits should
105

Id.

at 1167.
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apply, because of the similarity of the private activity to
that of the state's, then constitutional limits, such as due
process, should apply.

She writes explicitly:

an excellent example of this kind of activity.

"Education is
,,io 6

The reason Schneider believes that "[e]ducation is an
excellent example of this kind of activity" is because of
its fit into her criteria.

1) It is the state that is

mandated to provide education.

2) A private alternative is

available, but if the private school alternative does not
provide it, then the standard public school must do so.

3)

Statistically, from its very inception, the public school
has taught the greater majority of the nation's children.
Schneider's fourth criterion to establish "state
action" is that the person complaining of the constitutional
violation must be the intended beneficiary of the delegated
activity.

"State action"

(or "public function")

exists only

when the private entity's actions are directed at those whom
the state intended to benefit from these services.
case of education,

In the

"state action" exists when the non-public

school's actions are directed at the students.

Indeed, this

is part of the "nexus" argument of Rendell-Baker:i 07 that
io 6 Id.

at 1168.

i 07 Rendell-Baker,

Emphasis added.
457 U.S. at 843-44.
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the state's involvement centered on the students, and not on
the employees of the school.
The underlying premise of these criteria of "public
function" is that the state cannot delegate to a private
entity the obligation to perform certain services or tasks
without also delegating the responsibility to act within the
parameters of the Constitution. 108

It is clear that

private schools fall within the rubric of private entities
that should follow the parameters of the Constitution.
Accordingly, in spite of certain "public function" decisions
by the Court, non-public school students should have the
same constitutional rights as public school students
(specifically in the area of fundamental fairness),
regardless of the school's apparently "private" genesis.
This providing of constitutional rights recognizes the
private school's inherently public service to the community.
Considering that the students fulfill their compulsory
education requirements in a private school and that public
schools would be obligated to provide education to these
students absent the private schools, it is clear that
private schools fulfill an important educational mission in
the community.
108

As direct recipients of the private school's

Schneider, 60 Notre Dame Law Review at 1170.
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alternative education, students who would otherwise be the
responsibility of the state, should benefit from the same
rights as public school students.
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JUDICIAL DECISIONS REGARDING THE "PUBLIC FUNCTION" DOCTRINE
AND NON-PUBLIC EDUCATION
We shall now review various Supreme Court and lower
courts decisions, as well as legal opinions regarding the
"Public Function" theory in the area of non-public
education.
As stated above, there are two approaches to the
"public function" analysis.

In the first,

the analysis

focuses on whether the private enterprise in question is
sufficiently public to be considered "state action."

"State

action" may be found when the private enterprise performs
services that are delegated to it by the state or when these
services are so essential that in their absence the state
would perform them.

In the second approach, the analysis

focuses on the nature of the activity.

If the activity is

affected with a public interest, then a finding of "state
action" is appropriate.
According to the first approach, we will easily find
private education as serving a "public function."
state has compulsory education laws.

Every

The state has always

seen education as its major responsibility.

Private schools

provide the same or similar service, thus relinquishing the
state of its responsibility toward private school students.
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The provision of public education is clearly an act of the
state government; private education is clearly the
fulfillment of a "public function."
Two important Supreme Court decisions, Pierce v.

Society of Sisters 109 and Wisconsin v. Yoder,

110

help us

understand the Court's view of the centrality of education
to the states and its delivery to the citizens.

Pierce v.

Society of Sisters recognized the legitimacy of private
education as an option for parents in the rearing of their
children. 111

No longer were parents required to send their

children to the public schools.

Parents have a

"fundamental" right to rear their children as they prefer;
the choice of schools is one way that parents express that
preference.

Wisconsin v. Yoder1 12 found that the state is

justified in requiring a certain level of basic education,
even as it approved the "fundamental" right of parents to
select the proper education for their children. 113

As long

as a basic level of education is provided, the private
109

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).

110

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

111

Pierce,

112

Yoder,

113

Id. at 233.

268 U.S. 510.
406 U.S. 205.
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schools are considered to have fulfilled the state's
legitimate requirement for an educated citizenry.

Clearly

the private school is fulfilling a service that is in the
public's interest.

Its educational services proffered

should be considered a "public function."
We have seen that the "public function" notion properly
includes activities by a private body of a kind which must
be performed by the government if that private body fails to
perform them.

Private education is such an activity.

Were

any private school to close, the public schools would be
required to provide for the education of the disenfranchised
students.

We have also found that the notion of "public

function" applies when the action of a private body is
affected with an important public interest.
the apex of the state's responsibilities.

Education is at
As parens

patriae, the state must assure an educated citizenry.

This

analysis leads us to the conclusion that private education
is a "public function."

As one author concluded, "education

and justice--the two chief activities of state and local
governments--would be 'governmental functions' par

excellence, and justice on campus, a fortiori, would be a
"governmental function" and therefore subject to
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constitutional requirements. " 114

To limit education,

because of its great value to the student and society, even
in a non-public setting, should only be justified when all
procedural fairnesses were fulfilled. 115

114

Note,

Journal 1362,
115

"Judicial Review of Expulsions," 72 Yale Law
1385, n.126 (1963).

Id. at 1385.
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LOWER COURT DECISIONS ON EDUCATION AS A "PUBLIC

FUNCTION"

Perhaps the most significant statements in the area of
"Public Function," as it applies to education, are found in

Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University. 116

There,

Judge Skelly Wright wrote:
At the outset, one may question whether any school
or college can ever be so 'private' as to escape the
reach of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In a country
dedicated to the creed that education is the only sure
foundation ... of freedom, without which no republic can
maintain itself in strength, institutions of learning
are not things of purely private concern . 117
Clearly, the administrators of a private college are
performing a public function.
They do the work of the
state, often in place of the state. Does it not follow
that they stand in the state's shoes ? 118
It is important to note that, although Guillory was
later reversed, Judge Wright's comments on education as a
"public function" were not repudiated. 119
Another major statement on the relevance of the "Public
Function" theory to education was made in Belk v. Chancellor

116

Gui11ory v. Administrators of Tulane University, 203
F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La.), judgment vacated & new trial
ordered, 207 F. Supp. 554, aff'd per curiam, 306 F.2d 489
(5th Cir.), rev'd on retrial, 212 F. Supp. 674 (E.D. La.
1962) .
117

Id. 203 F. Supp. 857.

118

Id. at 859.

119

See Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University,
306 F.2d 489.

209
of Washington University. 120

The Belk court began by

quoting Greene v. Howard University: 121 "The amenability to
constitutional commands of what was once widely assumed to
be purely private activity is a fluid and developing 122
concept. " 123

Belk then continues with a clear statement

that private education should be considered a "public
function."
It is the opinion of this court that the acts of a
private university can constitute ''state action" when
said university is denying to its students their right
to participate in the educational process.
Education
is a public function ... The private university's
performance of a public function could render its
actions subject to constitutional restraints. 124
Belk recognized that Guillory was concerned with racial

120

Belk v.

Chancellor of Washington University,

336 F. Supp. 45 (1970).
121

Greene v. Howard University, 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir.

1969) .
122

Professor Van Alstyne makes an important comment
regarding Greene v. Howard University:
"Essentially no
procedural due process was required in Greene v. Howard
Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.C.C. 1967), on the theory that
the university was private and not subject to the fifth or
fourteenth amendments. The case is surely in error; even
before hearing an appeal on the merits, the court of appeals
ordered temporary reinstatement of the students." William
W. Van Alstyne, "The Student As University Resident," 45
Denver Law Journal 582, 594, n.32 (1968)
123

Greene, 412 F.2d at 1132, n.2.

124

Be1k, 336 F.Supp. at 48.
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discrimination, though it likened the acts of private
administrators in a university to other cases the Supreme
Court had decided.

These included cases regarding the

actions of private persons who governed the company town in
Marsh 125 or who ran the streetcar and bus service in Public
Utilities. 126

The Supreme Court concluded that the best

way to measure state involvement is through the inductive
process of "sifting facts and weighing circumstances.

11127

The Belk decision followed the Court's advise and found that
private universities serve a "public function."

The Belk

decision concludes with a quote from Brown v. Board of
Education,

128

"Today, more than ever before, the area of

education is a matter of greatest public concern and
interest.

11129

Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple University,

125

Marsh v. Alabama,

126

Public Utilities Commission v. Pollack,

326 U.S. 501

(1946).
343 U.

s.

451

(1952).
121

715,

see Burton v.
722 (1961).

Wilmington Parking Authority,

128

Brown v. Board of Education,

129

Id. at 493.

347 U.S.

483

365 U.S.

(1954).
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Etc . 130 concluded that, because a finding of "public

function" means that there is "state action," nonpublic
schools would certainly be included as "state action."
the Isaacs court found,

As

"State action would be present in

the operation of every non-public school, for example,
because education is surely a state function. 131
Another indication of "state action" may be gleaned
from Buckton v. National Collegiate Athletic
Association. 132

There, the court found a substantial

likelihood that "state action" would be found on the part of
Boston University.

The Buckton court relied on the view

that the university, though a private institution, clearly
performed functions governmental in nature such as providing
higher education to and exercising substantial dominion over
its students.
Moreover, the holding in Braden v. University of
Pi ttsburgh 133 points to the blurring of clear definitions

of "state action."

There, the court said,

"The difficulties

130

Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple University,
Etc., 385 F. Supp. 473 (1974).
131

Id. at 486.

132

Buckton v. NCAA,

133

Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 552 F. 2d 948

(1977) .

366 F. Supp. 1152 (DC Mass 1973) .
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of drawing a line between the state and private action are
by now well-recognized.

This is so because the realms of

the government and the private sector are not as clearly
defined as they were during the epoch in which the
Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were adopted." 134
A Note discusses the fact that the public universities
in the United States do not meet the total need for higher
education in this country . 135

In fact,

the community

relies heavily on the educational services provided by
private universities.

And,

"in the absence of a readily

available alternative to a private higher education there is
no way of lessening the impact of unreasonable restraints
imposed by the private schools except by direct intervention
in their affairs. " 136

Thus, it appears wholly appropriate

for courts to review the actions of the private schools, as
they do for public schools, to assure that no capricious
decisions of expulsion are made.
It appears to this writer that the courts should be
willing to review the disciplinary decisions affecting

134

Id. at 956.

135

Note, "Developments In The Law - - Academic Freedom, "
81 Harvard Law Review 1041 (1968) .
136

Id. at 1156.
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youngsters attending private elementary and secondary
schools as well.

Approximately ten percent of all American

children attend private schools.

It appears that the

government relies on many of its children being educated in
the private domain.

Certainly, it is at a significant

savings to them that these children are educated off the
public doles.

This would appear to put education squarely

in the area of a public function.

Further, with the abysmal

national achievement tests scores of many public schools,
there is little alternative quality education available to
students who are expelled from their private schools.

At a

minimum, private schools should be judged as fulfilling a
"public function" and, thus, in the public service.

Private

schools should be considered public in their requirements
for treating their students in ways similar to the public
schools.
order.

The following of procedural fairness is surely in
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THE IDENTICAL ANALYSIS FOR "EQUAL PROTECTION" AND
"DUE PROCESS" PROTECTIONS
An important question remains to be asked regarding
"state action" and "public function" cases.

In many cases

where "public function" or "state action" were found, the
case involved discrimination and the "equal protection"
clause.

The "equal protection" clause refers to the second

clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution: "· .. Nor shall any State ... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."

The question is whether the decisions regarding the

"equal protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment apply
to due process cases of the same Amendment.
The answer to this question was provided in Cohen v.

Illinois Institute of Technology. 137

There, it was decided

that the decisions based on the "equal protection" clause
apply to the "due process" clause as well.

Additionally,

the state action analysis which applies to equal protection
claims applies also to due process claims. 138
This Cohen v. IIT decision follows Isaacs v. Ed. of

137

818

Cohen v. Illinois Institute of Technology, 524 F. 2d

(1975)
138

Id. at 822-23.
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Trustees of Temple University, Etc. 139

In Isaacs, the

court wrote that a finding of "state action" in cases that
do not include racial discrimination may be just as
plausible as a finding of "state action" where there is
racial discrimination.

Invocation of the Fourteenth

Amendment's "equal protection" clause because of racial
discrimination should not be the sole reason for a finding
of "state action."

The court's analysis rests on the fact

that "it is difficult, and perhaps impossible, to arrange
federal constitutional rights in an ascending hierarchy of
value.
It is clear from both the Cohen and Isaacs decisions
that any deprivation of such a right, whether to the equal
protection of the law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment or to the freedoms of speech and association as
guaranteed by the First Amendment, is a matter of extreme
importance to the person who suffers the deprivation.

11140

Certainly, then, whatever deprivations would be disallowed
because of one clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would also
be disallowed under another clause of the same Amendment.

Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple University,
Etc., 385 F. Supp. 473, n.11 (1974).
139

140

Id.
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Accordingly, findings of "public function" or "state action"
that will reverse racial discrimination within a private
school will also have application to due process rights
within the same school.
It is not difficult to construct an argument that
private schools do serve this "public function."

A finding

that a private school serves a "public function" means that
the administration of these schools must allow their
students the same procedural fairness as in the public
schools.
Assuring procedural fairness is a wise educational
decision.
expect.

This is a measure of fairness that most people
It also shows a keen sense of justice by the

administrators who are advocating on behalf of the students
and providing them with every conceivable benefit.
Fulfilling procedural fairness also shows a respect for the
importance of education and the severe consequences of its
limitation.

The children deserve the fairness of "due

process" procedures.
We have moved from Marsh v. Alabama, 141 that
institutions that serve the public take on public-like

141

Marsh v. Alabama,

326 U. S. 501

(1946) .
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responsibilities, to Justice Harlan in Evans v. Newton,

i

42

that schools serve a "public function," to Justice
Marshall's dissent in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison
Co.,

i

43

that anything the state would do were it not for

the private institution must be considered "serving a public
function."

We have seen education called a "public

function" in both the majority and minority opinions of
v. Brooks. l. 44

Flagg Bros Inc.

It can easily be read into

dissents of Justices Brennen in Bl um v. Yaretsky1 45 and
Marshall in Rendell-Baker. i 46

It has been stated

explicitly by such lower courts as Guillory, i 47 Belk,
Greene,

i

i

i

i

49

and Isaacs. iso

4

s

Various legal commentators have

42

Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).

43

Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,

(1974)
i

l.

i

419 U.S. 365, 369

(Marshall, J., dissenting).
44

Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).

45

Blum v.

46

Rendell-Baker v. Kohn,

Yaretsky,

457 U.S. 991 (1982).
457 U.S. 830 (1982)

Gui11ory v. Administrators of Tulane University, 203
F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962).
i

i

47

4

sBelk v. Chancellor of Washington University,

Supp. 45
i

49

1969).

336 F.

(1970).

Greene v. Howard University, 412 F.2d 1128 (D:c. Cir.
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pointed to the importance of finding private education to be
a "public function."

Students are entitled to the

constitutional rights that pursue in the wake of such a
finding. 151

150

Etc.,

Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple University,
(1974).

385 F. Supp. 473
151

In a case not directly related to education, it was
stated: "Society's administration has become so complex that
private organizations are in a position of performing
governmental functions and in the discharge of such function
may be subject to the constitutional requirements of using
fair and equal procedures." Ryan v. Hofstra University, 324
N. Y. S. 2d 964, 978 (1971), quoting Silver v. New York
Stock Exchange, 373 U. S. 341 (1963).

CHAPTER VI
THE "STATE ACTION" DOCTRINE
AND "DUE PROCESS" RIGHTS IN NON-PUBLIC SCHOOLS
The Constitution of the United States has been
perceived as a document controlling the relationship between
the government and the residents of the United States.

It

is often appreciated for the limits that it sets on the
actions of the Federal and local governments.

For example,

the Fourteenth Amendment provides that the state may not
limit its residents' rights of "life, liberty, or property
without the due process of law."

This guarantee of "due

process of law" has been interpreted to apply only to
actions of the government.

The government may not deprive a

resident of these benefits without the "due process of law;"
an individual is not obligated to consider providing "due
process of law" whatsoever.
The requirement for the government's providing the "due
process of law" is based on the wording of the first clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1

Ever since the Civil

1

U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1, states in relevant part:
"nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law."
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Rights Cases, 2 this requirement has become known as "state

action."

In any situation where the state is directly

involved, or even an extension of the state is involved,
there will be a finding of "state action."

These bodies are

required to provide for the "due process of law" before they
limit life, liberty, or property rights.

As state

institutions that are financially supported and administered
by the state, public schools are considered extensions of
the state.

The public school's actions are, therefore,

"state action."

Public schools must provide due process

rights to their students before meting out serious
punishment. 3
Regarding non-public schools, prevailing legal opinion
has been that the actions of these schools are not
considered "state action." 4

It follows,

therefore, that

non-public school students on the verge of disciplinary
action are not constitutionally entitled to due process and

2

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)

3

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).

4

Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F.Supp. 1382 (N.D. Irid.
1970), 445 F. 2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971) .

221
fundamental fairness.

5

This conclusion is not the sole

possible conclusion, nor is it necessarily accurate.

This

chapter will review the substance of the "state action"
requirement.

It will also discuss the wisdom of limiting

due process rights to public institutions.

5

It will conclude

An interesting case that came before Judge H. Friendly
was Coleman v. Wagner College, 429 F.2d 1120 (2d Cir. 1970)
Here, New York had required public and private colleges
within the State to adopt and enforce regulations for the
maintenance of public order on college property. Several
students at this private college had taken over the office
of a college official during a sit-in and refused to end
this occupation. The students were expelled, allegedly
without due process. The students brought suit because of
their expulsion without due process. They lost their
original suit due a finding of insufficient state
involvement. The Court of Appeals set aside the lower
court's dismissal. The Court of Appeals held that, although
the school was with a religious denomination and almost
entirely supported by private funds, because the State had
required that there be a policy regarding campus unrest, the
State may now be perceived to be closely involved in the
implementation of these specific policies. This would be a
finding of "state action." The case was remanded for a
further hearing at which the students might prove whether
there was a meaningful state intrusion in the disciplinary
policies of this private college. Judge Friendly, in
concurrence, found "state action" in this case as he
believed that the common citizen would not distinguish
between public colleges and private colleges in New York.
Id. at 1127 (Friendly, J., concurring). Judge Friendly
further stated that he advocates a two-tiered analysis for a
finding of "state action" in Fourteenth Amendment questions.
Where there is racial discrimination he would require a
lesser showing of state involvement to constitute "state
action." It would appear that the same lower standard
necessary to show "state action" should apply to § 1 of the
same Fourteenth Amendment, thus gaining due process rights
for "private" school students.
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with suggestions for a new understanding of the "state
action" requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The single most important reason for concluding that
private school students are not entitled to due process
rights is because of the absence of "state action."
However, it has become more and more difficult to provide an
accurate and clear definition of "state action.

116

An

unclear definition of this difficult concept will limit its
usefulness for any legal purposes.
In an attempt to better define the "state action"
doctrine, we shall review where a finding of "state action"
has been appropriate.

A private school that serves in lieu

of a public school is considered serving a public function.
"Public function" is an alternate way of requiring the same
protections covered by "state action."

The "public

function" doctrine is discussed in Chapter V above.

6

In attempting to define "state action" in Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), the Court
stated that "only by sifting facts and weighing
circumstances can the nonobvious involvement of the State in
private conduct be attributed its true significance." Id.,
at 722. One legal scholar compared this elusive definition
of "state action" to Justice Stewart's famous "I know it
when I see it" standard for judging obscenity (Jacobellis v.
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring))
mainly in the comparative precision of the latter. (See
Brest, "State Action and Liberal Theory, 130 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 1296, 1325 (1982)).
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There are several other ways of finding "state action"
as well.

Firstly, should a private school possess a

"symbiotic relationship" with the government or be a "joint
participant" in the challenged conduct, then a finding of
state action would be warranted. 7

Secondly, even if no

single factor may constitute a finding of "state action," a
combination of several factors may paint a picture of a
"symbiotic relationship" between the state and the private
institution. 8

Thirdly, if there exists a "close nexus"

between the government and the particular challenged
conduct, then "state action" may be present. 9

All these

approaches try to clarify the nature of the relationship
between the state and the private institution.

Where the

state is closely involved in the administration, decisionmaking, or finances of the private institution, courts will
often find "state action."
Once there is a finding of "state action," it remains

7

See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 175
(1972) and Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S.
715, 725 (1961)
8

Sament v. Hahnemann Medical College and Hospital, 413
F. Supp. 434 (1976).
See also Rackin v. University of
Pennsylvania, 386 F. Supp. 992 (1972).
9

See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345,
351 (1974) .
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to determine which "due process" is applicable,
or "substantive."

"procedural"

"Procedural due process" looks only at

the procedure to be followed, requiring a level of fairness.
Typically the procedure is for a hearing of the charges and
an opportunity for rebuttal.
offered as well.

An objective tribunal may be

"Substantive due process" looks at the

substance of the right that is being diminished.

If it is a

right that deserves extra protection, then the offending
party must provide a compelling reason to overcome the
protection.

Examples of such rights include "fundamental"

rights and rights that have gained importance for historical
or social reasons.

While studying the applicability of "due

process" rights to private school children it will be noted
whether the result would be "procedural" or "substantive due
process" rights.
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THE "POSITIVISTS," THE "STATE ACTION" DOCTRINE,
AND THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION
We have seen that there are several ways for a finding
of "state action" to issue.

We shall now review why the

requirements for "state action" have persisted.

Why does

the Fourteenth Amendment require the involvement of the
states, or "state action," before it is said to apply?
Professor Paul Brest opines that the doctrine of "state
action" is an attempt to maintain a public/private
distinction by attributing some conduct to the state and
some to private actors. 10

As the theory goes, the actions

of the state would be circumscribed by the limitations of
the Constitution while the actions of the private party
would not.

This distinction is an important one.

It

respects the limitations on government that are appropriate
for a constitution to provide.

It also keeps the government

out of the personal and private lives of the people.
From a staunchly positivist perspective, however, such
a theory is on tenuous ground.
concept of natural law.

Positivists do not have a

Instead, they believe that every

right of a citizen is only what is provided by the state and

10

Paul Brest, "State Action and Liberal Theory," 130
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1296 (1982).
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affirmatively decided to be part of the state's panoply of
rights.

As such, every right becomes an act of the state,

i.e. "state action."

Even those rights only passively

accepted by the state will be considered by the Positivists
as "state action."

Furthermore, "since any private action

acquiesced in by the state can be seen to derive its power
from the state, which is free to withdraw its authorization
at will, Positivism potentially implicates the state in
every "private" action not prohibited by law. " 11

Thus,

according to the Positivists, a "state action" doctrine to
limit governmental actions does not exist.

They view every

action as either actively legislated or passively approved
by the state.

According to the "staunch" positivists every

action by both public institutions and private individuals
is "state action."
In Flagg Bros. v. Brooks 12 Justice Rehnquist wrote a
long footnote in which he recognized the danger inherent in
Positivism and disavowed its broadest implications.

In

discussing the law regarding property interests of a private
person in his own possessions, Justice Rehnquist states that
these laws are not to be considered "state authorization of
11

Id. at 1301.

12

Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
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private breach[es] of the peace." 13

His reasoning is that

"[i]t would intolerably broaden, beyond the scope of any of
our previous cases, the notion of state action under the
Fourteenth Amendment to hold that the mere existence of a
body of property law in a state, whether decisional or
statutory, itself amounted to 'state action' even though no
state process or state officials were ever involved in
enforcing that body of law. " 14

Thus, Justice Rehnquist

holds that the state is not involved (viz., there is no
"state action") if it merely "consents" to an action.
Instead, according to Justice Rehnquist, there will be a
finding of "state action" only when the state's action
directly causes the breach in question.
Professor Brest's response to Justice Rehnquist's
positivism and view of "state action" is that it rejects a
substantive, normative theory of rights. 15

Justice

Rehnquist seems to look only at the "person" directly
responsible for the act.

If the state is this "person,"

then the act is considered "state action;" if the individual
is this "person," then the act is not considered "state
13

Id. at 160, n.9.

14

Id. n .10.

15

Brest, 130 Univ. of Penn. L.Rev. at 1302.
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action."

Professor Brest would pref er to look at the

substance of the litigation.

He looks at the competing

rights at stake between the two litigants, the state and the
person.

Brest would resolve the questions of the competing

sides by balancing a possible abuse of power on the one hand
and the protection of individual autonomy on the other.
Similar balancing would be done to determine which level of
"due process" would be appropriate, depending on the issues
at stake.
In addition, Brest objects to Justice Rehnquist's view
of positivism because it renders the public/private
distinction "at best meaningless and at worst a vehicle for
manipulating outcomes to suit the Justices distribute
tastes." 1 6

We had said above that the reason for a "state

action" requirement was to preserve the public/private
distinction.

This distinction emphasizes the control put

appropriately on government and the freedom allowed the
individual.

But, if according to Justice Rehnquist the

public/private distinction is rendered an empty distinction,
because it looks only at the "person" doing the action
rather than its legitimacy, then the distinction serves no
purpose and should be eliminated.
16

Id.

It is then reasonable to
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say that if it was eliminated, there need not be any
requirement for "state action" before a private person's
acts would be reversed.

In other words, private action

would not be eliminated from constitutional control as there
would be no "state action" instrument to eliminate it.

All

action, state and individual, would be required to fulfill
constitutional guidelines.

The result, for our purposes,

would be that private schools would not be considered
private.

They would no longer be beyond the scope of the

Fourteenth Amendment; due process requirements would apply
to private schools as well.

Whatever "due process" rights

are available to public school students should be
immediately assumed by private school students.

Without a

finding of "fundamental" right, the only "due process"
rights available to public school students are
procedural . 17
Let us take a closer look at the Positivist school.
Justice Rehnquist recognized what he called "the danger of
unyielding positivism.

1118

His solution, as noted above,

17

See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), for a
delineation of what procedural rights are due public school
students.
18

Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 160 n.9 (1978)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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was to find "state action" only when the state directly
caused the breach in question.

We also saw that some

Positivists would say that since it is only the state that
can provide, or fail to provide, "due process of law," it
would be more appropriate to say that a state "deprives a
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of
law" 19 when it permits him to be deprived of liberty
without suitable legal redress in the government's
courts. 20

That is, the state has an affirmative duty to

protect its citizens from deprivation at the hands of other
individuals.

Positivists hold that every law or judicial

decision is an affirmative act.
situation:
or help.

They would picture this

The injured party comes to court for protection
If the court decides that there is no "state

action," it will refuse to provide that protection or help.
The court has made an affirmative statement that it will not
help.

This statement by the court is itself "state action!"

The court's decision of non-action also implicitly sanctions
the private infringement of rights.

The state has breached

its duty to ensure that "due process" will be followed;
19

2

U.S.

Const. amend. XIV,

§ 1.

°Kenneth L. Karst and Howard W. Horowitz, "Reitman v.
Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection," 1967
Supreme Court Review 39, 55.
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"state action" is now present. 21
According to this view, if the state allows a private
school student to be suspended or expelled from the school
without due process, it has not fulfilled its affirmative
duty of protecting an individual from the hands of other
private parties.

"State action" would be found to be

present when the court decided not to help the grieved
student.

Once there is "state action," then the

requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment must be followed.
Because there was no "due process" offered the student, the
decision of the private school might not stand for lack of
fulfillment of the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 22
The basis for the discussion regarding positive law and
a finding of "state action" is based historically upon the
portentous Supreme Court decision of Shelley v. Kraemer.

23

21

This extension of Positivist thought is presented by
Nerken, "A New Deal for the Protection of Fourteenth
Amendment Rights: Challenging the Doctrinal Bases of the
Civil Rights Cases and State Action Theory," 12 Harvard
Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law Review 297, 298 (1977)
22

See Frank I. Goodman, "Professor Brest on State
Action and Liberal Theory, and a Postscript to Professor
Stone." 130 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1331, 1344
(1982).
23

Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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This case involved a restrictive covenant that had been
signed by a group of neighbors in St. Louis, Missouri.
These neighbors had agreed not to sell their homes to
Negroes.

One neighbor, however, breached the agreement and

sold his house to Mr. Shelley, a Negro.

The owners of the

other houses brought suit to prevent Mr. Shelley from taking
possession of his new home.

The state courts had granted

the relief requested, but the United States Supreme Court
reversed unanimously, with three justices 24 not
participating.
The opinion of the Court was written by Chief Justice
Fred M. Vinson.

The Chief Justice agreed with the neighbors

that the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to states, and
not private persons.

Accordingly, private persons remain

free to discriminate against others in ways that the states
may not, e.g., by color or race.

Moreover, the restrictive

covenant entered into by the neighbors does not violate any
constitutional prohibition per se' . 25

However, by

24

Justices Reed, Jackson, and Rutledge disqualified
themselves from sitting on this case because they themselves
had signed racially restrictive covenants.
25

This statement by the Shelley Court, 334 U.S. at 13,
upheld the earlier Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926)
decision that the Fourteenth Amendment "erects no shield
against merely private conduct, however discriminatory or
wrongful." The Shelley Court accepted the legality of
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enforcing a discriminatory restrictive covenant against Mr.
Shelley, the Court would be participating in a
discriminatory act.

The Court reasoned as follows: The

right to buy or sell property is clearly protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment from discriminatory state action.
Therefore, the state cannot restrict a Negro's right to
property on account of his race.

The state cannot do this

by statute or by actions of its courts.

For the courts to

be engaged in such a restriction would be to use the "full
coercive power of government to deny ... on the grounds of
race or color . . . the enjoyment of property rights ...

1126

Such a judicial act would surely be "state action".
Therefore, for the Court to uphold the restrictive covenant,
even though it was entered into legally, would be "state
action" and illegal discrimination. 27
Read in its broadest interpretation, Shelley would
appear to make every private case into a governmental one.
Any private act that would later be upheld or retracted by a

entering into a discriminatory covenant, because this is a
private act and beyond the scope of the Fourteenth
amendment, but it refused to enforce such a private
arrangement.
26

Shelley,

27

Id. at 20-21.

334 U.S. at 19.
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court could then be seen as "state action." 28

Thus,

constitutional requirements would seem to apply not only to
the state but to all acts of private parties.
There was another consideration, explained Chief
Justice Vinson, in the Shelley Court's decision:

The

property from which the owner threatened exclusion (a home)
was peculiarly necessary to the lives of other citizens; and
the conditions the owner imposed were that citizens abandon
significant exercise of constitutional rights (to
nondiscrimination in housing) . 29

Regarding this study's

topic of fundamental fairness for non-public school
students, we must note: Certainly, a family having no place
to live is a problem.

But it is also a problem if they have

no place suitable to educate their children.

In addition,

the right to choose the proper school for a child's
upbringing is a family's "fundamental" right. 3 °

For a

private school to exclude a child may leave the child

28

As one author wrote, [All state court enforcement of
common-law principles constitutes "state action," because in
each case] "the state must choose whom to vindicate and the
vindication of either party is 'state action.'" See Thomas
G. Quinn, "State Action: A Pathology and a Proposed Cure,"
64 California Law Review 146, 160 (1976).
29

Shelley, 334 U.S. at 13.

30

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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without a suitable school in which to be educated and also
deprive parents of their "fundamental" right to have the
child educated in the school of their choice.

It would

appear, in light of Shelley, that it is wholly appropriate
to find for "state action" in private school cases of
expulsion.

If it can be shown that a "fundamental" right is

at stake, such as the religious upbringing of the child, the
parent may force the school to provide a compelling reason
why it must expel the child.

This is an example of

"substantive due process" being provided by the private
school.

If there is no "fundamental" right at stake, then

the private school would be required to simply provide
procedural fairness.
In subsequent decisions, the Court limited the
expansion of Shelley, though it never reversed its original
decision.

The Shelley decision was the logical conclusion

of the Positivist argument.

The opinion pointed out that,

on the basis of a Positivist position, the doctrine of
"state action" turns every private act into a public one,
and is meaningless.

This is because every judicial decision

will always be considered "state action."

Thus, a court's

decision should not be based on whether the private person
acted as a government officer.

Rather, a court's decision
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should be based on the merits of the case.

Shelley was

significant as a breach in the wall of ''state action."
There was no longer a clean distinction to be made between
public and private acts.
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MAINTAINING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION
WITHOUT RELIANCE ON THE "STATE ACTION" DOCTRINE
The distinction of public/private in the area of "state
action" appears to be an important distinction to make and
maintain.

People of all political and ideological colors

are concerned with the expansion of the "state action"
concept and how this expansion will limit their private
lives.

Professor Charles L. Black Jr. addressed this

concern as long ago as 1967. 31

His remarks should allay

any concerns that might come with the blurring of this
distinction.

He points to the legitimate concern that the

Fourteenth Amendment should not intrude into our private
lives.

The public/private distinction will remain.

At the

same time, however, he believes that an expansion of due
process rights to private institutions will not cause such
intrusion into our private lives.

Even if the "state

action" doctrine were expanded to include every form of
state fostering, enforcement, and even toleration (of
discrimination proscribed by the Fourteenth Amendment), this
does not mean that the Fourteenth Amendment will regulate

31

Charles L. Black, Jr. "Foreword: 'State Action, '
Equal Protection, and California's Proposition 14," · 81
Harvard Law Review 69 (1967) .
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the "genuinely private concerns of man. " 32

These concerns

will never be affected.
As Professor Black wrote so eloquently,
No suit is of record in which the prayer was
for a mandatory injunction that a dinner
invitation issue. The leading cases in the Court
. . . have been and will certainly continue to be
cases where the problem is in the public life of
the community -- in the prevailing policies of
restaurants, in the structuring of neighborhoods,
in the calling for books at the loan-desk, in the
casual swimming of strangers past one another in
some large pool, in the shouting of "fore!" down
the fairway ... Law deals abundantly with the
character of neighborhoods, with the obligation of
restaurants to serve, with the management of
public parks, with the conduct of common carriers,
with picketing and parades, with schools.
Law
does not, in our legal culture, commonly deal with
dinner invitations and the choice of children's
back-yard playmates. 33
This is the crucial point.

Who does or does not

receive a dinner invitation to my home and who will be
allowed to play with my children in the our backyard will
never be the stuff of litigation. 34

Our legal system

concerns itself instead with the "private" life which is
really the public life of the community.

These concerns, of

the private institutions which serve the public, are to be

32

Id. at 100.

33

Id. at 102.
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judged for their applicability to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Let us apply Professor Black's ideas to the non-public
school.

The private school is a private institution which

serves the public.

The private school is much more akin to

a communal body than to my own living room.

By expanding

the doctrine of "state action" to include these communal
institutions, we do no damage to the privacy of my living
room.

I shall always be free to include or exclude people

at will.

What we do accomplish with this expansion of

"state action" is to expand, in a positive way, the basic
tenets of fundamental fairness.

If a "fundamental" interest

is at stake, such as a private school that is racially
discriminatory, then "substantive due process" rights would
require even more protection of the affected interest.
But we must be careful.

Even if we were to view non-

public schools as "public institutions" for the purpose of
the Fourteenth Amendment, the public/private distinction
should not be entirely abolished within the education realm.
Consider religious schools.

Such schools must be viewed as

within the private domain because of their religious nature.
To judicially view a religiously oriented school as a
"public" institution brings us to the question of "excessive
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entanglement " 35 between the church and state.

The First

Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires that private
schools not be financially supported or statutorily
regulated by the state so that they not be considered
governmental institutions. 36

Thus, it is important to

maintain this public/private distinction to a certain degree
even in public-oriented private institutions.
Returning to Shelley, it is important to note that the
Court has rarely followed the thinking of that time.

This

would indicate that the holding might be considered an
anomaly, but Shelley is still considered good law, and has
never been overturned.

In addition, scholars have applauded

the Shelley decision, although some have challenged legal
analysts "to show that sturdier foundations for the opinion
can be laid." 37

Professor Louis Henkin has been

particularly concerned about what might be called the "seesaw problem" 38 that could result from the Shelley decision.

35

See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

36

See Jackson v. Statler, 496 F.2d 623

(1974).

37

Louis Henkin, "Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a
Revised Opinion," 110 University of Pennsylvania Law Review
473, 474 (1962).
38

The "see-saw problem" is this author's
characterization, not Professor Henkin's.
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Every time a person's (the violator's) freedom to violate a
constitutional right is upheld, then the victim's liberty to
be free of such violations is sacrificed. 39

In each case

when a question of "state action" arises, both the freedom
of the violator and the liberty of the victim are at stake.
No matter how a court decides, someone's liberty will be
expanded and someone's liberty will be restricted.
Recall that Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 40 concluded
that the "state action" doctrine as applied to private
parties was useful to preserve "an area of individual
freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and full
judicial power." 41

But to say that "state action"

preserves an area of individual freedom is to look at only
one side of the see-saw!

If the "state action" doctrine is

used to prevent judicial interference with a private actor,
then the usual result is that the victor's freedom to
violate the Constitution is seen as more important than the
individual's rights that are infringed.
should make one shudder.

Such a result

On the other hand, if the

"victim's" rights were upheld, and the institution severely
39

Henkin, 110 Univ. of Penn. L. Rev. at 487.

40

Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)

41

Id. at 936.
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limited by constitutional requirements, then the state may
be imposing itself too much in the private sector.

The

history of the Constitution requires sensitivity to
maintaining a "private domain" free of constitutional
strictures.
The better approach to resolving the respective rights
of each side is, as stated above, to set aside the "state
action" doctrine and look at the merits of each case.

The

court should ask in each individual case "Whose liberty is
to be maintained, that of the 'violator' or that of the
'victim'?" and respond accordingly.

This is not to suggest

that the court must halt all private infringements of
constitutional rights, thereby eliminating the
public/private distinction.

Rather, it does suggest that,

in each instance, the court should determine whether the
"violator's" freedom provides an adequate basis for
permitting the infringing activity. 42
Regarding our goal of achieving constitutional rights
for non-public school students on the verge of suspension or
expulsion:

While at first blush it would seem that there is

no way to overcome the "state action" requirement adhered to
42

This approach is suggested by Edwin Chemerinsky,
"Rethinking State Action," 80 Northwestern University Law
Review 503, 538 (1985).
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by the United States Supreme Court, it is reasonable to take
a different approach, albeit not the prevailing one in most
judicial decisions.

This approach suggests that we set

aside the "state action" doctrine and weigh the competing
merits of each side, that of the administration and that of
the student.

It would enable us to provide students with a

"fundamental" right to "due process" before they are
suspended.

At the same time, this approach would accept the

school's right to administer its affairs as it sees fit.

It

would be the court's responsibility to "weigh and sift" the
values at stake and reach a decision.

The school officials

would make a much better demonstration of thoughtfulness and
equity if they could show the court that had they provided
the disciplined student with procedural fairness similar to
that offered the public school student. 43

In this way, the

private school will have fulfilled (at a minimum) the spirit
of the Fourteenth Amendment, without hiding behind the
transparent veil of no "state action," in a feeble attempt
to avoid procedural fairness.

43

See Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
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REMOVING THE "STATE ACTION" REQUIREMENT IN SCHOOLS
FOR THE SAKE OF THE CHILD
Religious schools may be regulated by statute, their
students may be bussed and serviced in various ways (e.g.,
the "Child Benefit Theory" of Everson v. Board of

Education 44 ) without their becoming "public" schools.
follows,

It

then, that one may ask if it is possible for a

sectarian religious school to remain "private" even as it
takes on other characteristics and requirements similar to
those of the state schools.

This study seeks to show that

such a "hybrid" is possible, and indeed, appropriate.
Because of the "public" nature and function of the "private"
schools, the "public" requirements may be the lesson of the
"Child Benefit" Theory: 45 That the child is entitled to
certain desiderata from the state government even when he is
affiliated with a private school.

The governmental

character of the school the child attends is irrelevant, as
it is the student who is being served, not the school.
Considering the "fundamental" constitutional right of "due
process" and our willingness to provide benefits to the
44

45

Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

This theory was first advanced in Everson, Id. to
allow certain state funding, not to the religious school
directly, but to the children.
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children, regardless of their school, the provision of "due
process" 46 ,

in disciplinary cases would be a logical

continuation of the "Child Benefit" theory.
There are other issues to be considered as one steps
close to the border between the private and public domains
in education.

Maintaining the public/private distinction,

respecting the privacy of the private school, means that
these schools are not required to conform to the same
standards and operations of public schools.

Maintaining

this privacy is to be applauded as it accommodates the
divergent goals and objectives of the non-public school. 47
At the same time, even with divergent goals, it would seem
that every school

public and private -- has a goal of

teaching respect for the individual student.

There is no

better way to teach this respect than to show it in
practice.

"An institution which professes to prepare youth

for life in a democracy might wisely give them an example of
46

That "Due Process" is a fundamental right has been
resolved since Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), and
reaffirmed in the more modern cases of Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) . It is discussed at length in Chapters II and
III above.
47

See Donald A. Erickson, "Freedom's Two Educational
Imperatives: A Proposal," in Public Controls for Nonpublic
Schools, ed. Donald A. Erickson (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1969), 159.
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fair play when it is conducting its own affairs. " 48
Accordingly, even without imposing constitutional
requirements binding private schools to the regulations of
public schools, the private schools should provide for
procedural fairness.

This is good educational practice, and

can be followed without blurring the public/private
distinction.
Another issue inherent in the pubic/private distinction
is public financial support of non-public schools.
support must be accepted with great forethought.

This
Many

private schools need and seek governmental help to meet
their financial obligations.

But many also question the

wisdom of spending taxpayers' monies on nonpublic schools.
The issue gains even greater significance when the
taxpayers' monies are spent for religious private schools,
raising the issue of separation of church and state.
The "child benefit theory" provides at least a partial
answer to this question.

The theory concludes that it is

permissible for government to support the achievement of
secular objectives, even in church institutions.

According

to this theory, it is not the church or its school that is
48

Zachariah Chafee, Jr., "The Internal Affairs of
Associations Not for Profit," 43 Harvard Law Review 993,
1027 (1903).
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benefitting, but rather the child.

The child is being

provided with bus transportation to and from school; the
child is reading from secular texts provided by the state.
No sectarian goal of the sectarian school is fostered or
enhanced by the state expenditure.
Let us take this "child benefit" theory a step further.
If the government may contribute to the achievement of

secular objectives, then the government is, to some extent,
required to supervise that these objectives are being
fulfilled.

Once the government is already in the school, it

should be able to insist that students are provided with
procedural fairness before they are suspended or expelled
from the school.

The government is not breaking into the

inner chambers of the private school.

It is simply

requiring that students be afforded elemental educational
essentials.

Just as Yoder49 recognized the state's right

to require the fulfillment of certain minimal education, as
well as safety and zoning regulations,
49

50

50

so should the

Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).

William J. Sanders, while commissioner of education
of the state of Connecticut, went so far as to propose that
it was legal for states to require that private schools
provide qualified teachers, adequate libraries and
laboratories, and programs that fulfill the stated goals of
the school. William J. Sanders, "Regulation of Nonpublic
Schools as Seen by a State Commissioner," Public Controls
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state be allowed to require the provision of "due process."
We must remain vigilant not to implicate the state
unnecessarily in the school's governance, for this would
make the private school no longer private.

Imposing

procedures for fundamental fairness before the traumatic
steps of suspension or expulsion does not overstep the limit
of state involvement.

There appears to be no serious

problem of excessive state regulation.
The question of whether Fourteenth Amendment norms can
be applied at all in private schools was resolved in the
affirmative by Cooper v. Aaron. 51

The case was one of

discrimination against blacks, and dealt with the "Equal
Protection" Clause of the Amendment. The Cooper Court found
that state support of segregated schools through any
arrangement, management, funds or property cannot be squared
with the demands of the "Equal Protection" Clause. 52
Private schools that receive government support cannot go
against the "Equal Protection" Clause.

By extension, any

private school that receives government support, even for
for Nonpublic Schools, Erickson, ed., supra note 540, at
177. Sanders' ideas, printed in 1969, are commonly
implemented today.
51

Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).

52

Id. at 4.
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secular purposes, must follow all the guidelines of the
Fourteenth Amendment, including the "Due Process" Clause.
What is true about the second clause of the Amendment should
be true about the first clause as well. 53

Accordingly,

non-public school students should be afforded "due process"
guarantees.

This is the explicit holding in Cohen v. Illinois
Institute of Technology, 524 F.2d 818 (1975).
Cohen follows
Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple University, Etc., 385
F. Supp. 473, n.11 (1974). These cases are discussed in
greater detail in Chapter V.
53

250
PROVIDING "DUE PROCESS" WITHOUT "STATE ACTION"
A question arises: What if there was no "state action"
doctrine -- would "due process" still have to be provided?
The answer, without a doubt, is "yes."

"Due process" is a

"fundamental" right to which every citizen of the United
States is entitled.s 4

As a "fundamental" right, any

abridgement must stand up to "strict scrutiny" by the court
before the abridgement will be upheld. ss

While

governmental abridgement of a right may be more severe than
private abridgement (given the size and power of the
government) we should, nonetheless, also review the acts of
private parties.

In this way, we may ascertain that the

infringements are minor or sufficiently justified.

"If one

sees the Court's role as protecting fundamental values, then
there is no reason why such rights should be safeguarded
from only governmental action.

Nothing in the definition of

those values or in the rationale for their protection
explains why protection is limited to government

s4 U.S. Const. amend. V, made applicable to the states
by amend. XIV in 1868.
sssee, Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1885)
and Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
See also the
more modern day case of Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) .
I
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conduct. " 56

The courts are there to protect our rights

from abridgement, especially in cases of "fundamental"
rights.

If the courts protect us from private abridgement,

and there is no reason inherent to the rights to prevent
this, then why have a "state action" doctrine?

The

conclusion that necessarily follows is that, in protecting
the private citizen from breaches of "fundamental" rights,
the "state action" doctrine has become anachronistic.
This is perhaps the unarticulated conclusion of Franz
v. United States. 57

There, the court held that the U.S.

Constitution should be viewed as a code of social morals,
not just of governmental conduct.

Included in these morals

are individual rights that no entity, public or private,
could infringe without a compelling justification.

This

conclusion of Franz makes sense because the "Constitution
was designed to embody and celebrate values and to inculcate
the proper acceptance of them, as much as to compel
governments to abide by them.

1158

It is clear, according to

some judicial opinions, that constitutional values are meant

56

Chemerinsky, 80 NW L. Rev. at 535.

57

Franz v. United States, 707 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir.

1983) .
58

Id. at 594,

n.45.
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to be kept by all of society's institutions, both public and
private.

Surely, this should be the case in schools that

are teaching the very Constitution itself and a general
approach to life and moral values.

In order to do so, non-

public schools should provide their students with the "due
process" rights guaranteed by the Constitution they are
trying to teach.
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THE "POWER FACTOR" OF PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS
AND FINDING "STATE ACTION"
Prevailing judicial opinion today, especially after
Burton v.

Wilmington Parking Authority5 9 and subsequent

"state action" decisions such as Reitman v. Mulkey,
Lodge No.

107 v.

Irvis,

61

60

Moose

Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison

59

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715
(1961). "Only by sifting facts and weighing circumstances
can the nonobvious involvement of the State in private
conduct be attributed its true significance." Id. at 722.
Here, there was a finding of "state action" based on the
"symbiotic relationship" between the private enterprise, a
restaurant, and the state, which owned the parking garage in
which the restaurant was housed.
60

Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
The question
here was whether California's Proposition 14, stating that
the State will not limit individuals' rights to enter into
restrictive covenants for the sale of property, was
constitutional. The Court found that it was not
constitutional as it "encouraged" racial discrimination.
The Court explained that, although there is no exact
definition for a finding of invidious (offensively unfair)
discrimination, the Court must carefully assess the
potential impact of official action in determining whether
the State has significantly involved itself with this
discrimination.
61

Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
Racial discrimination was disallowed at a private club based
on ''state action," because the State of Pennsylvania
provided the club with a liquor license. The Court said
that even state regulation will not necessarily turn a
private club into a state entity so that "state action"
could be found.
Rather, the relevant criterion for a
finding of "state action" is the State's significant
involvement with invidious discrimination.
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Co.,

62

and Flagg Bros. v. Brooks 63 indicate that the "state

action" doctrine is, at a minimum, not very useful.

This is

because cases testing Fourteenth Amendment rights for an
individual against a private institution, must show that the
state was directly involved in requiring the specific point
of contention.

This is rarely possible.

The requirement

for "state action" has seemingly put Fourteenth Amendment
benefits beyond the reach of most children attending private
schools.

The original decision in Civil Rights Cases,

64

that the Fourteenth Amendment applied only to "state
action," has gone through many reviews and revisions.
The "state action" doctrine is apparently putting "due
62

Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345
(1974). The private utilities company turned off Mrs.
Jackson's electricity for her failure to pay her bills.
She
claimed that the electricity was turned off due to her race.
The Court found in the utility's favor, rejecting the
"public function" argument and finding no "state action"
(despite the state regulation of the private utilities
company) . In addition, the Court found that the state was
not involved in the fostering or encouraging of racial
discrimination.
63

Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
This
case dealt mostly with the "public function" argument,
though it also touched on "state action" to limit it once
again.
Here the Court said, "A state is responsible for the
act of a private party when the State, by its law, has
compelled the act." The decision also pointed out that the
Court has never held that a State's mere acquiescence in a
private action converts that action into that of the State.
64

Civil Rights Cases,

109 U.S. 3, 11-19 ( 1883) .
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process" rights beyond the reach of private school children
at the same time that we are finding increasingly blurred
lines dividing public from private action.

These blurred

lines indicate that excluding private action from common
public controls is unwise.

Further, the large number of

private institutions indicates that there is a great amount
of private power; this power is having a profound effect on
individuals and their rights.

This power should be

controlled in ways similar to those that society has, over
the years, imposed on public power.

The growth of private

power should put private institutions within reach of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Let us take a closer look at the two litigants in a
private school situation: the school and the student.

The

school itself, although essentially "private," is open to
most students seeking enrollment.

The school, in its role

of overseer and "controller" of student behavior, determines
the rules and regulations that will affect the individual
student's life as a student.

As long ago as 1927, Professor

Morris Cohen analyzed the power of the "boss" or land owner
over his "subjects."

Cohen wrote,

"Private property is a

form of power, not unlike the power of a sovereign over its
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subjects. " 65

By extension, school officials may also be

said to have "sovereign" power over student "subjects."
Administrators often set the school rules, control
schedules, punish by recess- and after-school detention, and
there is little students may do to overcome this control of
their school lives.

Accordingly, even though we are

discussing private schools, school officials take on the
role of government-in-miniature.

They must be held

responsible to conduct themselves in ways similar to other
"sovereigns."

This would include the assurance to the

students (the "subjects") that they will provide with "due
process."

Students should not be excluded ("banished from

the kingdom") without an explanation of the causes of their
banishment.
Officials and organizations in positions of power over
underlings must be extremely careful in the exertion of
their power.

This is especially the case where there are

limited alternatives for employment or education if the
underlings wish to avoid this power.

This was Justice

Bradley's concern in The Civil Rights Cases 66 •

65

Justice

Morris Cohen, "Property and Sovereignty," 13 Cornell
Law Quarterly 8 (1927) .
66

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3.
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Bradley looked at the particularly vital nature of the
services offered by railroads and public accommodations.
Concurrently, he looked at the resultant power over the
public enjoyed by the owners of these facilities.

All this

resulted in a finding of these "private" properties (the
railroads and private accommodations) being declared
"affected with a public interest."

Because of the

importance of the service provided as well as the
concomitant power that this provision included, Justice
Bradley, for the Court, ruled that the public facilities
were subject to state regulation.
Private schools provide an important and high quality
service in the form of education.

Concurrently, their

officials wield much power over the beneficiaries of this
service, the students.

This status of power, coupled with

the importance of the service provided, indicate that the
private schools should be considered "affected with a public
interest" and subject to the same requirements as other
"public interests."

Fundamental fairness should be offered.

Further, in Munn v. Illinois 67 , the Court upheld state
laws regulating the operation of grain transporting
railroads and the operation of warehouses and grain
67

Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877).
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elevators.

The Court declared that "[p]roperty does become

clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make
it of public consequence, and affect the community at large.
When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which
the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the
public an interest in that use, and must submit to be
controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent
of the interest he has thus created." 68

The underlying

reason for this is that the public stands in a position of
inequality with monopolies of public service.
Such is the case with education as well.
essentially a communal institution.

The school is

Parents and families in

the community have an interest in the school and its
vitality.

Even though the school may have started as a

private institution, it quickly grows into an integral part
of the community as more parents enroll their children.

In

addition, it may be the only school in the area that
provides quality education.

As a community organization,

the school gains a new role and new responsibilities.

It

should follow the same rules that apply to other public
institutions.

68

These rules include fundamental fairness.

Id. at 126.
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SCHOLARLY OPINION IN FAVOR OF SETTING ASIDE THE "STATE
ACTION" REQUIREMENT, AND THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DISTINCTION
We have seen that the courts have been quite respectful
of the traditional Civil Rights Cases 69 decision that "due
process" requirements apply only when the state is closely
or directly involved in the limitation of "life, liberty, or
property.

1170

The doctrine has, however, not fared well

among legal commentators.

Several legal scholars have

advocated deserting the "state action" doctrine in favor of
a merit-oriented approach. 71

Over the last quarter

century, we have begun to see the "state action" doctrine
being pronounced as "'unsatisfactory' as a guide." 72
Further, the "state action" doctrine, although attempting to
provide a single approach to respond to the myriad cases

69

Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3.

7011

Life, liberty, and property" are guaranteed to all
American residents by the U.S. Const. amends. V and XIV.
The finding by the U.S. Supreme Court that "state action" is
required in order for these guarantees to be in effect is in
The Civil Rights Cases, Id. at 11 - 19.
71

This approach, as discussed above, looks to the
values and merits at stake, rather than the "person"
performing the alleged activity.
It offers the private
person protection from abridgement of important rights by
other private persons or institutions.
William w. Van Alstyne and Kenneth L. Karst, State
Action, 14 Stanford Law Review 3, 58 (1961).
72
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before the courts, has been rather unsuccessful.

The search

for this approach has fulfilled Holmes' prophecy: "Certainty
generally is illusion, and repose is not the destiny of
man." 7 3

Man, in search of a legal doctrine that will

provide certainty, adopted "state action."

This is a nice

category, but it has not accomplished its goal.
The "state action" requirement, as part of the
pubic/private distinction, may, in part, be due to a
compromise or an easing-into of the notion of equal rights
for the newly freed slaves. 74

"By finding in the Civil

Rights Cases that the Fourteenth Amendment would not allow
the federal government to prohibit private discrimination,
the Court assured that as a nation we would forbear
punishing such violations, allowing enforcement of private
civil rights violations, unless and until state action was
found.

Thus did the vision of private liberty to violate

civil rights under the label "private action" become part of
the Court's dogma as it entered the Lochner75 era. 76
73

It

Id.

74

Ira Nerken, "A New Deal for the Protection of
Fourteenth Amendment Rights," 12 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil
Liberties Law Review 297 (1977).
75

The Lochner Era began in 1905 with the Lochner v. New
York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), decision.
Lochner struck down New
York's maximum hours laws for bakers. More historically
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must be noted that today, more than a century after the

Civil Rights Cases, our country should be perceived as
having grown beyond its earlier mentality.

If the

private/public distinction was originally articulated to
ease the American people into an acceptance of nascent Negro
rights, then this distinction should no longer be necessary.
It is time to look at the substance of the violation, not
its place within the outdated legalistic construct of "state
action."
Professor Howard Horowitz is another legal commentator
who pointed to the ineffectual use of the "state action"
doctrine.

His claim is that state action always enfolds

private action, that there is no reality of pure private
action as the state always attributes some legal
significance to private action.

As soon as the state

attributes legal significance, then their attribution alone
has already connected the act to the state.

In essence,

significant, was the Court's use of the Fourteenth
Amendment's perceived "substantive due process" clause to
protect economic and property rights. The Court spent
thirty years engaged in "Lochnerizing," i.e., scrutinizing
economic regulations and often striking them down, based on
"substantive due process" protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Now, people could enter in almost any agreement
both parties found acceptable.
76

Nerken, 12 Harvard Civil Rights - Civil Liberties Law
Review at 327-28.
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then, every act is "state action."

Horowitz recommends that

instead of the question of the general absence or presence
of "state action," we should rather ask about the
constitutionality of the "state action" that is always
present. 77
Subsequently, Professor Jerre Williams noted our entry
into a new era.

He wrote,

"We have entered the time of the

twilight of state action; the sun is setting on the concept
of state action as a test for determining the constitutional
protection of individuals. " 78

Williams' suggested that the

real issue was "the merits of accommodating the interests,
not one in the nature of a formula which is irrelevant to
the interests involved." 79
Professor Charles Black suggested that we abandon the
"state action" doctrine completely.

He believes that "The

field is a conceptual disaster area; most constructive
suggestions come down, one way or another, to the suggestion
that all attention shift from the inquiry after "state

77

Howard W. Horowitz, "The Misleading Search for 'State
Action' Under the Fourteenth Amendment," 30 Southern
California Law Review 208 (1957) .
78

Jerre Williams, "The Twilight of State Action," 41
Texas Law Review 347, 382, 389 (1963).
79

Id. at 389.
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action" to some other inquiry al together." 00
Harvard's Professor Duncan Kennedy, discussed the
public/private distinction.

He does not view the public and

private domains as two distinct absolutes.

Rather, he

suggests putting the two domains on a continuum.

"People

who believe in continua tend to explain how they go about
deciding what legal response is appropriate for a given
institution by listing factors that "cut" one way or the
other or must be balanced.

1181

The practical significance

of this, according to Kennedy, is that the public/private
distinction is no longer good as a legal argument, for the
distinction may "land" elsewhere on the continuum in the
next case. 82

Ultimately, the public/private distinction

fails "as a description, as an explanation, or as a
justification of anything." 83

It should be abandoned for

lack of certainty or clarity.
What we may conclude from Professors Van Alstyne and
8

°Charles L. Black, "Foreword: , State Action,
Equal
Protection, and California's Proposition 14," 81 Harvard Law
Review 69, 95 (1967).
I

Duncan Kennedy, "The Stages of Decline of the
Public/Private Distinction," 130 University of Pennsylvania
Law Review 1349, 1353 (1982).
81

82

Id. at 1354.

83

Id. at 1357.

264
Karst, Horowitz, Williams, Black, and Kennedy is that the
continuation of the public/private distinction is no longer
meaningful if it ever has been.

The distinction calls for

legal decisions based on the structural considerations that
focus only on the governance or ownership of the school.
Students attending schools governed by the public
authorities are in the public domain and considered involved
in "state action."

These students are entitled to all the

rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. 84
Students attending schools governed by private parties are
in the private domain and, heretofore, not considered
involved in "state action."

These students have been found

not entitled to the rights guaranteed by our
Constitution. 85

Our legal system and people would be

better served if we looked at the substance and merits of
each argument.
In the area of private schools, Powe v. Miles is a
leading case.

Its holding indicates how unhelpful the

"state action" doctrine has become.

Some students were

suspended without "due process" for demonstrating on the

84

85

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).

Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F.Supp. 1382 (N.D. Ind.
1970), 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971).
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campus of a private university.

This university consisted

of three private colleges and one college under contract
with and substantially subsidized by the state.

The court

found ''state action" with respect to the "contract" college
students, but no "state action" for the private college
students

This, although the suspensions were made by the

same university officials for participation in the same
demonstration. 86

This holding brings us to an important

conclusion: "That the "state action" doctrine of the
Fourteenth Amendment is too narrow a yardstick to measure
the requisite degree of fair play essential in the legal
relationship between students and universities, public or
private. " 87
We should decide the applicability of governmental
requirements such as "due process" based on the rights
affected rather than the public or private nature of the
institutional charters.

Thus, private school students

would gain the rights to "due process" before facing serious

86

87

Powe v. Miles, 407 F.2d 73 (1968).

Sally Furay, "Legal Relationships Between the Student
and Private Colleges or Universities." 7 San Diego Law
Review #2, pp. 246, 247 (1970).
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disciplinary action. 88

Although obviously in the private

domain, these students would have the same rights as their
public school compatriots.

The Fourteenth Amendment would

no longer require, above all, a finding of "state action."
The rights that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees,
specifically the "due process" rights of Clause I, would now
apply to all Americans regardless of the schools they happen
to attend.
This chapter reviewed the requirement for "state
action" before the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of "due
process" will go into effect.

"State action" has come to

mean that not only is the government involved in the
financial support or governance of private institutions, but
that it was directly involved in the particular incident of
complaint.
The "state action" requirement has persisted since the
post-Civil War period.

This persistence is usually

attributed to its value at maintaining the distinction
between public and private acts.
88

This distinction prevents

These rights would include the rights elucidated in
Goss v. Lopez for suspensions of ten days or less:
"Oral or
written notice of the charges, an explanation of the
evidence the authorities have, and an opportunity to present
his side of the story." Goss, 419 U.S. at 581. Longer
suspensions or expulsions may require more formal
procedures.
Id. at 584.
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the government from insinuating itself in uniquely private
situations.

The reasoning was that government could not

control personal actions or limit personal freedoms because,
in the absence of a connection between government and the
act, government regulations do not apply.
It has been suggested that the "state action" doctrine
is no longer useful.

Today, the focus is not the legalistic

question of whether private institutions are connected with
the state.

Instead, the focus is on the merit of the claim.

In the case of "due process," for example, no one wants to
lose a right to which they are entitled or expect to
continue enjoying, such as education, without procedural
fairness being provided.

"Due process" rights are

considered too "fundamental" to our society to have them
discounted for lack of "state action."

A value such as

education is also considered too precious to have diminished
without procedural fairness.

If "due process" and education

are considered "fundamental," they will require even more
judicial scrutiny before they are affected.
Also, private institutions wield power over their
clientele in ways similar to public institutions.

Indeed,

public and private institutions function in such similar
ways that it is often difficult to differentiate between the
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two.

It is appropriate to apply the requirements of public-

governmental institutions upon such private institutions as
private schools that serve a community of disparate
individuals.
Additionally, the doctrine of "state action'' is itself
unclear.

The Positivists may show that the doctrine itself

admits of no clear definition and doctrinally cannot be
imposed without inherent problems.

It is an imprecise and

unnecessary doctrine.
The original benefit of the doctrine, the proper
distinction between public and private affairs, can be
resolved in other, more useful ways.

No one is suggesting

that, with the demise of the "state action" doctrine, courts
will require an individual to host racially integrated
dinner parties under the threat of a legal suit for racial
discrimination.

What has traditionally been considered

staunchly private will remain private.

What commentators

have recommended is that legal doctrines must respond to
society.

The lines between public and private institutions

are now blurred.

The private institutions that service so

many people have taken on the qualities of public
institutions.

Let private institutions that function like

public institutions respect their clientele in ways that
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public institutions have been mandated to provide for many
years.

CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The purpose of this study was to identify
constitutional principles that would warrant the provision
of "due process" for non-public school students.

The

philosophical, legal and educational bases of these
principles were examined.
Relevant Supreme Court cases, federal appellate court
rulings, and federal district court decisions were reviewed
to ascertain the application of due process rights to nonpublic school students.

Additionally, the writings of

various legal scholars were reviewed to determine the
current state of legal thinking regarding possible changes
and revisions in current judicial interpretations.
The significance of "state action" was reviewed.

The

"state action" doctrine is based on the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment,

"nor shall any

state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.

111

The Supreme Court

interpreted the Due Process Clause to ref er only to acts of

1

u.s.

Const. amend. XIV,

§
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1.

(Emphasis added.)
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the state, and not to proscribe acts of private parties. 2
In the area of education, the Supreme Court recognized
the "state action" inherent in public schools when it
decided that public school students were entitled to
procedural due process before suffering a suspension of ten
days or less. 3

The question remains what the Supreme Court

would decide regarding the public character of the private
school.

On the one hand, the school is private and beyond

the scope of constitutional law. 4

On the other hand, the

school services the community as a public institution.

This

study reviewed what an enlightened Supreme Court might
decide when faced with a similar situation as Goss, but in
the private sector.
Five approaches to securing "due process" rights for
private school students were presented and analyzed.
included:

(i) natural law and the natural right to

fundamental fairness;

(ii) the students' property and

liberty rights to education;

(iii) the constitutionally

"fundamental" right that students have to education;

2

The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883)

3

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).

4

They

(iv)

See Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F.Supp. 1382 (N.D: Ind.
1970), 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971).
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the public function served by private education which should
require private schools to follow the same procedures as
public schools;

(v) a reevaluation of the century-old "state

action" requirement.

All of these approaches were presented

for the purpose of suggesting a legal, philosophical and
educational rationale for securing "due process" rights for
private school students involved in disciplinary action that
suspends them from school.
In addition to "procedural due process" which looks at
procedural fairness,

the Supreme Court has required a second

form of "due process," called "substantive due process." 5
This form looks at constitutionally protected "fundamental"
rights and, for the sake of protection of these rights,
requires a higher level of justification before their
abridgement.

Once the rationale for securing "due process"

rights for private school students was presented, a
discussion ensued regarding which form of "due process" was
appropriate.
Natural Law and Natural Rights
The doctrine of Natural Law posits that there are
certain laws that have always been part of nature that must

5

See Lochner v. New York,

progeny.

198 U.S. 45 (1905), and its
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be identified, by man's power of reason, and followed.
These laws, in addition to man-made positive law, form the
corpus of law today.

Man follows these laws because of the

moral weight of the natural law or because of the social
compact he makes with society to ensure lawfulness and
order.
Positive law is morally legitimate only when it
incorporates natural law.

The closer the positive law's

approximation to natural law, the more legitimate it is.
Thus, governments and institutions are morally bound to
include natural rights in their laws and procedures.
Procedural fairness is an example of a natural right
which became codified in positive law.

Starting with the

Magna Charta, proceeding to the Laws of England and
eventually to the United States Constitution,

"due process"

has always been one of those natural rights that is
incorporated in governmental lists of citizen rights.
The constitutional requirement of "due process" is
directed at the government because the Constitution is a
document of citizens' rights and governments'
responsibilities.

This, however, does not free the private

person from following the moral code that preceded and
precipitated its inclusion in the Constitution.

Indeed, the
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fact that "due process" was included in the Constitution is
an indication of its moral imperative and rightness.

From

the perspective of moral behavior, the Constitution was not
meant to exclude private individuals and institutions, but
to include governmental agencies.
The doctrine of natural rights was included in the
Declaration of Independence with the ''inalienable rights"
clause. 6

Since that time, the doctrine found its way into

the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution 7
and various Supreme Court decisions. 8
The right to receive "Due Process" is a "natural"
right. 9

The right to education was shown to be a "natural"

right as well.

This means that (constitutionally

recognized) morality requires that education be preserved
6

" [T]hat
[all men] are endowed by their Creator with
certain inalienable Rights" The Declaration of Independence
para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

7

" [N]or shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law" U.S.
Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
8

See, e.g., Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518
(1819); The Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 83 (1872)
(Field, J., dissenting); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Corrunittee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1851) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 515 (1961)
(Douglas, J., dissenting); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 511 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting)
9

Lochner, 198 U.S. 45.
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for all students, regardless of the governmental nature of
their school.

It also means that students may not be

deprived of their education without procedural fairness.
The constitutional requirement of "state action" is simply
irrelevant in the area of "natural" rights.
Legal scholars often debate the question of "What
process is due?"

At a minimum, the deprivation of education

warrants "procedural due process."

This means that an

administrator, before subjecting a student to a disciplinary
suspension of ten days of less, must give the student "oral
or written notice of the charges against him and, if he
denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities
have and an opportunity to present his side of the
1110

story.

Education, though not yet recognized as a "fundamental"
right,

11

carries tremendous inherent importance.

It was

shown to be a natural right of children to accumulate
knowledge.

Another natural right is to worship God

according to one's conscience, and to raise children
accordingly.

10

11

When we combine the natural right to an

Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975).

San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973), but see
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
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education and to a religious upbringing, sectarian schools
take on additional importance.

This importance may raise

private religious education to a constitutional level,
gaining for it even more significance.

The deprivation of

religious education may hinder the First Amendment
guarantees of the "free exercise of religion.

1112

Accordingly, disciplinary suspensions or expulsions may be
subject to greater protections.

These protections, called

"substantive due process" rights, would require the school
to explain why it had no choice but to impose such a serious
punishment on the student.

The same "substantive due

process" would be appropriate if education is identified as
a "fundamental" natural right.
Students' "Property" and "Liberty" Rights and "Due Process"
The Supreme Court has never defined "due process" with
precision.

The concept has purposely been kept vague so

that it may fit different times and places as it guarantees
fairness. 13

It has always been seen as an important

protection against the unfair limitation of rights that are

"Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion];" U.S. Const. amend. I, § 1.
12

Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee, 341 U.S. at
162-63.
13
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rooted in our nation's conscience. 14
is education.

One of those rights

The fact that the educational institution

providing the education happens to be private is of little
concern for the Supreme Court has suggested that "due
process" should be imposed by Congress on private
institutions as well. 15
The precise definition of "due process" may

vary from

time to time, but the existence of these rights is
guaranteed by the Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment. After
the decision of Board of Regents v. Roth, 16 that property
rights are created by state statutes and constitutional
guarantees, children now have a "property" right to
education.

This right stems from state constitutions that

guarantee free public education and state compulsory
education statutes.

This property right cannot be limited

without procedural fairness procedures.

It was argued that

these property rights are part of the student's rights and
should be respected in all schools, even in the absence of
"state action."

The same protections apply to the "liberty"

14

Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 ( 1952) .

15

United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966)

16

Board of Regents v. Roth,

408 U.S. 564

(1972).

278

right of maintaining a student's reputation from
sullying. 17
Other approaches were suggested to earn private school
students the same "due process" guarantees as their public
school counterparts.
in education.

One approach looks at the state's role

As parens patriae, the state may require a

certain level of performance in the private school's
provision of education.

It is not unreasonable for the

state to also insist that the school administration's
approach to students be fair,

to the inclusion of

"procedural due process."
Another approach suggests that, as a quid pro quo for
requiring students to attend school (i.e.,

compulsory

education statutes), the administration must provide quality
education.

This quality includes, in part, procedural

fairness when a student is being disciplined by exclusion.
In addition to the student's right to education, the
parents have a right to send their child to private,
especially religious, schools. 18

If the student is

suspended without "due process," then the parents have lost
their right unfairly.

It is clear that "due process" should

17

Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433

18

Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925)

(1971).
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be provided.
An additional "property" right protected by the
Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment is that contracts should
be fulfilled.

Implicit in a contract is the understanding

that students in good standing will be allowed to continue
from year to year until completion of the academic program.
Thus, there is a "property" right in continuance.

When this

"property" right is not fulfilled, such as when a student is
suspended or expelled for disciplinary reasons, the school
must provide a hearing to explain its reasoning. 19
In summation, it was shown that students have various
claims to "property" and "liberty" rights in the area of
education.

All of these are focused more on the individual

student or parent, and only indirectly related to the
presence of "state action."

Accordingly, the requirement

for "state action" is a side issue and of little
significance to the larger picture of rights that students
should enjoy.
Education as a "Fundamental" Right
A right is classified "fundamental" when it is either
stated explicitly in the United States Constitution, or is
inferred to be one of the Constitution's protected rights.
19

Ewing v. Board of Regents,

742 F.2d 913

(1984).
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Once a right is "fundamental," anyone seeking to diminish it
is required to respond to "strict scrutiny" by the courts.
They will be required to provide an overriding reason for
the diminution of the important right at stake.

If they

cannot provide this reason, one that sets the individual's
right aside, then the act of diminution will be disallowed.
If the right to education may be seen as "fundamental," then
it will not be allowed to be diminished without procedural
fairnesses being invoked.

Further, the administrators will

be required to explain why they have no alternative but the
particular exclusion being imposed.
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that
education is not a "fundamental" right. 20

Justice

Marshall, writing in dissent, provided an adequate rationale
for judging education to be "fundamental.

1121

He looked at

the "unique status accorded public education in our society,
and the close relationship between education and some of our
most basic Constitutional values.

1122

Justice Marshall felt

that education is necessary for the child to adjust to the

20

San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 1 (1973).
21

Id. at 70 (Marshall, J., dissenting) .

22

Id.
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environment, to feel at home in our culture, and to prepare
for later professional training.

He also believed that the

other guarantees of the Constitution are meaningless without
the requisite education.

For example, there is a

constitutional right to vote for elected officials, but this
right cannot be adequately fulfilled if the voter cannot
read the literature and make an intelligent choice between
the candidates.
Justice Marshall was in the majority in Plyler v.

Doe, 23 when education was judged to require "heightened"
scrutiny.

This middle-tiered scrutiny, between "strict

scrutiny" and "rationality," requires that the school
district provide "a showing that [the limitation of
education] furthers some substantial state interest. " 24
This is a difficult showing to make.

According to some, the

Plyler decision made the non-"fundamentality" gleaned from
Rodriguez now irrelevant. 25
A significant number of state courts have ruled that
the right to education, if not "fundamental" on a federal
23

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).

24

Id. at 230.

25

See Dennis J. Hutchinson, "More Substantive Equal
Protection? A Note on Plyler v. Doe," 1982 Supreme·court
Review 170, 192.
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level, is so on a state level.
Meskill,

26

Beginning with Horton v.

the Connecticut Supreme Court seemed to favor

Justice Marshall's reasoning in Rodriguez, and ruled that
education is a "fundamental" right in its state.

Other

states followed Connecticut's example, often disagreeing
explicitly with the rationale of the Rodriguez Court, in
addition to finding their own local reasons for the
"fundamentality" of education rights.
The "heightened scrutiny" that is appropriate for any
limitation of the right to education stems, in part, from
the inherent and instrumental values of education.

These

values are not connected to the governance of the school.
Accordingly, the requirement for "state action" plays no
role in this case.

We may conclude that "due process"

rights must be maintained for all students, of public and
private schools alike.
The "Public Function" Theory
When a private institution performs an essential
service usually performed by the state, the private
institution is said to be performing a "public function."
private school, despite its private governance, functions
very much like a public school.
26

Its students fulfill the

Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359 (1977).

A
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state's compulsory education requirements; 27 its
educational mission is very similar to that of state
schools.
The "public function" theory is a form of "state
action."

This means that private institutions would be

considered acting on behalf of the state even without the
state governing their every act.

The Fourteenth Amendment

would then be applied to private schools.
This study traced the development of the "public
function" theory from its genesis to contemporary times.
The "public function" theory began in the 1940's with a
United States Supreme Court decision regarding a "private"
company town which had prevented the distribution of
religious literature. 20

The majority opinion stated that

private facilities that serve a larger public were required

27

Indeed, part of the strength of the private school's
disciplinary power is its authority to expel students. Once
a student is expelled, the compulsory education statutes
require the student to attend a public school. To avoid
this result, mindful of the state's compulsory education
statute, the student might be more behaviorally cooperative.
Moreover, education has been seen as one of the most
important state functions.
The state has an overriding
interest in an educated citizenry.
See Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972). The imposition of the state into
private schools is obvious; the conclusion that the private
school is doing the work of the state is justified.
28

Marsh v. Alabama,

326 U.S. 501 ( 1946) .
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to fulfill the constitutional requirements of state-owned
facilities. 29
A similar decision was handed down regarding a
"private" park that served a "public function" such that it
was disallowed from discriminating on racial grounds. 30

In

this case, Justice Harlan stated explicitly that private
schools serve a "public function, " 31 and that the
Fourteenth Amendment applies to them. 32
In Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., Justice Marshall
applied the "public function" quality to any private service
that is important for the state to provide, yet is also
provided by private institutions.

In these situations

Justice Marshall required private institutions to follow the
same requirements as states. 33
Subsequently, the Supreme Court, in a majority opinion,
stated explicitly that education was one of those functions
"which have been administered with a greater degree of

29

Id. at 506.

30

Evans v. Newton,

31

Id. at 315

32

Id. at 322.

33

Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.,

(1974)

383 U.S.
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(1966).

(Harlan, J., dissenting).

(Marshall, J., dissenting).

419 U.S. 365,

372
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exclusivity by States. " 34
In a later case, Justice Marshall reiterated that he
considered private education to serve a "public
function. " 35

He also stated that education is different

from other services done by private contractors which might
be considered "public function" cases. 36

Education is

unique because of its "vital public function." 37
Additionally, Justice Marshall wanted to avoid a state's
freeing itself of Fourteenth Amendment guidelines by
privatizing traditionally public services. 38

This

particular concern was also expressed by Professor
Schneider, with the solution being that ways be found to
recognize the public role and responsibility of private
institutions. 39

There is judicial opinion that the courts

34

Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 158
(1978).
35

Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 851 (1982)
(Marshall, J., dissenting).

37

Id. at 849.

38

Id. at 851.

39

Ronna G. Schneider, "The 1982 State Action Trilogy, "
60 Notre Dame Law Review 1150, 1164 (1985).
Professor
Schneider, writing regarding private activities that should
be required to follow Fourteenth Amendment requirements,
states: "[e]ducation is an excellent example of this kind of
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would be even more willing to consider education a "public
function" if the rights of the students were at stake. 40
Other judicial opinion in favor of viewing private
education as a "public function" can be found in lower
courts.

The Guillory court wrote,

"Clearly, the

administrators of a private [school] are performing a public
function. " 41

The Belk court wrote,

"Education is a public

function." 42 The Isaacs court wrote,

"State action would be

present in the operation of every non-public school
because education is surely a state function. " 43
Thus, there is sufficient judicial and scholarly
opinion to conclude that private schools provide an
important "public function."

In this role, private schools

are considered acting on behalf of the state with the "due
process" requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment applying.
Specifically, the private schools should be required to

activity."
40

Id. at 1168.

Rendell-Baker, 641 F. 2d at 26.

41

Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane University, 203
F. Supp. 855, 859 (E.D. La. 1962).
Belk v. Chancellor of Washington University, 336
F.Supp. 45, 48 (1970).
42

43

Isaacs v. Board of Trustees of Temple University, 385
F. Supp. 473, 486 (1974).
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follow the same "procedural due process" guidelines as
public schools. 44
Reevaluating "State Action"
Finally, this study confronted the "state action"
notion for its relevance to non-public schools.

If "state

action" can be discarded for lack of relevance to modern-day
jurisprudence, then Fourteenth Amendment guidelines can be
brought to bear upon private schools.

In this way, private

school students would be entitled to "due process."
According to the Positivists, it is an easy task to
discard the notion of "state action" due to its inherent
ambivalence.

Positivists believe that citizen's rights are

assigned or allowed by the state.

They believe that only

those rights agreed to by the state exist.

Every state act

that allows a right, either actively or passively, may be
considered "state action. " 45

Thus, the entire concept of

44

These are described in detail in Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. at 581.
45

Perhaps the lead case for the Positivists is Shelley
v. Kraemer, where the Court said that "state action" would
be involved if a court upholds a private contract entered
into by private parties. Although the Court recognized a
private group's right to enter into such agreements, it
could not judicially uphold discriminatory agreements.
Shelley broke the wall of "state action," blurring the clear
distinction of what is a private act and what is a public
one. The Positivists had their case on which to rely.
See
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1(1948), overturning Corrigan
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"state action" is contrived and not useful. 46
While some legal scholars have written that the "state
action" notion is not useful and should be discarded, it
should be noted that the notion serves an important
function.

"State action" prevents the government from

creeping into a person's private domain.
"public/private distinction. " 47

It preserves the

It is not suggested that

private homes should become imbued with a public character.
The Constitution was not written for private homes and
should not be applied to them.

But, when a private

institution such as a school takes on a public character and
goes beyond the norm for public institutions, then one must
question whether these schools are truly free of these
important and ennobling constitutional norms. 48

The

significant point is that one may maintain the
"public/private distinction" while abandoning "state

v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926) (private discriminatory
agreements are beyond the arm of the law for lack of "state
action").
46

Paul Brest, "State Action and Liberal Theory, " 13 O
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1296 (1982).
47

48

Id. at 1302.

Charles Black, "Foreword: "State Action, " Equal
Protection, and California's Proposition 14, 81 Harvard Law
Review 69, 95 (1967).
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action."
One may abandon the "state action" requirement by
looking at the substance of the claim.

When claims are made

against private institutions, courts should look at the

content of the claim, not the person of the claim.

In this

way, a state fulfills its responsibility to protect a
citizen from deprivation at the hands of another. 49
Concurrently, the competing rights of private persons and
institutions can be weighed fairly.

The state will not

always be the violator of fundamental fairness and the
individual, the victim, with no legal redress for lack of
"state action."

"State action" would not be invoked to keep

the courts away from reaching an equitable resolution of
"private" litigation.

Private school students would then be

entitled to "due process" rights as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Other approaches were described to show the interest
and connection between the state and private schools.

In

this way, the presence of "state action" is evident, and the
Fourteenth Amendment protections would apply.

One approach

applied the Child Benefit theory to the "state action"
49

See Kenneth L. Karst and Howard W. Horowitz, "Reitman
v. Mulkey: A Telophase of Substantive Equal Protection,"
1967 Supreme Court Review 39, 55.
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notion.

This theory allows states to provide certain

benefits to children in religious schools without
confronting the constitutionally mandated separation of
Church and State. 50

Another benefit that could be brought

to the children within this theory is that of fundamental
fairness.

Just as the state provides busing for students to

religious schools, it was shown that the state may demand
that these schools provide their students with "due
process."

Further, the Supreme Court has ruled that the

state may require an acceptable level of quality
education; 51 it follows that it may require the school to
follow certain norms of dignity.
process."

Also,

These norms include "due

just as education prepares students for

their future role as wage earners, and the state has
legitimate controls over all education, including private,
so should education prepare students for proper citizenship.
A key tile in the American mosaic of citizenship is
fundamental fairness.

Inasmuch as experience is the best

teacher, the best way to learn fairness is to experience it
in school.

Accordingly, it seems wholly within the state's

right to demand of private schools to provide "due process"
50

See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).

51

See Wisconsin v.

Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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for their students before imposing disciplinary action.
This is most appropriate for private schools that teach the
Constitution itself, and that aspire to teach patriotism and
respect for the American way.
Another attempt at showing the presence of "state
action" even in private schools is the close comparison
between states and schools.

Just as states control the

lives of their citizens, so do schools control their
students.

The same protections afforded citizens to prevent

the state from taking advantage of them should be afforded
private school children as well.

The power invested in the

state that was restrained by the Constitution is similar to
the power of the school over its students.

The school,

public or private, should follow the same requirements for
fairness as the state.
The conclusion to draw from this chapter is that the
"state action" notion is not clear, nor does it guide us
toward legal certainty.

It should, therefore, be abandoned

in favor of merit-based decisions that balance legitimate
private concerns.

Once this abandonment is accomplished,

there is no doctrine to prevent us from applying the
constitutional right to "due process" in non-public schools.
All students would benefit equally and identically from the
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right to fundamental fairness before being deprived of the
great benefit of education.
Recommendations for Further Research
There are several additional approaches to inaugurating
"due process" in private schools that should be researched
in depth.

This study researched constitutional theories,

theories affecting the constitutional right to "due

i.e.,

process" and the requirement for "state action."

Another

study is needed to research non-constitutional theories that
might bring the entitlement for "due process" to the private
school student's door.
1.

Fiduciary Rights Theory: A fiduciary relationship

is one in which there is a confidence and trust between two
parties.

If one party reasonably reposes confidence in the

fidelity and integrity of another, a fiduciary relation
exists.

If confidence is lacking, but one party dominates

another, then, too, a fiduciary relation may be present. 52
The nature of the relationship assumes that the
fiduciary can succeed in exercising undue selfish influence
over the entrusting party.

This influence is sufficient

reason for courts to impose special standards of conduct on

52

Higgins v.

Chicago Title and Trust Co.,

143 N.E. 482, 484 (1924).

312 Ill. 11,
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the fiduciary.

The fiduciary has the burden of proving the

validity, fairness, and reasonableness of any transaction
involving the subject matter of the confidence. 53
All of these elements appear present in the studentschool relation.

It is an act of confidence and trust for

the student to be placed under the tutelage of the school.
The value of the school experience is a direct result of the
conscientiousness and faithful performance of school
officials.

The examination process discloses the students'

levels of knowledge as they repose confidence in the
teachers' abilities to interpret the evaluations and plan
appropriate educational programs.
Professor Seavy described the relationship between
students and their schools as fiduciary.

"Since schools

exist primarily for the education of their students, it is
obvious that ... administrators act in a fiduciary capacity
with reference to the students. " 54

Accordingly, the burden

is upon the school officials to prove that they have dealt
fairly and reasonably with the students.

School

administrators, regardless of the public/private nature of
53

Johnson v. Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Co.,

159 F.

Supp. 104, 118-19 n.9 (W.D. La. 1958).
54

Warren Seavy, "Dismissal of Students: Due Process, "
70 Harvard Law Review 1406 (1957) .
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the school, should show that they followed procedural
fairness.
2.

Contract Theory: The relationship between private

schools and their students is generally seen as based on
contract law.ss

Most contracts represent the mutual and

voluntary undertakings of parties operating in a commercial
setting.

School contracts, on the other hand, are usually

one-sided in favor of the school.

From the student's

perspective, these contracts may be seen as "adhesion
contracts.

1156

A study should be conducted on using the

significant difference in power as a basis for creating
special rights for students.

Perhaps the school has certain

obligations to follow procedural fairness, accept upon
itself the burden of proof, and construe ambiguities in the
student's favor.
3.

Implied Condition of the Contract Theory: This

theory suggests that there are certain procedures that have
developed to the point of becoming the "standard of the

ssDixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 294 F. 2d
150 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961)
56

An adhesion contract is "a contract that is so
restrictive of one side, while so non-restrictive of
another, that doubts arise as to its representation as a
voluntary and uncoerced agreement." Gifis's Law Dictionary
12 (1984) .
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industry."

As such, they may be required of all schools,

private and public, regardless of where and how they began.
Procedural fairness may be one of these standards.

If so,

private school parents may presume that this standard will
be fulfilled as part of the contract between the family and
the school.

Moreover, the entire legal distinction between

public and private schools may be unknown or insignificant
to the parents and students.

They may expect the same

freedoms and rights on private campuses as they would enjoy
on public ones. 57

The legal significance of these

parental- and student-implied rights and expectations should
be studied further.

Procedural fairness may be seen as

required in private schools.
4.

A Comparison to Other Countries: This study's

historical review of the development of governmental "due
process" began in England with the Magna Charta.

It would

be interesting to study the Laws of England to learn what
procedural rights have developed in that country that affect
private individuals and institutions.

Perhaps we should

glean from the English jurisprudential experience once
again.

57

See Note, "Developments - - Academic Freedom,
Harvard Law Review 1045, 1151 (1968).

11

81
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In addition, it would be enlightening to see what
private rights are being accorded in the newly-developing
democratic countries.

As the countries of the former Soviet

Union develop their own constitutions and statements of
rights, what are they guaranteeing their private citizens
and institutions?

Is there something to be gained from

their legal analyses that is meaningful for us?
In addition to an inquiry into theories that would
muster procedural fairness for private school students,
other questions emerge from the current work that are worthy
of study.
5.

What are the particularly religious values that are

part of the milieu of religious private schools?

Would

these values support or suppress the acceptance of
procedural fairness within the religious school?

Are

religious school administrators more or less willing to
incorporate procedural fairnesses in their schools?

How

does this willingness differ from that of principals in
secular private schools?

Are there significant differences

in implementation of procedural fairnesses based on
ideological differences within the various religious
denominations?
6.

What do the parents feel regarding the
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incorporation of procedural fairnesses within the private
school's discipline code?

Do they prefer a liberal,

student-centered code, or are they more concerned with
providing their administrators with free reign of the
students and unquestioned authority?

Is there a difference

in parent feeling based on the perceived authoritarian
nature of the denomination?
parents of boys?

Do parents of girls differ from

Is there a significant difference in

response between ethnic groups?
"recidivists"

Are parents of

(students who have faced disciplinary action

several times and are quite familiar with "the system") more
likely to prefer new, more fair procedures?
7.

After procedural fairness has been incorporated in

a school, it would be useful to study several claims made by
this study.

For example, are the students learning and

appreciating civic responsibility on a higher level?

Have

they learned from the experiences of procedural fairness?
Is there a heightened awareness of self-control and
accepting of personal responsibility for oneself?

Are there

less hostile and violent acts as a result of greater
administrative fairness than before and in comparable
schools?

Do the answers to these questions change as more

"due process" is provided?
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8.

Is there greater satisfaction in private schools

that provide ''due process" than schools that do not?
school climate significantly different?

Is the

Are the parents

more satisfied with the discipline in the school with the
inclusion of procedural fairness?
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